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The Mahābhārata describes itself as both a comprehensive and exhaustive text, 
incorporating a range of genres while presenting diverse perspectives through a matrix of 
interacting narratives. Its main story and subtales are the subject of productive 
contemporary studies that underscore the significance of the Sanskrit epic, though this 
scholarship is also famously criticized for overlooking literary inquiry. The following 
dissertation enacts a close reading of four subtales, Nala’s Tale, Rāma’s Tale, Sāvitrī’s 
Tale, and The Yakṣa’s Questions, in context with the larger work to uncover the 
implications of a literary study of the Mahābhārata. By conducting translations of 
passages from the epic, this dissertation builds sites of alliance among frame and subtale, 
literary and translation theory, critical analysis and contemporary scholarship, as well as 
the Mahābhārata and other works of literature in order to consider the ways in which 
meaning is generated throughout the text. Language, constituent parts, and operative 
principles are found to reverberate in the epic, eschewing didacticism and stasis for 
literary vitality. Themes of loss, love, disguise, and discovery veer throughout the 
 vi 
subtales as sideshadows that at once collaborate and contradict to continuously redefine 
one another. The Mahābhārata’s self-conscious and reiterative reinterpretation of its own 
constructs presents critical insights on translation as dialogical correspondence, occurring 
within utterances as well as between languages. The act of translation, utilized by the 
poem itself to develop and proliferate significance, reveals difference and bears legibility 
within the epic. 
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 1 
Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
I can’t help but dream about a kind of criticism that would try not to judge 
but to bring an oeuvre, a book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light 
fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind, and catch the sea foam in 
the breeze and scatter it. It would multiply not judgements but signs of 
existence; it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. Perhaps it 
would invent them sometimes—all the better. All the better. Criticism that 
hands down sentences sends me to sleep; I’d like a criticism of 
scintillating leaps of the imagination. It would not be sovereign or dressed 
in red. It would bear the lightning of possible storms. (Michel Foucault, 
“The Masked Philosopher”) 
 
 
WHAT IS HERE IS FOUND ELSEWHERE 
 
Aftershocks from Alf Hiltebeitel’s 1999 claim that “the largest inadequacy of 
Maha ̄bhārata scholarship is simply the failure to appreciate the epic as a work of 
literature” continue to be felt in the academic community to this day.1 The statement calls 
on scholars to reexamine those foundations upon which many contemporary inquiries 
reside. How, then, were these verses considered? What success might scholarship achieve 
in adopting a new perspective? If we are to occupy a more fitting space, each tectonic 
                                                
1  For evidence of the anxiety that follows Hiltebeitel’s proclamation, see its frequent citation in Hudson 
2013, Fraizer 2011, Brodbeck and Black 2007, Fitzgerald 2003. 
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movement that comes to bear upon our present understanding of the epic must be 
reexamined so that scholarship might veer toward an ethic that has come to characterize 
other literary scholars working in the humanities.   
And if our ground shakes, let it all fall apart. A study of the Maha ̄bhārata as 
literature should cause us to interrogate the process of scholarship in this particular mode. 
What does it mean to study something as “literature?” Surely the Maha ̄bhārata as 
presented in the critical edition is ink and page and plot and character. Should this allow 
us to presume that it is literature – and thereby deem any type of analysis sufficient? The 
study of literature should not only shed light on the Maha ̄bhārata, but, inversely, the epic 
itself might be a productive voice in larger conversations on the state of the discipline. 
In light of Hiltebeitel’s work, some scholars of ancient South Asia are beginning 
to ask questions that hold paramount the literary nature of the text. Primacy is important 
here. We must take great care in what we choose to elevate in our study. I will argue 
throughout these pages that to consider a work as literature first demands that the scholar 
back away from a monolithic reading. Literature allows space for contradiction, change, 
multitudes, among other qualities. It veers and entangles itself, it speaks to ghosts. To 
develop our study of the Maha ̄bha ̄rata as literature first, and not dependent on historical 
theorization, is to place Sheldon Pollock’s horse back before the proverbial cart.2 
Concurring with Pollock’s argument, we should utilize and build upon theory while 
conducting literary analysis, the literature itself cannot be shoehorned to fit a particular 
                                                
2 See Pollock 2006, 33. 
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mode. We do not, then, hope to find a particular theory, or even type of theory, as 
panacea in grasping the whole of this literature.   
Instead, literary theories will serve as tools that open the text at the point at which 
a specific implement is needed most. My hope at the outset of this dissertation is to gain 
additional, and critical, entryways into the epic and better discern its design.3 To be clear, 
I agree with Hiltebeitel’s assertion that the Maha ̄bhārata as we have it in the critical 
edition represents a whole and intentionally constructed narrative.4 Reasons for adopting 
this position will become more clear throughout this study, but for now it should suffice 
to say that I believe this perspective is necessary in attempting to gain any foothold in the 
Maha ̄bhārata as it forces us as readers to take nothing in the text for granted. A slippery 
slope occurs in scholarship that cites sections of the text as incongruent with some overall 
theoretical structure, therefore inconsequential and summarily a tacked-on addition to 
some elusive epic core. 
In this introduction, I will proceed by moving backwards and considering those 
academic inquiries that have led to our current moment. I should admit here that I find 
Hiltebeitel’s statement at the start of this section productively provocative, but in need of 
some qualification. My inspection will show that many early scholars laid important 
groundwork for the literary study of the Maha ̄bhārata. Nevertheless, discord between 
literary scholars and those who study the Maha ̄bhārata exists, and we mean to 
understand why. 
 
                                                
3 See Bowles 2009 for Mbh and design. 
4 See Hiltebeitel 2001, 2005. 
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF RECENT MAHĀBHĀRATA SCHOLARSHIP 
 
Beginning in the late nineteenth century, the Maha ̄bhārata becomes a consistent 
object of inquiry for academics interested in South Asia. We can discern four distinct 
turns in the development of modern Maha ̄bhārata studies, specifically in regard to 
scholars’ attitudes toward the literary nature of the epic: historical, rhetorical, literary, 
and contextual. The historical approach draws upon constituent parts of the text in order 
to place it within a periodized mapping of Sanskrit composition. Rhetorical analyses 
consider linguistic and stylistic choices in developing a reading of the text. The literary 
approach works to uncover the interplay between generic and rhetorical qualities of a 
whole text in relation to the larger landscape of literary analysis. And finally, a contextual 
methodology returns to constituents in order to conduct close inspection in light of 
literary analysis. To set the ground for the initial historical phase, I will commence by 
considering the work of Winternitz and Hopkins. In the mid-twentieth century, a second 
period of scholarship, placing precedence on rhetorical elements, emerges through the 
work of van Buitenen, Ramanujan, and Brockington. The third stage, while building upon 
previous studies, illustrates a literary perspective in studies by Biardeau and Hiltebeitel 
around the turn of the millennium. A final phase will consider those more recent scholars 
who work in the aftermath of Hiltebeitel’s Rethinking the Maha ̄bhārata, utilizing 
contextual forms of analysis. This is not, of course, an exhaustive list of scholars who 
made significant contributions to the academic study of the epic. Additional scholars will 
be mentioned below. These figures, however, represent shifting attitudes and perspectives 
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on the work over time and usher in the historical, rhetorical, literary, and contextual. 
Furthermore, by responding to and anticipating those attitudes and perspectives of 
adjacent phases, these four perspective trends should not be considered monolithic, but 
necessarily hybrid. 
The earliest period of contemporary Maha ̄bhārata scholarship is characterized by 
analyses that operate from an understanding of the epic as exhibiting a distinct lack of 
design. Thinkers here regarded the epic as a “literary monster” (Winternitz 1908, 326), 
“monstrous chaos” (Oldenberg 1922, 1), and “a text that is not a text” (Hopkins 1901, 1). 
Such statements underpin a prevailing perspective that held the epic as an amalgam of 
thrown-together narratives. We must recognize and promptly interrogate the desire of 
those scholars in constructing an elaborate framework in which the text is often bent and 
broken apart in order to fit. This, once again, is the type of mistake recognized by 
Sheldon Pollock in 2006 that allows a theory of literature to reign over what might be 
present in the work itself. More specifically, I will show that these scholars placed two 
concerns over all else: issues of periodization and genre. That is to say, the establishment 
of a consistent timeline in some historical context along with a name to categorize the 
style of the narrative in comparison to other Sanskrit works appears paramount within 
these studies. Though generative in its own right, we find that blind spots occur in 
ignoring the Maha ̄bhārata as primarily an act of literature. 
Through the historical approach, periodization and genre become congruent 
concerns with interdependent fates in Winternitz’s 1908 History of Indian Literature. A 
mapping of the development of an epic genre allows the scholar to make certain claims as 
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to the overall historical context of the Maha ̄bhārata. He identifies gāthā nārāśaṃsī or 
“songs in praise of men” as a precursor category of text, alongside Itihāsas and Purāṇas, 
that would eventually evolve into epic. 
These “songs in praise of men” probably soon developed into epic poems of 
considerable length, i.e. heroic songs, and into entire cycles of epic songs, 
centring around one hero or one great event; for the only two national epics which 
have come down to us, the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa, represent but the last 
remnants of a long past period of epic poetry. Long before these two epics existed 
as such, songs must have been sung of the great combat of nations around which 
the Mahābhārata centres, and of the deeds of Rāma, the hero of the Rāmāyaṇa. 
Neither is it conceivable that the battles of the Kauravas and Pāṇḍavas and the 
adventures of Rāma should have been the only subjects of poetry. Many other 
heroes and great events in other royal houses also must have been sung. These old 
heroic songs, whose existence we must take for granted, have not all vanished 
without trace; in remnants and fragments some of them have been preserved in 
our two epics. (Winternitz 1908, 314) 
In a single move, Winternitz demonstrates that an understanding of the text’s genre, and 
thereby its antecedents, permits a theoretical narrative to flourish around the text’s 
historical development. His timeline, in which “songs in praise of men” become “heroic 
songs,” then “cycles of epic song,” and finally epic “remnants” as we have them in the 
Mahābhārata, presents a type of chronicle in which we can view an evolutionary model 
in the creation of the text. From there, Winternitz is able to posit further details as to the 
way in which these works were transmitted and altered over time. Even the space 
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inhabited by the text, facilitated by court singers aligned with the warrior class can be 
divined from the particular progression of generic textual qualities.5 
What renders the Mahābhārata as a “remnant” of this literary development for 
Winternitz is the incorporation of additional genres in a seemingly haphazard fashion. 
The fortitude of that original genealogy is compromised by the introduction of other 
types of poetry – to such a degree that it leads the scholar to question the poem’s 
congruence with an “epic” genre designation. 
But what we know as the popular epics of the Indians, the Mahābhārata and the 
Rāmāyaṇa, are not the old heroic songs as those court-singers and travelling 
minstrels of ancient India sang them, compiled into unified poems by great poets 
or at least by clever collectors with some talent for poetry, but accumulations of 
very diverse poems of unequal value, which have arisen in the course of centuries 
owing to continual interpolations and alterations. Though ancient heroic songs do 
indeed form the nucleus of both these works, the more devotional Itihāsa 
literature was included in them to a great extent, and such long poems of a 
religious-didactic nature were inserted, that the Mahābhārata, in particular, has 
almost completely lost the character of an epic. (Winternitz 1908, 316) 
The type of nucleus theory advanced here is important, and will play a major part in the 
work of subsequent scholars. What emerges is a desire to find some source or name a true 
Mahābhārata over its unnecessary parts. For Winternitz, the core Mahābhārata is 
discernible through a comprehensive understanding of the genre formations in Sanskrit 
poetry. The corruption of courtly epic, which seems to refer to the epic cycle stage above 
and is the height of the genre, leads to a new type of text altogether, which Winternitz 
designates as its own “whole literature” (Winternitz 1908, 316) and a “repertory of the 
                                                
5 Winternitz 1908, 315. 
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whole of old bard poetry” (Winternitz 1908, 318). Indeed, Winternitz seems to create a 
category superstructure for the Mahābhārata in which a host of genres might 
simultaneously subsist. Despite categorizing the epic as an amalgam, the scholar still 
identifies certain pieces as part of some singular true core. Winternitz goes on to map out 
particular regions of the text as aligned with his conceptions of the original genre and 
therefore an older core, elevating the narratives focused on the Pāṇḍavas while setting 
aside “everything that has no reference to the principal narrative” (Winternitz 1908, 328), 
including subtales. Winternitz surmises that lost within the “wild undergrowth” 
(Winternitz 1908, 321) we might find “epics within the epic” (Winternitz 1908, 381), 
suggesting that generic designations might permit the reader to reaffirm an epic quality 
within, but not encompassing, the text. 
E. Washburn Hopkins more explicitly maps out his historical approach to the 
Mahābhārata. It is worth noting that Hopkins looks to make room for the text itself to 
speak first in attempting to devise a theoretical construct, at least in name here.   
The best way, of course, to take up the historical investigation of a literary 
product the origin of which is well known is to begin with the source and 
afterwards to study the character of the completed whole. But if the origin be 
unknown, and we wish to discover it, we must invert the process, and begin our 
examination of the character of the work. When the results of our analysis become 
plain, we may group together those elements which appear to have existed from 
the first, and thus, on the basis of analysis, reconstruct the past. (Hopkins 1901, 
vii) 
Hopkins’ analysis proceeds as planned. He begins his study by outlining those Sanskrit 
works and philosophical schools of thought that may have been known to authors of the 
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Mahābhārata. This contextual foregrounding allows the scholar to identify strands of 
thought and literary qualities that might be factors in the epic’s construction. 
Concurrently, Hopkins inspects the style of poetry found in the epic in order to identify 
types of verse that might precede it. More accurately, multiple styles of writing are 
categorized within the epic in order to suggest discordant conglomeration of different 
modes of writing.6 Something that might more fittingly inhabit the designated genre is 
then found hidden within the text, as Hopkins explains that “[t]races of epic poetry within 
the early poem cannot be disregarded” (367). Unearthed “traces” of a core epic allow 
Hopkins to construct a periodization schema in which tribal (here Kuru) communities 
gave way to later additions, interpolations, and poetic corruptions. Through Hopkins’ 
theory, the above mentioned “monstrous” designation of the Mahābhārata is the result of 
an evolving genealogy of writing and thought that is stuck together with poor patchwork.7 
Advancing now to our second phase, van Buitenen’s 1972 essay, “On the 
Structure of the Sabhāparvan of the Mahābhārata,” breaks down the events of the epic’s 
second book in order to better derive the structural intention of the text, particularly those 
puzzling final moments of the dicing game. Through this rhetorical approach, van 
Buitenen struggles with apparent feelings of discord in the book’s closing event when 
compared to the rest of the text’s description of Yudhis ̣ṭhira’s ascent to the throne. More 
specifically, he asks why the dice game would occur at this particular juncture. To 
uncover this final problem, however, van Buitenen begins at the start of the book. 
                                                
6 Hopkins 1901, 232-233. 
7 See Hopkins 1901, 368-370. Particularly, “we may expect to find that the tale, as a tale, is full of the 
grossest incongruities; for to fulfill its encyclopedic character all is fish that comes to the net, and scarcely 
an attempt is made to smooth away any save the most glaring inconsistencies. Tale is added to tale, 
doctrine to doctrine, without much regard to the effect produced by the juxtaposition.” 
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Beyond observations, he breaks down key plot elements in order to display their logical 
development.8 This mode lays groundwork for a deeper inspection of structure within the 
epic. 
We might note from the start here van Buitenen’s reluctance to disregard points of 
potential misfit in order to produce a productive and comprehensive reading. Allowing all 
evidence within the text to weigh equally, van Buitenen then develops a structural model 
that might help elucidate the second book.9 Once able to discard the notion that labels 
events in the text as “meandering improvisation” (van Buitenen 1972, 82), the scholar 
goes on to make some pronouncements upon that final dicing game. He surmises that the 
dicing appears as a Vedic remnant, a lost part of the ritual that is contentiously revived. 
Once enacted, van Buitnenen states that the game’s historical precedent dictates that the 
challenge must be accepted. Furthermore, the game’s structure, consisting of two distinct 
rounds at ten throws apiece, alerts the audience to the stakes faced by the protagonist. Of 
course this raises further questions: Is this another indication that the dice game was a 
relic and even unknown to the epic’s audience? Does the Mahābhārata have to educate 
the audience on the game? The point to make here is that van Buitenen’s more expansive 
argument regarding the design of the second book clears space once again for closer 
inspection of its constituent parts. To be productive in this manner, then, we move from 
                                                
8 For instance, on page 69, van Buitenen argues that Nārada’s description of the Great Halls serves as the 
necessary impetus for Yudhis ̣t ̣hira’s desire to perform rājasūya, which sets the fateful chain of events in 
motion. 
9 For van Buitenen, the second book is a narrative representation of ritual: “the circumstances of the 
rājasūya have lent their design to the parvan as a whole that the parvan is epic dramatization of the events 
of the rājasūya.” (van Buitenen 1972, 70) 
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text to theory and back again to text.  Van Buitenen shows us that we can take little for 
granted in an analysis of the text. 
Though first written a few years preceding van Buitenen’s article, A. K. 
Ramanujan’s “Repetition in the Mahābhārata” was published over twenty years later, in 
1991. He argues that patterning and order pervade the text in everything from phrasing 
and events to character relationships.10 Ramanujan sheds light on motifs throughout the 
epic to show that “[s]uch repetitive elements foreshadow later events and recapitulate 
earlier ones” (Ramanujan 1991, 424). In this way, repetition becomes an aesthetic device. 
Internal allusions punctuate and give weight to the events and figures of the epic. 
Ramanujan interrogates van Buitenen’s notion that discernible design necessitates 
original intention by citing a later folk story that recasts the Mahābhārata’s dice game. 
According to the story, Śakuni, Yudhis ̣ṭhira’s opponent in the dice game, was imprisoned 
and starved, along with his brothers by an ancestor of the Pāṇḍavas.  Śakuni fashioned 
dice out of his brothers’ bones and vowed revenge, leading to the later events of the 
Sabhāparvan. Ramanujan here argues that later-composed events can be made to fit just 
as effectively as those within the critical Sanskrit text.11 
We should also note here that Ramanujan’s focus on repetition gives us cause to 
consider the upākhyānas, or subtales, told throughout and distinct from the central 
narrative. For instance, the story of Nala is shown to repeat several of the occurrences 
experienced by Yudhis ̣ṭhira. Ramanujan points out that Nala’s tale first serves to 
summarize Yudhis ̣ṭhira’s concurrent state as both lose their kingdom and are sent to the 
                                                
10 Ramanujan 1991, 421-422. 
11 See Ramanujan 1991, 442. 
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forest. Yudhis ̣ṭhira is then made to hear the conclusion of Nala’s, and thereby his own, 
story: the kingdom regained. 
Thus, these scores of tales that seem to interrupt the main action have a narrative 
function. They are performative, i.e. they too are acts, not merely explanations. 
They add the vector of past and precedent to present and future. (Ramanujan 
1991, 427) 
Ramanujan argues that repetition is not only necessary for the epic’s audience, but also to 
propel events within the narrative. Discrete parts of the text are recast through 
Ramanujan’s work as integral rather than poorly stitched.   
J. L. Brockington’s extensive study of The Sanskrit Epics might provide further 
insight on the congruencies and disagreements found in this second phase of scholarship. 
His task is more Herculean, tackling both the Mahābhārata and the Rāmāyaṇa in total. 
Such scope seems to prohibit the scholar from more finely-grained analysis, working 
with larger concepts in regard to both epics. While concurring with Ramanujan’s 
assertions on structural unity within the epic through recurring patterns, he nonetheless 
relegates repetition to a function of oral recitation.12 Brockington organizes his study 
through more general observations of major themes, for instance providing a list of fauna 
found in the Āraṇyakaparvan,13 useful more for reference than for developing further 
understanding of the text. Nonetheless, there are moments in which the influence of 
preceding studies shine through. Brockington takes the notion of repetition and structure 
a step beyond earlier scholars by illustrating instances of “bracketing” (Brockington 
1998, 115) as an aesthetic device within the text. The study plots out verses that contain a 
                                                
12 Brockington 1997, 115. 
13 Brockington 1997, 192-195. 
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fixed first and fourth pāda, while the second and third display variation. Though 
bracketing is explained as a later addition to the text, we should note that the basis 
through which Brockington determines the younger and older layers of the epic is unclear 
at times.14 
Additionally, Brockington’s study discounts the relevance of the upākhyānas 
within the epic. Nala’s tale is only referred to insofar as it provides some insight into the 
nature of marriage as imagined by the text,15 though we should note that Brockington 
finds agreement between Nala’s presentation of matrimony and that of the central 
narrative. If we already have suspicion to categorize this work as a swerve away from the 
more literary-minded analysis found earlier in this second phase, evidence solidifying this 
designation might be found in Brockington’s theory on the development of the epic. 
According to him, the Mahābhārata underwent four stages of development: the basic 
story, the introduction of mythology, brāhmanization, and, finally, commitment to 
writing.16 Through this historical construction, which Brockington deploys early on to 
color the rest of his study, the perspective on the epic is more aligned with those earlier 
encyclopedic notions found in the first phase of scholarship rather than a literary 
production. 
Madeleine Biardeau’s Le Mahābhārata might represent the start of our third 
phase, often considered foundational for an expressly literary understanding of the text, 
though Biardeau largely sided with notions around a primarily oral epic. Biardeau’s 
                                                
14 Brockington concludes his discussion of bracketing by stating: “The lateness of these passages is 
unmistakable and points toward written composition as well as transmission” (1998, 116). This conclusion 
appears based on comparison with other later Sanskrit texts, but it is not substantiated. 
15 Brockington 1997, 219. 
16 Brockington 1997, 20. 
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undertaking in this text is enormous, first exploring the epic’s context in preceding Vedic 
works through Aśoka before addressing, book by book, major incidents of the epic. Each 
section is given summary retelling, followed by substantial commentary on its import and 
design. Through this method, Biardeau creates more extensively and accessibly a literary 
analysis of the epic. Clearly influencing Hiltebeitel here, the subtale and main story 
relationship in Nala becomes a “récit-miroir” (Biardeau 2002, 482), in which characters 
and values are given further dimension. The latter, for Biardeau, is the crux of the tale as 
she argues that complexity in the term dharma underscores its importance for the hero to 
grasp in order to succeed in the climax of the epic. Looking ahead to the Great War as 
predicated upon a multifaceted dharma, such conflict could only be expressed by 
intermingling the subtale with the main story. Biardeau reads Nala as integral to the epic 
in a purposefully cryptic way.17 We can see the relationships between Hiltebeitel and 
Biardeau’s work here as both find the text’s vitality within seemingly disparate sections. 
But they differ, too, in that Biardeau looks to grand structure as an end in itself while 
Hiltebeitel is more occupied with those details that are cast in new light, as are 
Ramanujan and van Buitenen. 
The linchpin study in our brief history of scholarship that comes to define our 
third phase, Alf Hiltebitel’s Rethinking the Mahābhārata adopts as its banner the literary 
analysis of the epic. His inquiry proceeds with deliberate and deep readings of events in 
the text – thereby placing that horse first in order to arrive at issues that might encircle 
the narrative. For example, Hiltebeitel explores the introductory frame as aesthetically 
                                                
17 Biardeau 2002, 502. 
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pertinent and ideologically relevant for the whole text. Through the story’s reduplicated 
primary presentation, told at the Naimiṣa forest and Janamejaya’s court, Hiltebeitel 
uncovers a pattern that supports the epic’s self-identification as the whole of thought18 
and “déjà écouté” (Hiltebeitel 2001, 104). 
Hiltebeitel expands upon the perspective of literary analysis by employing context 
as intertextual factor rather than guiding theory, with Alexander and Aśoka as directly 
preceding elements.19 By advancing a date of conception between the mid-second century 
BCE and the year zero, however, Hiltebeitel does not argue for a hidden-core or 
evolutionary text, but rather the invention of an entirely unique epic genre.20 
Furthermore, he identifies those contested key concepts, most notably dharma but also 
karma and kāla, that pervade and surround the Mahābhārata.21 But Hiltebeitel finds their 
unity in difference here, stating that a singular truth would negate the epic’s own literary 
nature. 
The palpable tension between contingency and determinism opens the field of 
narrative possibilities. At every point we are given the possibility of many stories. 
No story is ever the whole story. Every version has another version. Every 
outcome has multiple fatalities behind it. The stories that heroes and heroines hear 
are sideshadows of their own. (Hiltebeitel 2001, 38) 
Where others cite incongruity, Hiltebeitel argues integrity. Echoes of van Buitenen and 
Ramanujan can be felt here as little is taken for granted and space is cleared for a deeper 
analysis of the text. 
                                                
18 Mbh 1.56.33 
19 Hiltebeitel 2001, 16. 
20 Hiltebeitel 2001, 19. 
21 Hiltebeitel 2001, 39. 
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Most notable, then, is Hiltebeitel’s treatment of Nala’s Tale. We are led by the 
hand through the subtale here, with those major pronouncements of the text in the 
background, free to make closer observations. At the outset, parallels in character traits 
alert us to consider the correspondence between tale and main story. Nala is portrayed in 
connection to both Arjuna and Yudhis ̣ṭhira, while Damayantī displays parallels to 
Draupadī. Thereby, Hiltebeitel brings new dimension to the dice match by noting that 
Yudhis ̣ṭhira’s act in staking his wife goes unmatched in Nala’s version of events. This 
dissonance, rather, places the text in greater harmony as Hiltebeitel argues that the 
sideshadow subtale serves to extend an ideological theme of the epic by once again 
confronting Yudhis ̣ṭhira with Draupadī’s question.22 The events of the subtale are then 
contrasted as a romantic recasting of the main story, created by the authors of the epic 
specifically to provide incongruous fit. Hiltebeitel presents Nala’s tale as a deeply 
embedded portion of a single narrative. 
 Hiltebeitel’s chief interlocutor following the publication of Rethinking the 
Mahābhārata, James L. Fitzgerald, is generally unconvinced by the study’s arguments 
toward the epic’s deliberateness and design. For Fitzgerald, the Sanskrit work contains 
far too many discordant tones to come together fully. But the counterpoints seem to 
require some finessing. For example, Fitzgerald subtly repositions Hiltebeitel’s 
perspective on the Mahābhārata as literature to “The Mahābhārata as Fiction” 
(Fitzgerald 2003, 806) as a straw man to debase the breadth of the original argument.   
                                                
22 Hiltebeitel 2001, 219 and 226.  At the end of the Sabhāparvan, Draupadī asks her husband whether he 
staked himself or her first in the dicing match, to which Yudhis ̣t ̣hira provides no reply. The question, 
argued here (240) and elsewhere (Hiltebeitel 2000) becomes a major catalyzing moment for the epic. 
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It could be fruitful to approach every aspect of the text as being, possibly, a 
contingent invention designed for some specific artistic purpose, but not all 
elements of the MBh were designed with the same degree of artistic purpose and 
freedom; and at the other end of the spectrum, some portions of the text (such as 
the Mokṣadharmaparvan) seem clearly to have been used as convenient 
containers for the preservation and transmission of text and passages deemed 
important independently of and prior to their introduction into the MBh.  Some 
parts of the text Hiltebeitel examines closely in this book (e.g. Nala, Dharma’s 
tests of Yudhiṣṭhira, the Śuka story at 12.310-20) are good examples of passages 
that do exhibit an inventive freedom suggestive of “fiction.”  (Fitzgerald 2003, 
807) 
Categorically reducing the discursive possibilities of the text’s genre here, Fitzgerald 
believes that the type of inventiveness required for this mode of writing can only extend 
so far. A theory of an encyclopedic text is advanced through the basis of oral narration. 
The differentiation of “main” Mahābhārata, which might concur with earlier 
periodization, from later interpolated pieces of text, is advanced mostly out of the 
scholar’s disbelief at the possibility of coordinated and complex construction.23 Instead, 
Fitzgerald advocates for an “excavationist” approach that seeks to organize, sort, and 
name divergent parts of the whole text in order to arrive at its evolutionary process of 
development.   
 In its most recent contextual phase, Mahābhārata scholarship might be defined by 
an outgrowth of productive dialogue based on the contention of the preceding phase. For 
example, Georg von Simson’s 2005 essay, “The Nalopākhyāna as a Calendar Myth,” 
more explicitly considers the aesthetic connections between subtale and main story than 
                                                
23 Fitzgerald 2003, 812: “-but I have difficulty in imagining a committee of poets jointly inventing such a 
complex and ingenious connected narrative and at the same time allowing itself such ‘loose joins.’” 
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earlier studies. Von Simson uncovers botanical and astrological significances throughout 
the upākhyāna, without advancing a drastic new conception of the text. Instead, these 
connections appear mainly to enhance the narrative and illustrate the poetic skill of the 
authors. Von Simson’s major contention is that the year myth uncovers further 
“parallelism” (von Simson 2005, 113) between Nala and the main narrative. He surmises 
that these threads might account for some pre-Mahābhārata trope that pervade both 
subtale and main story.  Starting from, but ultimately disagreeing with, Biardeau’s 
notions of the Nalopa ̄khya ̄na as a mirror story, von Simson contends that focus on 
keystone concepts such as dharma and kingship distorts the subtale, which has more of 
“a fairy-tale atmosphere” (von Simson 2005, 132). By illustrating etymological 
connections between character names and specific plant life, von Simson shows that the 
authors evoke the particular time period that such a plant might flourish.  For example, 
Puṣkara, Nala’s opponent in the dice match, is related to the lotus, which grows in 
autumn.  As the reed,24 Nala loses his kingdom to the lotus, which indicates the 
transference from rainy season to fall. Yudhis ̣ṭhira’s tour of the sacred fords, which 
follows the telling of Nala’s tale, similarly indicates the passing of the monsoons into 
autumn as the area is associated with Brahmā as Puṣkara.25 Notable for our purposes, von 
Simson does not claim this reading as foundational to an understanding of the text. 
Rather, we can intimate poetic flourishes and moments of skill in writing that pervade 
                                                
24 von Simson disagrees with Biardeau and Hiltebeitel’s assertation that Nala is meant to signify Nara 
(man) and instead illustrates an interpretation of Nala as nala (reed).  Nevertheless, von Simson agrees with 
Nala’s correspondence to Yud ̣is ̣t ̣hira and Arjuna. 
25 von Simson 2005, 115. 
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main story and tale.26 The poetic undertones, therefore, suggest further methods of entry 
into the narrative. 
 In a fundamental attempt to revive the first phase of scholarship,27 Michael Witzel 
produced a comparative study on epic and Vedic literature, which takes as its starting 
point the idea that the epic provides narrative flourishes to the skeletal stories presented 
in the Vedas.28 By surveying the differences between these texts, Witzel uncovers some 
contemporary politics. For example, the division of an epic lunar and solar dynasty from 
a more unified Vedic genealogy signals a changing landscape, which is made to include 
heretofore unknown peoples.29 Witzel surmises that the historical moment for these 
changes likely occurred around the year 100 CE, diverging slightly from the models put 
forth in the third phase. By viewing the Mahābhārata as a sponge of a text, growing out 
of the Vedas by incorporating the shifting social conditions of its context, and agreeing 
here with Fitzgerald, Witzel calls for the narrative to be “mined and utilized” (Witzel 
2005, 70) in order to better understand the surrounding world during the epic’s creation 
and development.   
Adam Bowles’ 2009 study, Framing Bhīṣma’s Royal Instruction, tackles the often 
easily differentiated didactic portion of the text.  For our purposes, the subject of whether 
Bowles provides reason to perceive the interconnection of the post-War material is not 
the point – although he does, particularly through a deep reading of character traits and 
                                                
26 von Simson 2005, 133. 
27 See below and Hiltebeitel 2012. 
28 Witzel 2005, 21. 
29 Witzel 2005, 43-54. 
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their positions in the didactic sections which recall previous dialogues.30 Instead, most 
fruitful for our purposes is the way in which Bowles frames the debate. By calling for an 
inspection of “design,” Bowles incorporates earlier concerns with repetition, structure, 
difference, and function into a more unified perspective. Noting that even Hiltebeitel and 
his critics can agree when conceiving of the epic as a work of intentional design, Bowles 
states that “the days of the ‘pseudo-epic’ are fast being left behind” (Bowles 2009, 124). 
 
THE MONSTER AND THE CRITICS 
 
Adam Bowles might be onto something here. But we can nevertheless observe 
that distinct phases of scholarship on the epic co-mingle with, resuscitate, and build upon 
previous work. More recently, Hiltebeitel notes that remnants of Hopkins’ method of 
mining the text have found new life through studies by Witzel and Fitzgerald.31 My hope 
here, then, is to provide some perspective on the landscape of theories that surround the 
Mahābhārata – and perhaps, in some sense, loosen ourselves from their grip. While there 
is much to revere in the scholarship above, these views can also shackle future readings. 
In establishing what it entails to principally consider the epic as literature, we must move 
away from readings that treat historical considerations as the only end game in a study of 
the text. Fleshing out a world around this document is compelling, but not my aim here. 
Furthermore, as a piece of literature, we will hold the epic as a unitary work with an 
                                                
30 Bowles 2009, 129. 
31 see Hiltebeitel 2012 and forthcoming. 
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intentional design, not because it has been well argued in the past, though I believe it has, 
but because it is the only way to achieve any comprehensive reading of this work. To 
delineate some core or more true sections of the text is simply to limit our own ability to 
view what might be present in the poem. A critical approach that primarily considers a 
text as a work of literature develops productive reading of its material without relying 
chiefly on periodization or a well-understood process of authorial creation. But that is not 
to say that we have arrived at exactly what this approach to the text does or how it might 
achieve its goals. 
We might find precedent for our struggle in a 1936 lecture by J. R. R. Tolkien 
titled The Monsters and the Critics, in which the scholar argues for literary treatment in 
the study of Beowulf. Eerily familiar, Tolkien writes against “a mass of discussion and 
theory, which has in the main been directed to the origin of the story of Beowulf, or of 
the allusions to Beowulf, rather than the understanding or valuation of Beowulf as it is, 
and was made” (Tolkien 2011, 32).  He aims to move away from the historical 
considerations that have occupied scholarship toward “the actual judgements on Beowulf 
as a thing itself, as a poem, as a work of art, showing structure and motive” (Tolkien 
2011, 32). For Tolkien, and my own considerations, scholarship that employs the text for 
means outside itself is based on far too much speculation, threatening to relegate the 
material to curio.    
For the moment my point is this, and it is my main point, and the one on which I 
hope to convince you: nearly all censure, and a great deal of praise, of Beowulf, 
has been due either to believing it to be something that it is not (e.g. primitive, 
rude, or Teutonic) or to disappointment because it was not itself like something 
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else the critic would have preferred (e.g. an ancient heroic lay of slaughter and 
divided allegiances).  And this, even where the intention has been ‘pure’ criticism 
(as in the case of Ker or Chambers), and the acumen and originality displayed has 
been great, is due to a mental background due to ‘research’ - to too much 
‘research’ of the kind that is not so much criticism of the poem as mining in it. 
(Tolkien 2011, 32) 
Mining is a key term here, as we have seen it before throughout the inspection of studies 
on the Mahābhārata.32 Just as we began our discussion of the epic through geologic 
imagery, there is clearly something to be gained through a conception of the lithic text. 
Jeffrey Cohen reminds us of the correspondence between story and nature, particularly in 
regard to its durability within time. 
If narrative is a future-saturated device for artful connection-forging (that is, an 
apparatus of composition, of production), then humans are among the world’s 
most finely attuned story machines.  Only stone has fulfilled this charge with 
stauncher historical determination. (Cohen 2013) 
At the very least, we might say that the epic was carved out with stone in mind, 
particularly in the shadow of Aśoka’s preceding edicts. Furthermore, I believe that 
Tolkien’s conception of pre-literary studies of the epic is spot on. Extracting what might 
be deemed valuable rather than holding the pieces together disfigures the literature. 
Tolkien additionally points to scholarly expectation of the text, indicating that difficulty 
in generically aligning Beowulf with other pieces of literature adversely affects its 
reading. When scholars experience similar difficulties within the Mahābhārata, the trend 
is to once again extract portions of the story under the heading of a particular genre. By 
                                                
32 “The epic has been mined for Indo-European myth, Indo-European epic, Indo-European goddesses, non-
Indo-European goddesses, oral epic, a prior epic cycle, a pre-Brahmanic Kṣatriya tradition, an historical 
kernel; a textual kernel; the ‘old’ narrative beneath the final written ‘surface’; etc.” (Hiltebeitel 2001, 2).  
Per our correspondence, Hiltebeitel was unaware of Tolkein’s use of the term in his literary study. 
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positing some alignment between a segment of the text and another type of Sanskrit 
writing, the study often debases the writing surrounding such extractions. Tolkien might 
serve as a kind of neti neti model through which we can begin to home in on, at least, 
what a literary reading is not. Furthermore, for all the epic might be mined for, Tolkien 
reminds us that “Also it is by an author, and is a thing itself” (Tolkien 2011, 37). 
While aware of pitfalls in studies of the epic that do not attend more fully to the 
literary character of the text, we have yet to describe how to conduct proper procedure in 
this discipline. The chapters below will work to demonstrate the process of literary 
analysis in regard to understanding the Mahābhārata. I will proceed by conducting my 
own literary analysis of the epic in order to define more accurately the perspective that 
Hiltebeitel calls for in the opening of this chapter. While a strict definition might do more 
to restrict than carry my inspection at the outset, there are, nonetheless, particular 
questions to ask at the outset that might true our bearing. In an effort to better define our 
limits, how can we partition historical considerations? Tolkien might be instructive here: 
I am not trying to trace in full its history. The eye is fixed primarily on the poem 
itself, and such criticism as I notice is principally that which is still current, 
potent, and influential, and even interesting; and insofar as I allude to its history at 
all it is to point to what I think is the explanation of certain critical commonplaces 
which I attack. (Tolkien 2011, 31) 
There are two key points to comment on here. First, it is crucial that this study be 
accessible and engaging to others who concurrently study literature. Concordant with my 
reading of Tolkein here, I argue that the literary approach opens the text, rendering it 
generative for an array of approaches and disciplines, such as religion and history. This 
means, secondly, that we need to employ means of critical theory available and 
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paramount to such individuals today. Hiltebeitel demonstrates this well by engaging with 
thinkers such as Foucault and Bakhtin in his studies, but the field has grown in recent 
decades with additional modes of criticism that we should also consider in relation to this 
text. 
It is also important to note at the outset that issues of genre will play a major role 
in the proceeding literary inspection. We will not only consider the mire of consequences 
and possibilities that accompany the designation of “epic,” but the possibility of viewing 
interior genres within the work itself. This is not to extract, but to understand design. Is 
epic, as Richard Martin recently argued, and corresponding to earlier notions by 
Winternitz, a type of super-genre that contains other categories of writing within its 
binding?33 As Hiltebeitel notes, the epic itself seems to contend with multiple genres as a 
thematically consistent rhetorical device. 
The Mahābhārata differs. It has unversified inset phrases to indicate speaker 
shifts. It has multiple “chief listeners” and no one character within the main story 
who listens to the whole. And it sets off its ancillary tales both in its frontmatter 
and its framing with specific generic terms.  (Hiltebeitel 2011, 424) 
Throughout this study we will ask what might be gained by a consideration of upākhyāna 
as genre or sub-genre. On the issue of epic, Tolkien finds fault in the way that the term 
has been conceived. Perhaps we will have to re-imagine it. 
But why class ‘Beowulf’ as “epic” however conducted; and who has legislated for 
what should be the main stuff of any poem. Only, I hear, the antiquarian historian, 
who prefers semi-historical legend to folk-tale (whatever that may be) which he 
calls “wild.” (Tolkien 2011, 40) 
                                                
33 see Martin 2005. 
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The contention here alerts us to kernel theories on the Mahābhārata in which scholars 
express difficulty in allowing well-written materials to exist as literary creations. For 
Tolkien, the high-brow designation of “epic” renders the text as beyond an author’s 
control. I am not certain that I agree on this point, as the term “epic” might work toward 
the goal of making the text more accessible. The meshwork of correspondences that arise 
in imagining an epic might give us more points of entry than available otherwise when 
studying the Mahābhārata. Of course, we should not overlook the epic’s self-
designations, deftly plotted out here by Hiltebeitel: 
Most frequently, the Mahābhārata characterizes itself fourteen times as a 
‘‘narrative’’ (ākhyāna: 1.1.16a; 1.2.29b, 235c, 238a, 239b, 240b, and 241b; 
1.53.31d and 32a; 1.56.1c, 30c, 32c; 12.337.10a, 18.45.53a) and eight times as a 
‘‘history’’ (itihāsa: 1.1.17a, 24d, 52c; 1.2.237a, 1.51.16c, 1.56.18c and 19a, 
1.93.46c). But it also calls itself a work of ‘‘ancient lore’’ (purāṇa: 1.1.15b, 
1.56.15d), a ‘‘story’’ (kathā: 1.56.2a), a ‘‘collection’’ (saṃhitā: 1.1.19.1c and 
61b), a ‘‘fifth Veda’’ (1.57.74ab, 12.327.18ab), the ‘‘Veda that pertains to Kṛṣṇa’’ 
(Kāṛṣṇa Veda, probably referring primarily to Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa – 
1.1.205a, 1.56.17c), a ‘‘great knowledge’’ (mahaj-jñāna: 1.1.25b and 49a), a 
‘‘treatise’’ (śāstra: 1.56.21: indeed, in this verse a dharmaśāstra, arthaśāstra, and 
mokṣaśāstra; and probably 12.238.13c), an upaniṣad (1.1.191a), a “biography” or 
“adventure” (carita: 1.56.1d), a “victory” (jaya: 1.56.19a), and, surprisingly a 
“subtale” (upākhyāna: 1.2.236a)!  (Hiltebeitel 2005, 456) 
A fluid and hybrid self-identity within the epic might alert us to the challenges in 
attempting to name a genre for the work. But I believe it also demonstrates that questions 
of association and discernment in category are reflectively important to the text itself. By 
demonstrating difference through genres, constructed as a reciprocal dialectic, I will 
argue that the text generates meaning and conditions readings. 
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 This literary study of the Mahābhārata will focus on the historically contentious 
relationship between upākhyāna and main narrative in order to understand how these 
distinct pieces might be conceived as symbiotic. Taking a cue here from K. R. Norman, 
we will attempt to move beyond simply what is being said in order to query how the text 
creates meaning.34 Though ours is not philological in nature, this study will similarly 
consider those nuts and bolts of language that might shed light on questions of design. 
The subtales, which interrupt the main story on roughly 67 separate occasions, provide 
opportunity to closely inspect portions of the text in medias res. Looking from the middle 
outward will be instructive as a divergent perspective from previous studies on the epic.35  
Furthermore, as a text that self-identifies as preexistent and without limit — “What is 
found here is elsewhere, what is not here is nowhere else” (Mbh 1.56.33) — I argue that 
the middle is a critical point of entry for the Mahābhārata and its literary study. To be 
succinct, this dissertation argues that the Sanskrit epic demonstratively and reflectively 
operates from an intermediary position and subsequently works to establish an approach 
to the epic’s scholarship that opens up to that potentiality in generating meaning. My 
reading will be informed by Deleuze and Guattari’s notion of rhizomatic literature.  
A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, 
interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely 
alliance. The tree imposes the verb "to be," but the fabric of the rhizome is the 
conjunction, "and. . . and.. . and. . ." This conjunction carries enough force to 
shake and uproot the verb "to be." Where are you going? Where are you coming 
                                                
34 Norman 1997, 6. 
35 See Deleuze and Guattari 2004, 25. “It’s not easy to see things in the middle, rather than looking down 
on them from above or up at them from below, or from left to right or right to left: try it, you’ll see that 
everything changes.” 
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from? What are you heading for? These are totally useless questions. Making a 
clean slate, starting or beginning again from ground zero, seeking a beginning or a 
foundation—all imply a false conception of voyage and movement. (Deleuze and 
Guattari 2004, 25) 
The subtales of the poem serve as productive sites for understanding alliance by 
connecting, recasting, and veering among ideas, structures, and language throughout the 
surrounding narrative. My intervention into the text, which I detail more explicitly below, 
similarly builds a multi-modal alliance between the study of literature and the epic. 
Furthering Hiltebeitel’s pronouncement at the opening of this chapter, my work is as 
much to carry the Mahābhārata into the study of literature as it is to carry the study of 
literature to the Mahābhārata. Moreover, I argue that a rhizomatic approach to the 
history of scholarship on the epic outlined above informs an understanding of the text as 
literature. My contribution to the state of the field comes about by enacting the claims 
made upon a reading of the text by that scholarship rather than leaving such work inert.  
To derive meaning as an ends rather than a means, I argue, is the act of ‘handing down 
sentences,’ Foucault’s warning that I have invoked at the outset of this dissertation. The 
alliance I find in the epic, which is similarly reflected in this study, eschews linear 
progression and instead requires a veering gesture to generate meaning throughout 
seemingly divergent contact zones. 
Our middle within the text is the middle of the Mahābhārata’s third book, in 
which the central protagonists, the five Pāṇḍava brothers and wife Draupadī, have spent 
several years banished in the forest following a losing dice wager by the eldest brother, 
Yudhis ̣ṭhira. The protagonists hear many upākhyānas during their time in the wild, but 
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we will focus on four significant instances: Nala’s Tale, Rāma’s Tale, Sāvitrī’s Tale, and 
the Yaks ̣a’s Questions. Hiltebeitel’s survey and categorization of the subtales will be 
instructive here. 
First come ten in Book I that Yudhis ̣ṭhira has not heard. Second are the twenty-
one, all but one of them recounted in Book 3, that he hears by the time he meets 
his father Dharma disguised as a Yaks ̣a. Eight subtales are then told between 
Books 5 and 9 that relate mainly to the themes of war.  Of these, Yudhis ̣ṭhira 
hears only the first, which recounts a set of stories about Indra through which the 
narrator predicts Yudhis ̣ṭhira’s victory (Mbh 5.9–18). Finally, there are twenty-
seven postwar subtales, of which Yudhis ̣ṭhira hears twenty-six, all but one of 
them in Books 12 and 13.  (Hiltebeitel 2011, 426) 
We see here that the events surrounding the subtale are of chief interest in its 
classification, including its manner of transmission. This study focuses on that second 
category of subtales that come at crucial points leading up to and during Yudhis ̣ṭhira’s 
encounter with Dharma, which Hiltebeitel further delineates as bent on “the Pāṇḍava’s 
entertainment and edification” (Hiltebeitel 2011, 428). I will also argue, and it has been 
discussed elsewhere,36 that the Yaks ̣a’s Questions subtale serves as a type of climax and 
culmination to those preceding upākhyānas in the epic’s third book. 
This study is predicated upon a close reading of these four subtales because they 
explicitly denote a middle point within the text and reflect a critical movement that will 
guide my work. These narratives bridge disparate milieus in the text through non-linear 
and rhizomatic means, carrying the main story through intermediary zones on several 
concurring planes. I will demonstrate that Nala’s Tale marks a grappling with the 
                                                
36 see Hiltebeitel 2011, 435–438. 
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wilderness that necessarily works to render re-legible earlier and subsequent occurrences 
in the epic in order to carry meaning across and through that unstable landscape. The 
subsequent subtales re-deploy, compound, and continue to complicate those threads that 
are visible between Nala’s Tale and the main story to continuously elucidate one another. 
The four subtales are selected as a unit to underscore the immediate dialogue that veers in 
a multi-direction manner, which is subsequently enacted by a study that proceeds in a 
reflective fashion. 
The opening quotations to this chapter by Michel Foucault and Alf Hiltebeitel not 
only propel me to look for ways of understanding the text that primarily consider its 
nature as literature, but also to rethink and more explicitly define the act of literary 
analysis as I work with the Sanskrit poem. As such, this dissertation is necessarily 
performative, an apologia pro vita mea, to present my own process of reading the 
Mahābhārata. As a student of literature, I have long held the belief that a text teaches us 
how it wants to be read. My work proceeds as a pedagogy, not only to provide my own 
reading of the text but more so to better understand how the epic itself creates meaning. 
The title of my dissertation, Carried Meaning in the Mahābhārata, points to what 
I see as a keystone for reading and understanding the epic, the act of translation, which I 
align with the latin translatus, carried across. Through my work, I build a conception of 
this action as it moves through many borders by way of language, milieu, discipline, and 
genre. Translation is located at the center of a critical exchange that I find to be 
necessarily multidirectional and generative. In line with that movement, my own process 
of analysis works from the middle of the Mahābhārata’s third book, inspired by Deleuze 
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and Guattari’s notion that literature is rhizomatic, building alliance within and throughout 
the text. I will read four upākhyānas while moving comparatively between subtales and 
the main story of the epic, as well as building points of contact with other works more 
commonly studied as literature. I also develop alliance with literary theorists like 
Foucault, Derrida, and Barthes and scholars in South Asia such as Pollack, Shulman, 
Hiltebeitel, and van Buitenen. In concert, these critical lenses work to render the Sanskrit 
epic more vulnerable, open to readings and new points of entry. By explicitly conducting 
my own translations at distinct sites, I attempt to lay out those points of contact that come 
to bare on my own reading of the Mahābhārata. 
For example, we will consider how the operative principles of separation and 
obfuscation weave through the epic. The conditions manifest uniquely in each of these 
subtales. On separation in Nala’s Tale, the eponymous character abandons his wife, 
Damayantī, to serve out his period of banishment to the wilderness. In Rāma’s Tale, 
Rāma’s wife Sītā is abducted by Rāvaṇa and made prisoner in his kingdom. For Sāvitrī’s 
Tale, her husband Satyavān is taken by Yama, and during the Yakṣa’s Questions, 
Yudhis ̣ṭhira works to bring about the return of his four felled brothers. As a thematic 
point of entry, separation allows me to query the language and moments of unique verse 
structure in Nala’s Tale, finding the emotional resonance indicative of a romance genre 
further informed by, for example, Fredric Jameson’s notions of structural analysis and 
linguistic alliance with The Letters of Abelard and Heloise. These elements, however, are 
noticeably absent from the depiction of separation between Rāma and Sītā, and thereby 
underscore the displays of power and violence that propel their distinct separation, a 
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difference that comes to a head at the contentious reunion of the couple. For Rāma’s 
Tale, contact points in Peter Scharf’s reading and translation of the narrative and the Old 
Testament serve to inform my understanding of their framework and trajectory. Veering 
back toward the heart in Sāvitrī’s Tale, the language and atypical verse structure that was 
earlier employed to denote the emotion of Nala and Damayantī’s separation is recast with 
a corporeal focus in the context of a female protagonist at the impending departure of her 
husband. The emotional resonance from the earlier subtale alerts us to the form of this 
separation while cacophonous trajectories provide space to unearth variation between the 
stories. The Yakṣa’s Questions presents a separation between Yudhis ̣ṭhira and his 
brothers to set into motion a conversation that reverberates with Sāvitrī’s discourse. The 
recurrent loss of each of the four brothers is dialogically bound to other moments of loss 
and separation, allowing my reading to perceive the patterning as the re-vitalization of 
dissonance and difference. The corporeal language of separation that we see in Nala and 
Sāvitrī’s Tales is given distinct bent as cognitive reflection within this distinct setting. My 
study illustrates how models and their alterations guide moments in the text.  
My dissertation will subsequently argue that obfuscation is necessarily enmeshed 
with separation in the Mahābhārata. Building our rhizomatic alliance, Nala’s Tale 
illustrates the contingency of these two operative principles. First, gods disguise 
themselves as Nala at the outset of the subtale to disrupt Damayantī’s selection in 
marriage and the initial union. Later, the dice that initially bring about the exile of Nala 
and his wife return to the fore in the form of golden birds to further render Nala bereft. 
Damayantī is similarly described as embodying a disparate state when separated from 
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Nala. Nearly stripped naked in the forest, Nala is bitten by a fork-tongued snake and 
unrecognizably transformed ahead of the reunion with his wife. Sītā is left vulnerable to 
attack in Rāma’s Tale following his interaction with Rāvaṇa’s sage disguised as a deer 
who takes up Rāma’s voice. Obfuscation later takes the form of invisible warriors and 
all-obliterating deaths. Finally, failed vision is embodied in Rāma’s reading of Sītā’s 
distressed state at the point of their reunion. For Sāvitrī, concealment allows her hide 
knowledge of Satyavān’s death that threatens to delegitimize her marriage and 
subsequently lexically outmaneuver her interlocutor, Yama, in order to save her husband. 
And The Yakṣa’s Questions are actually deployed by the figure under several guises, 
Yama, a voice in the sky, a crane, a Yakṣa, and ultimately Dharma, altering the resonance 
of each utterance. 
Through these readings, I argue that disguise functions here as the impermanent 
separation of the self and identity. As entry points, these two operative principles allow 
me to conceive of the epic’s project in creating meaning around conceptions of 
belonging, possession, agency, and ultimately the self. As the latter subtales structurally 
denote, I argue that a frame question looms large over the Mahābhārata, Draupadī’s 
prompt to Yudhis ̣ṭhira, which I translate as “Did you first lose yourself? Or me, Bhārata” 
(Mbh 2.60.7). The self is an important site of meaning within the Mahābhārata. And we 
might expect a world building text like this Sanskrit epic to present a pointed conception. 
Instead, each figure veers in the epic, discordant but contingent. It is perhaps our most 
glaring example that this work thrives on difference. There are no complete heroes, there 
are participants, of which we are necessarily complicit in reading and thereby translating 
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the work. By self-consciously and reiteratively recasting its own constructs, the 
Mahābhārata proliferates significance within the poem. The poem carries meaning 
through and across realms, indeed ensuring that, “What is found here is elsewhere, what 
is not here is nowhere else” (Mbh 1.56.33). 
Returning then to Foucault’s opening charge and our desire to better 
conceptualize literary analysis, I find four key markers. First, to bring something to life, 
George Steiner provides a theoretical framework to conceive of the process of translation 
as the continuous haunting of one text to another. Additionally, Steiner states that 
“Literature…has no chance of life outside of constant translation” (Steiner 1998, 31). 
Reflectively, we find that the dialogical association between realms enacts critical 
vitality. Second, we must multiply signs of existence. I demonstrate through my 
dissertation that a reading stemming from rhizomatic alliance is necessarily generative, 
discursively finding affiliation and difference that is simultaneously rendering difference 
coherent. Third, criticism must take leaps of the imagination. As Rancière will 
demonstrate within my dissertation, “Thus the exegesis of stories belongs to the same 
activity as their invention” (Rancière 2004, 83). I argue that it is a participatory and 
creative scholarly act that presents a close reading by the translator. As we are tasked 
with teaching a text, rendering it more accessible to others, so too is the translator. 
Finally, criticism must bear the lightening of possible storms. My work attempts a gesture 
toward the future by providing an ethic for reading this work of literature, bringing into 
conversation divergent points of contact that better inform my understanding of the way 
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in which meaning is carried across the epic, creating space for difference as an action that 
mirrors the Mahābhārata.  
 Recently, I discussed yaks ̣as as a particular category of monster in the 
Mahābhārata.37 And we should pay close attention to such figures in how they inhabit 
boundaries and interact with other characters, but we should not forget that the term 
“monster” also comes down to us as an early designation for this text in modern 
scholarship. Jeffrey Cohen’s work on the monster might allow us to redeploy such a 
designation in a more productive light. There is key significance in this object, the text, as 
monster, though earlier designators might be incorrect in their usage of the term. If the 
Mahābhārata is interpreted as a monster, then it is one that reflectively queries our own 
notions of itself as we inspect it. A reading of the epic, therefore, is not solely pertinent to 
the stuff of history. 
The monster commands, “Remember me”: restore my fragmented body, piece me 
back together, allow the past its eternal return. The monster haunts; it does not 
simply bring past and present together, but destroys the boundary that demanded 
their twinned foreclosure. (Cohen 1996, ix–x) 
We will work to repair previously damaged joints of the poem, gulfs between rhizomatic 
nodes brought about by mining, in order to recognize its literary heritage. Furthermore, as 
monster, the text challenges our markers of identification by embracing hybridity and 
fluid association.    
I argue that the monster is best understood as the embodiment of difference, a 
breaker of category, and a resistant Other known only through process and 
movement, never through dissection-table analysis. (Cohen 1996, x) 
                                                
37 Rudmann 2014. 
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The monster, or the Mahābhārata, is able to contain contradicting fragments in one 
whole work. However, those parts are not best revealed through a process of mining. 
Instead, I believe that we can follow Foucault’s aspirations in the epigraph to this essay  
by employing literary analysis for the sake of opening and understanding the text. We 
might shed some of those negative monstrous connotations by rendering the work more 
welcoming to readers and scholars alike. This can be done best, I believe, with the type of 
engagement that risks deep inspection and new perspective. We will commence by 
conducting a close reading of the four subtales with panoramic perspective on their 
correspondences and deploy critical theory when appropriate to undergird our new 
ground. 
 
ON TRANSLATION 
 
This dissertation is contingent upon an understanding of translation as a critical 
mode of engagement with the text. Translation is not only the means by which we can 
begin to make the Sanskrit verse legible to an audience that is unfamiliar with the 
workings of this Indo-European language, I argue that it is a participatory scholarly act 
that presents a close reading by the translator in a fashion consistent with literary studies 
that do not necessarily contend with disparate forms of communication. In other words, 
as the academic is tasked with teaching a text, rendering it more accessible to others, so 
too is the translator. Translation, after all, is not simply a linguistic process, but pertains 
to the carrying over of ideas and materiality in a multi-directional and necessarily 
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symbiotic process of exchange.38 Therefore, translation involves both a teaching and 
learning of the text. The translator necessarily becomes a new kind of author, though not 
an authorial one. Instead, the translator intercedes on behalf of the text to understand how 
the work itself reciprocally conditions its own reception and thereby acts as intermediary 
through attempting to re-present those rhizomatic connections.  
Consider George Steiner’s four-step process of translation in After Babel (1998), 
in which the “hermeneutic motion” proceeds as academic inquiry. The translator’s initial 
step requires expectation in the source material for elements that might possess potential 
for re-rendering into the target idiom. 
There is initial trust, an investment of belief, underwritten by previous experience 
but epistemologically exposed and psychologically hazardous, in the 
meaningfulness, in the ‘seriousness’ of the facing or, strictly speaking, adverse 
text. We must venture a leap: we grant ab initio that there is ‘something there’ to 
be understood, that the transfer will not be void. All understanding, and the 
demonstrative statement of understanding which is translation, starts with an act 
of trust.  (Steiner 1998, 312) 
Initial trust sets the groundwork for academic inquiry in order for the translator to 
develop a vision of what might be present within the pages. Steiner calls for the 
scholar/translator to primarily develop an “understanding” of the source text, which is 
subsequently demonstrated through translation. We might go further to say that any 
reading, regardless of language, calls upon the reader to rethink and redeploy the source’s 
words into new space in order to make that material legible in a new bent. The 
proceeding second step calls for deliberate scrutiny of the text through “aggressive” 
                                                
38 See Mehdizadeh 2013, 7. 
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(Steiner 1998, 313) close reading. This phase emphasizes the particularity of translation 
as tied to the person engaged in the act of carrying over the work. Sheldon Pollock 
reminds us that “translation is as philosophically problematic, stylistically individual, and 
practically hard as life, and as we keep on living we keep on translating, with the 
inevitable singular imperfections that define being human" (Pollock 1996, 112). Just as a 
study of literature must necessarily contain the distinct mark of an individual scholar, so 
too must a translation — that mark, I would further argue, as a recognition of 
incompleteness, is what gives a translation or study its vitality.   
Steiner’s third step reveals further tenuous elements in the production of 
translation. The source material must be rendered to fit the milieu of the target space, 
necessitating the incorporation of elements specific to a particular time and place, not 
only a language. This process additionally highlights the dynamic and multi-directional 
relationship between source and target worlds. 
But whatever the degree of ‘naturalization’, the act of importation can potentially 
dislocate or relocate the whole of the native structure. The Heideggerian ‘we are 
what we understand to be’ entails that our own being is modified by each 
occurrence of comprehensive appropriation. No language, no traditional symbolic 
set or cultural ensemble imports without risk of being transformed.  (Steiner 1998, 
315) 
By working critically within the confines of both source and target spaces, the translator’s 
ability to carry over the text into the latter is as crucial here as the acquired knowledge of 
the former – just as the scholar’s ability to represent a reading is as critical to the work as 
the ability to perceive that reading. A translation, according to Steiner’s final phase, must 
therefore leave space for the original work to persist between the lines of the new form. 
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The source must continuously haunt the target so that the audience is aware of the 
translation’s imperfections and can maintain a skeptical or critical eye toward the 
reworking.  But Steiner maintains that this final step is not to delegitimize or destabilize 
the translation, but rather recognize the incompleteness of any exchange, linguistic or 
otherwise. 
But we know that in practice this perfect fit is possible neither at the stage of 
interpretation nor at that of linguistic transfer and restatement. The limiting 
conditions on hermeneutic totality, moreover, are not restricted to translation. We 
saw at the start of the discussion that there are no perfections and final stabilities 
of understanding in any act of discourse above the most rudimentary (even there 
ambiguity might interfere).  Understanding is always partial, always subject to 
emendation.  Natural language is not only polysemic and in process of diachronic 
change. It is imprecise, and has to be imprecise, to serve human locution. And 
although the existence of a ‘perfect translation’ or ‘perfect exchange of the totality 
of intended meaning’ between two speakers is theoretically conceivable, there 
could be no way of verifying the actual fact. (Steiner 1998, 428) 
Jean Paris wrote that the translator’s role is to “retrace the original intuition, the root of 
the work” (Paris 1961, 63) – a dreadful thought. This sentiment places a kind of authority 
– and burden – upon the translator that one can never hope to achieve. Instead, Steiner 
provides us with the tools to approach translation as participation in scholarly inquiry. 
Furthermore, Steiner’s assertion that the challenges in carrying over meaning are not 
particular to the translator underscores translation’s function as a critical exercise. 
Meaning and understanding are caught in a complex meshwork of contingencies and 
determinations that allow for their continuous redeployment and our own perpetual 
interest in their inexhaustibility. 
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Translation is enacted in two different ways in the following chapters.  First, I will 
provide my own English reworking of select Sanskrit phrases and verses in order to 
explicate and understand the text.  Taking Steiner’s four-step process as a guide, in 
addition to A. L. Becker’s notion of fluidity of communication contained in the coined 
term “languaging.”39 I work to develop a mimetic rendering that must at times move 
beyond lexicographical holdings in order to present a close reading.  My aim is to convey 
the pulse and economy of kāvya – the metrical verse style that makes up a majority of the 
Mahābhārata – while presenting something akin to what Seamus Heaney called 
“directness of utterance” (Heaney 2000, xxix) in his translation of Beowulf – a feature 
similarly present in this epic. Enacting Steiner’s process of translation calls on me to ask 
why the text might present a particular phrasing at a particular moment, similarly 
recalling K. R. Norman’s earlier charge to ask how the text develops meaning, and 
subsequently employ translation to reflect my own conclusions. In this case, the 
translation is closely woven within an exegetical inquest of the work, which will make 
more explicit my own choices in carrying over meaning. Second, I will consider 
translations of the Sanskrit by M. M. Williams, K. M. Ganguli, J. A. B. van Buitenen, Alf 
Hiltebeitel, and John D. Smith in order to place these renderings in concert and provide 
further perspective for my own understanding of the text and further reveal the 
particularity in each act of translation. We should consider these translations as a network 
of events that continuously has a hand in bringing the original work into being. 
                                                
39 See Becker 2003, 7. 
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I will work to present translation as a means of critical analysis in examining the 
Mahābhārata, building upon rhetorical, literary, and contextual approaches discussed 
above in the history of scholarship. The act of translation calls for close reading of the 
text in order to derive meaning that supports the dialogical resonances that exist between 
and across particular terminology, verse, tale, book, and epic. A liminal space between 
source and target language serves as the site in which a close reading is conveyed by the 
scholar to the audience. The act of the translator — particularly in light of Steiner’s final 
step, gesturing toward the original form in order to recognize the target’s inability to 
totalize — is inevitably the work of scholarship, carrying meaning over into different 
realms in order to proliferate understanding. Moreover, an inspection of the relationship 
between subtale and main story within the epic will reveal a text that is chiefly concerned 
with its own ability to carry meaning between contexts. By extending its narrative 
conditions, character types, and constituent parts through distinct portions of the work, 
the Mahābhārata provides a type of road map for its own transmission, anticipating the 
act of translation, either across or within language. I will argue that the epic teaches its 
readers how it should be read, disclosing the procedures through which it creates and 
carries meaning throughout its own disparate contexts in order to propagate its vitality. 
My analysis on the Mahābhārata moves through four successive subtales of the 
epic over four successive chapters: Nala’s Tale, Rāma’s Tale, Sāvitrī’s Tale, and The 
Yakṣa’s Questions. The structure of this dissertation, however, does not presume to 
suggest unidirectional progress. Instead, we will journey through the narrative while 
identifying critical points to establish rhizomatic contact. In translating those verses, we 
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will veer toward other contact zones that inform my reading in order to consider the ways 
in which meaning is carried and generated through those pages. For this dissertation, 
these sites include other moments in the Sanskrit epic, past scholarship on the 
Mahābhārata, critical theory, and a larger canon of works studied under the discipline of 
literature. By identifying these alliances, I work to “multiply… signs of existence” by 
opening the text to the type of potentiality that I will argue is present within its own 
project. This dissertation will demonstrate that by incorporating difference, the 
Mahābhārata perpetually reconsiders its own utterances in order to maintain dialectic 
vigor. Furthermore, each subtale will identify unique and interdependent contact zones. 
Nala’s Tale introduces motifs of love, loss, veiling, discovery, and repetition. Rāma’s 
Tale recasts sideshadows of those themes by presenting repetition as sound while offering 
seemingly inconsistent depictions of love and separation. Sāvitrī’s Tale similarly 
expounds upon the discursive possibilities of the text by re-centering its focus upon a 
female character that at once breaks from and is consistent with notions advanced in the 
other subtales. Finally, the Yakṣa’s Questions structurally redeploy tropes of the text 
through the more explicit gesture toward the reverberative relationship between subtale 
and main story. As a nonlinear process that carries meaning through these moments, each 
point of contact contributes to an understanding of the Mahābhārata as a generative work 
of literature.  
In Derrida’s essay on translation, “Ulysses Gramophone,” he wonders how to 
transpose laughter. He argues that it would be an impossibility given the “singularity of 
the event, and therefore uniqueness of signature, or rather of an irreplaceable mark that 
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cannot be reduced to the phenomenon of copyright, legible across the patronym, after 
circumcision” (Derrida 1992, 295). So what is necessary, and inevitable, is a secondary 
event that would hermeneutically transpose the original event, which in turn is the only 
way that the original event can ever be confirmed.40 This process of exchange, Steiner 
shows us, is not limited to translation but accompanies any exercise of understanding. 
However, translation does provide unique opportunity to present an understanding of a 
source object in both a rigorous and imaginative manner. This dissertation will 
demonstrate that translation of the Mahābhārata proceeds generatively through a 
rhizomatic motion between scholarship on the Sanskrit epic and critical thought on 
literature. By treating translation as a critical act in the middle of these perspectives we 
might fulfill Foucault’s charge in the epigraph by not ‘handing down sentences’ but 
instead by multiplying those “signs of existence” (Foucault 1997, 323). 
  
                                                
40 see Derrida 1992, 309. 
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Chapter 2 - Nala’s Tale 
 
A LOVE STORY 
 
By the time Bṛhadaśva, sage and storyteller, reaches the Pāṇḍavas during their 
exile in the third book of the Mahābhārata, the brothers have already traveled deep into a 
wilderness teeming with gods and monsters. After a series of conflicts and recurring 
debates over whether Yudhiṣṭhira should accept the fate handed to them by the dice, the 
eldest brother’s emotions boil over as he laments their misfortune. Upon asking if anyone 
could be in an unhappier state, Bṛhadaśva intervenes to relay the upākhyāna of Nala. We 
should note that this is the sage’s sole appearance in the Mahābhārata, peculiar even for 
the text’s cacophony of interjecting storytellers. Furthermore, Yudhiṣṭhira seems to 
anticipate, or even request, Nala’s Tale, pointedly compelling Bṛhadaśva to tell him about 
a more unfortunate (alpabhāgyatara) king that the sage might have seen or heard of 
before — bhavatā dr ̥ṣṭapūrvo vā śrutapūrvo ’pi vā bhavet (Mbh 3.49.34). 
From the initial verse of Nala’s Tale, both readers and listener, here Yudhiṣṭhira, 
are given information on the title character that will prove essential in propelling the 
subtale. 
āsīd rājā nalo nāma vīrasenasuto balī | 
There was a king named Nala, the mighty son of Vīrasena, 
upapanno guṇair iṣṭai rūpavān aśvakovidaḥ || 
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imbued with desired virtues, handsome, and skilled with horses.   
(Mbh 3.50.1) 
It is of the latter and more specific attributes that we should take note. Beauty, rūpavat, is 
frequently deployed alongside various protagonists throughout the text. The term is 
repeated in just a few verses when introducing Damayantī,41 and similarly describes 
Draupadī to underscore her prestige at the end of the Mahābhārata’s second book.42 The 
placement of this adjective at the outset, however, should alert us to its importance as the 
story progresses. The final term, aśvakovida or skilled in horses, is far less common as an 
initial modifier – in fact it is not associated with another character in the epic. And it 
should stick out to the reader: this quality will serve a crucial function for Nala as we 
proceed. Of course, it seems all too fitting that a sage called Bṛhadaśva, whose name 
means “Great Horse” or “One Who Has Great Horses,” describes a hero whose narrative 
hinges on his ability to handle such animals. Finally, Monier Monier-Williams’ 
translation of aśvakovida renders the term “skilled in taming steeds” (Monier-Williams 
1965, 4), which gets at something of the spirit here – Nala’s renown might stem from a 
certain mastery over the natural world. We should be sensitive to the relationship 
between Nala and his environment. Beyond the utilitarian function of setting, the 
imposition of the wild will crop up repeatedly for our protagonists, both within the 
upākhyāna and the surrounding main narrative. 
                                                
41 Mbh 3.50.13 
42 Mbh 2.72.13 
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Subsequent verses continue to extol Nala through information that will come into 
play throughout the narrative. We learn that the king is akṣapriya,43 lover of dice, which 
squarely aligns Nala with the subtale’s listener, Yudhiṣṭhira, who fell victim to gambling 
in the previous book of the Mahābhārata. However, the term might simultaneously work 
to contrast Nala from Yudhiṣṭhira as the akṣapriya compound can similarly signify one 
who is favored by the dice. In either interpretation, the term acts as a point of contact 
between upākhyāna and the main narrative. Nala is also one who speaks the truth, 
satyavādin,44 a frequently employed qualifier for characters throughout the epic. Most 
recently in the adjacent main story, Draupadī, the wife of the Pāṇḍavas, asks Yudhiṣṭhira 
how he might have allowed the dice to “swoop down” (van Buitenen 1974, 280)45 upon 
him despite the fact that he himself is a person who spoke the truth.46 That contradiction, 
then, between constancy and chance further unites both listener and hero in the subtale. 
These praises subsequently turn inward from the audience as the text relates such 
information to Nala and Damayantī, alternatively. While the initial spark for each other is 
lit, it is the intervention of a haṃsa47 – a type of goose, anser indicus – that appears to 
ratify the immediacy of their affection.  Not just any animal, of course, this fowl is 
“jātarūpaparicchada,” (Mbh 3.50.18) covered in gold. Nala captures the bird, who then 
speaks to the king, begging for his life. The animal offers to fly to Damayantī and speak 
of his beauty. This act, apart from the news already sent back and forth between the two, 
causes Damayantī to develop such ardor for Nala that she loses herself, na svasthā… 
                                                
43 Mbh 3.50.3 
44 Mbh 3.50.3 
45 here van Buitenen’s translation of āpatitā (Mbh 3.31.18). 
46 Mbh 3.31.18 
47 Mbh 3.50.18 
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babhūva,48 setting into motion her svayaṃvara marriage. Both princes and gods travel to 
Damayantī in order to participate in the selection of her husband. The invitation, 
however, meant for those princes, and specifically Nala, was only haphazardly overheard 
by the deities.49 In the midst of their travel, then, the gods approach Nala to represent 
them in announcing their intention to Damayantī.   
bho bho naiṣadha rājendra nala satyavrato bhavān | 
Oh, great Nala of Naiṣadha, Indra of kings, you are bound by truth. 
asmākaṃ kuru sāhāyyaṃ dūto bhava narottama || 
Help us, become a messenger, best of men.  
(Mbh 3.51.29) 
Unaware of Nala and Damayantī’s romance, the gods select Nala, they explain, because 
he is satyavrata, which I translate as “bound by truth” to emphasize the sense of 
obligation present in the second word of the compound, to which Nala has no choice but 
to acquiesce. However, it is worth noting that Nala pledges his fidelity to the gods before 
knowing their identity or intention.50 Though appearing to be a roadblock in Nala’s quest 
for Damayantī, the gods’ intervention facilitates Nala and Damayantī’s first meeting as 
they sanction a taboo introduction before the svayaṃvara.51 With help from the gods, 
Nala is able to bypass the kingdom guards and enter Damayantī’s chamber.52 
                                                
48 Mbh 3.51.1 
49 Mbh 3.51.23 
50 Mbh 3.52.2 
51 Monier-Williams biblically translates Indra’s pravekṣyasi (Mbh 3.52.10) as “Thou shalt enter” (1965, 
17). 
52 niveśana, Mbh 3.52.10. 
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The unique circumstances of Nala and Damayantī’s initial encounter alert us to 
pay close attention to their contact here. First, through Nala’s perspective, Damayantī’s 
beauty is once again confirmed. That observation serves to underscore the hardship of the 
hero’s subsequent actions as he “dhārayām āsa hr ̥cchayam” (Mbh 3.52.13), which 
Ganguli translates as “suppressed his passion,” (2000, 118) van Buitenen renders as 
“mastered his love,” (1975, 326) and Monier-Williams presents as “all his passion he 
suppressed” (1965, 17).  These somewhat disparate interpretations illustrate ways of 
understanding the verbal root dhṛ. “Held” might be the most literal corollary, while 
“mastered” perhaps harkens back to Nala’s strength in control as described in regard to 
horses. However, it is Ganguli and Monier-Williams’ translation as “suppressed” that 
more clearly conveys a necessary connotation to remind us that the hero is keeping a 
secret. We should note, then, the position of this verb in regard to what Nala might be 
holding in the verse, “satyaṃ” (Mbh 3.52.13), which we earlier identified as “truth.” It is 
the quality of truthfulness, what the gods had uniquely identified in Nala, that conversely 
causes him to be something false. This motif, hiding in plain sight, weaves throughout the 
subtales and central narrative of the epic. 
The text proceeds to illustrate the attraction between Nala and Damayantī by 
repeating different forms of the verbal root smi, to smile, when the pair lock their gaze 
upon each other.53 This simple image of the two figures smiling at each other, before a 
word is spoken between them, gets at the core of their romance.  What seems crucial here 
is perhaps the reciprocal nature of the act by both figures in contrast to those slanted 
                                                
53 Mbh 3.52.18 
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smiles in the previous book by the antagonistic Dhṛtarāṣṭra and Duryodhana during the 
assault upon Draupadī.54 A moment later, however, Damayantī is more forthcoming, 
declaring her adoration for the man before knowing his identity. By firmly rooting their 
story as a romance here, an aspect of the subtale often overlooked,55 this part of the 
Mahābhārata evades reduction as echo or mirror of the main narrative, standing out as 
something uniquely its own, but at the same time inseparable from the larger work. 
Though suppressing his true feelings, Nala maintains his vow to the gods by 
imploring Damayantī to select one of the deities at the svayaṃvara. The princess, now 
aware of Nala’s identity, professes that she will only choose Nala. Nala remains 
perplexingly true by relaying the subversion plan back to the gods themselves. In 
response, the gods each disguise themselves as Nala during the ceremony so that they 
might be accidentally selected. Damayantī cuts through the deception by pleading with 
the crowd, stating “haṃsānāṃ vacanaṃ śrutvā yathā me naiṣadho vr ̥taḥ” (Mbh 3.54.17) 
— that she chose Nala when she heard the words of the geese — reminding us of the 
animal’s intercession while pointing to something of the veracity of their romance. It is 
through her own quality of satya, evoked in each of the three subsequent verses, that 
Damayantī makes her appeal. Moved by her argument,56 the gods reveal themselves 
through a series of marks, such as their inability to sweat, cast a shadow, blink, or place 
                                                
54 Mbh 2.62.23 and 2.63.10, respectively. Duryodhana’s smile occurs during the infamous exposure of his 
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55 see Hiltebeitel 2001, 218 
56 More accurately, the process follows a type of recurrent ritual in Vedic, Prakrit, and Sanskrit literature 
identified by Eugene Watson Burlingame as an “act of truth” (satyakriya) in which “a formal declaration of 
fact [is] accompanied by a command or resolution or prayer that the purpose of the agent shall be 
accomplished” (1917, 429). 
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feet firmly on the ground.57 To further convey their approval in the wedding, the gods 
bestow eight boons on the happy couple, notably Nala’s ability to withstand fire and skill 
in preparing food.58 
Madeline Biardeau has argued that the gods possessed no real design to marry the 
princess after all, but instead acted to sanctify the match.59 The claim hinges upon an 
understanding of the compound “vigatasaṃkalpāḥ” (Mbh 3.51.27) and its surrounding 
context, employed to describe the gods during their primary encounter with Nala on the 
road to the svayaṃvara.   
taṃ dṛṣṭvā lokapālās te bhrājamānaṃ yathā ravim | 
Seeing him shine like the sun, those world guardians, 
tasthur vigatasaṃkalpā vismitā rūpasaṃpadā || 
with departed intention, astonished by his perfect form, were still. 
(Mbh 3.51.27) 
This is a brief moment in the text, and we know that it immediately precedes the gods’ 
request of Nala to intercede in the marriage ceremony so that Damayantī might choose 
one of the world guardians. Nonetheless, there is evidence in the verse to indicate a 
sudden change of course here by the gods. As Biardeau points out, the phrase 
vigatasaṃkalpāḥ, which I translate as “with departed intention,” suggests that their 
earlier notion to woo the princess was abandoned in the intensity of that moment. This 
might not be gleaned from Monier-Williams’ translation, glossing over the ramifications 
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59 see Biardeau 1984, 249. 
 50 
of the gods’ reaction to Nala by simply stating, “Each arrested stood and silent” (1965, 
13). Monier-Williams seizes upon the shock as an end unto itself without complicating its 
consequences. Therefore, he overlooks vigatasaṃkalpāḥ to support the earlier word 
tasthuḥ, stopped.   
To further support Biardeau’s reading, I argue that we should be more concerned 
with the term vismitāḥ, which directly follows vigatasaṃkalpāḥ. While this past passive 
participle of the verbal root smi with prefix vi- is often translated as ‘surprised’ or 
‘amazed,’ in this context a more appropriate translation might be “astonished.”60 The 
OED points out that astonish is derived from the Old French estonnir, which would later 
evolve into tonner, a boom or thunder.  Particularly, as we see here in the reaction of the 
gods, to be astonished is to experience a sudden thunder-clap that stuns. Looking closer at 
the text in translation, the affect might correlate with Chaucer’s Troilus upon first laying 
eyes on Criseyde, “And sodeynly he wax therwith astoned” (I.274).  Elaine Tuttle Hansen 
identifies this moment as a type of “paralysis” (1992, 145) that alters the character’s way 
of thinking. This shock upon sight of a beautiful physical form renders the appropriate 
resonance to utilize “astonished” in my translation of the Sanskrit. Furthermore, we will 
see that instances of stunned debilitation will recur at significant moments in the 
Mahābhārata, calling us to pay special attention to this verse. “Astonished,” therefore, 
gives appropriate weight to the translation, allowing the reader to identify a possible 
turning point in the narrative.  
                                                
60 This interpretation is not without precedent. Ganguli more literally renders the construction “filled with 
astonishment” (2000, 117). 
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We should also note here that the root of vismitā closely aligns this section to the 
subsequent scene in which Nala and Damayantī first lay eyes on each other. This careful 
crafting of pathos at the outset of the subtale contrasts with the emotion from a wailing 
Yudhiṣṭhira at the start of the episode and allows for the unique distinction of Nala’s Tale 
as a love story. Agreeing with Biardeau’s suggestion that the gods worked toward Nala 
and Damayantī’s union, we might read their actions in transforming into Nala’s likeness 
during the ceremony, a ruse that they only keep up for a few moments, as a recognition of 
the veracity of their match. In the introduction to his translation of the epic, van Buitenen 
points out that this is the only free bridegroom choice thus far in the Mahābhārata.61 The 
agency exerted by Damayantī here, allowing no room for chance as was the case with 
Draupadī’s union with the Pāṇḍavas, finds support by those ‘astonished’ gods.  Moving 
along with the narrative, we will see that it is not the similarities between this subtale and 
main story that make it a significant episode for the epic. Instead, the subtale’s ability to 
turn conventions from the main story on their head adds vitality to the entire text. 
Furthermore, those “astonished” gods stand in contrast to Kali, who was neither 
present at the sighting of Nala nor the svayaṃvara ceremony and therefore harbors desire 
to have Damayantī for himself. When Kali protests the princess’ selection of a human 
over one of the world guardians, the other gods attempt to allay his concerns by 
reassuring Kali that the match was “samanujñātaḥ” (Mbh 3.55.7) by the gods. Ganguli 
renders the term “consented” (2000, 123), while Monier-Williams utilizes the force of the 
prefixes as “full and liberal sanction” (1965, 33). Both understandings might support 
                                                
61 see van Buitenen 1975, 184. 
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Biardeau’s claim regarding the intentionality of the gods’ actions. In the first book of the 
Mahābhārata, the term is employed when the river Ganges “allows” Śaṃtanu to take the 
child Bhīṣma,62 and again when Agni “allows” the Pāṇḍavas to leave the Khāṇḍava 
forest.63 The connotation for the word here seems to be one of divine permission rather 
than a hand at orchestration, which I suggest is based on the gods’ placement of Nala in 
the chamber of Damayantī before the ceremony.  Nonetheless, we can discern something 
approximating authorization by a significant party in this context, leaning a translation 
more toward Monier-Williams’ “sanction.” Despite the admonition, an unsatisfied Kali 
sets Nala’s ruin in motion. 
 
DICE PLURAL 
 
We should remember here that the events at the end of the Mahābhārata’s second 
book are still a fresh wound for the Pāṇḍavas — namely, the dice match and subsequent 
disrobing of Draupadī. Therefore, the emotional impact of Bṛhadaśva’s subtale, 
particularly in the events enacted by Kali, must be acutely felt by the listening 
Yudhiṣṭhira. The main narrative’s prince hears how Kali waited patiently for twelve 
years, and once “having possessed” Nala64 immediately initiates a dice match. Like 
Yudhiṣṭhira, Nala’s opponent is a family member intent on winning his kingdom. 
                                                
62 Mbh 1.94.37 
63 Mbh 1.225.18 
64 samāviśya (Mbh 3.56.4) 
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However, Nala has little agency in the matter as the text repeatedly reminds us that he is 
unable to resist gambling due to the possession.   
tam akṣamadasaṃmattaṃ suhr ̥dāṃ na tu kaś cana | 
Maddened by the dice, none of his friends 
nivāraṇe ’bhavac chakto dīvyamānam acetasam || 
could stop him, who was mindlessly gambling. 
 (Mbh 3.56.10) 
The force of possession here is unstoppable by the possessed and his surrounding retinue. 
Even Nala’s gambling ability escapes blame here as the dice themselves were likewise 
possessed by Kali’s companion, Dvāpara.65 This emphasis on distancing the hero from 
his actions stands in contrast to Yudhiṣṭhira, who consciously debates the merits of his 
dice match and acts on his own accord.   
What echoes here, I argue, is Draupadī’s question after she was gambled away in 
the sabhā by her husband in Book Two: “kiṃ nu pūrvaṃ parājaiṣīr ātmānaṃ māṃ nu 
bhārata” (Mbh 2.60.7) — “Did you first lose yourself? Or me, Bhārata?” Perhaps out of 
shame, Yudhiṣṭhira is at a loss to respond. How do we assign blame to these parallel 
calamities? Yudhiṣṭhira implicates himself by his silence, but in Nala’s case the gambler 
is seemingly guiltless. By holding that distorted mirror up to Yudhiṣṭhira here, Bṛhadaśva 
forces the prince to confront his role in the dicing. Nala is a figure who has lost himself in 
the same set of circumstances, in stark juxtaposition with Yudhiṣṭhira. Of course the 
subtale is told in the presence of Draupadī as well, adding support to her question. To 
                                                
65 Mbh 3.55.13. Both names can also refer to different types of dice throws. 
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further augment the dicing scene, Bṛhadaśva says that Nala’s gambling goes on for 
months while the citizens of his kingdom languish at the palace gates.66 
The crucial intra-textual point of contact occurs when Nala’s losses in the dicing 
leave him with little left to wager. Aware of the larger story, both reader and listener can 
anticipate the next narrative stroke as Puṣkara, Nala’s dicing opponent, beckons him to 
stake his wife. If Nala proceeded in the prescribed way, he might still be easily forgiven, 
taking into consideration the influence of Kali. But without explanation here, Nala seems 
to throw off his possession and react in surprising fashion. 
puṣkareṇaivam uktasya puṇyaślokasya manyunā | 
With Puṣkara’s words, Nala’s heart  
vyadīryateva hr ̥dayaṃ na cainaṃ kiṃ cid abravīt || 
was as if split with rage, and he said nothing. 
tataḥ puṣkaram ālokya nalaḥ paramamanyumān | 
Fixed on Puṣkara, Nala, with rage, 
utsr ̥jya sarvagātrebhyo bhūṣaṇāni mahāyaśāḥ || 
the glorious one stripped the ornaments from his body. 
ekavāsā asaṃvītaḥ suhr ̥cchokavivardhanaḥ | 
Bare but for a single cloth, to friends’ dismay, 
niścakrāma tadā rājā tyaktvā suvipulāṃ śriyam || 
the king walked out, abandoning his substantial fortune. 
(Mbh 3.58.4-58.6) 
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As he requests her to be staked, perhaps it is in Puṣkara’s speaking of Damayantī’s name, 
which is related to the verbal root dam, meaning ‘control,’ that allows Nala to begin to 
exert himself again. Nala’s silence opposes Yudhiṣṭhira’s loss of speech at Draupadī’s 
question. Here it is an act in rejection of rather than submission to the wager. Is this 
section of the subtale perhaps reproach for how Yudhiṣṭhira should have acted in his dice 
match? Similarly “ekavastrā” (Mbh 3.58.7), in a single cloth, Damayantī follows her 
husband out into the wilderness. The repeated mention of clothing here evokes another 
detail for the end of the second book, Draupadī’s disrobing. Draupadī is similarly 
described as “ekavastrā” (Mbh 2.60.15) when she is brought out into the hall as a result 
of the dicing. Draupadī’s aggressors attempt to remove the garment, but an identical 
covering repeatedly appears in its place. The retention of that one cloth, then, signals the 
depth of loss for both main story and upākhyāna while simultaneously functioning to 
hold those characters somewhat intact. 
In exile, Nala comes across a flock of birds — a historically good omen for the 
prince. These birds are not haṃsa as before, but instead described as a species called 
śakuna. It must not be coincidence here that Yudhiṣṭhira’s opponent in his dice match 
was called Śakuni. The plumage of the śakuna also warrants distinguishing language as 
“hiraṇyasadṛśacchada” — “feathers that seemed made of gold” (Mbh 3.58.11; trans. van 
Buitenen 1974, 332). That their precious plumage might only be a matter of perception 
here foreshadows the results of their interaction with Nala, who removes his single cloth 
to utilize in the capture of the birds. Nala acts on the speculation that the birds might 
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provide sustenance and fortune for himself and his wife. Once the robe is deployed, the 
śakuna take off with cloth in tow. Like the earlier haṃsa, they speak to Nala: 
vayam akṣāḥ sudurbuddhe tava vāso jihīrṣavaḥ | 
We are the dice, fool, here to take your robe. 
āgatā na hi naḥ prītiḥ savāsasi gate tvayi || 
No satisfaction has come to us while you went clothed. 
 (Mbh 3.58.15) 
The cloth and the dice, nearly bumping up against each other in both main story and 
subtale, finally become intertwined, but perhaps we have several sets of dice in this text. 
In concert, these scenes build that object from manipulated instrument to active 
aggressor. This dice, becoming animal, one that speaks, one that holds a grudge, calls the 
reader to rethink the constraints or conditions faced by a particular hero. We should also 
remember the above-mentioned exchange  on gambling misfortune between Draupadī 
and Yudhiṣṭhira, in which she described his loss as the dice “swoop[ing] down” — that 
image becomes more literal here. 
And why should birds bookend this initial phase of Nala’s Tale? Considering our 
earlier discussion of the text as a love story here, Susan Crane identifies generic 
conditions that allow birds to come in close contact with humans. 
Closer to a romance’s sensibilities than official science and theology were 
pervasive cultural convictions about animals’ similarities to humans. Birds were 
broadly conceived (and, according to Claude Lévi-Strauss, were still conceived in 
modern France) as making up a society with metamorphic relation to human 
society, in which birdsong fills the function of human language. (Crane 2013, 
121) 
 57 
For Crane, this particular genre lends to the anthropomorphizing of animals, and birds in 
particular, by expanding the boundaries of acceptable speech and action. Nala is pained, 
but not astonished. Their spectrum of behaviors testifies to the complexity of all 
characters in the text. The animals are both enemy and ally, with lives of their own. As 
Karl Steel posits, birds, often employed in storytelling for purposes of scale, remind the 
reader of the “many, many worlds” that intersect and miss each other through birds’ 
indifference to human production.67 No story is ever the whole story. Here both haṃsa 
and śakuna play a crucial role in progressing the plot of the subtale, but they also take the 
hero down a peg by de-centering his agency.  
With this ultimate ruin, Nala’s downfall is complete. He returns, naked, to his 
wife to proclaim to her that he is “gatacetana” (Mbh 3.58.19). This term receives a 
variety of interpretations: “frantic” (Monier-Williams 1965, 45), “deprived of my senses” 
(Ganguli 2000, 126), “my mind is failing me” (van Buitenen 1975, 332). I would suggest, 
however, that Nala is referring to something more severe and totalizing that might speak 
to his subsequent abandonment of Damayantī. Taking cetana then to include the whole of 
a person rather than just the mind, keeping in mind its definition by Monier-Williams as 
both “man,” “soul,” and “sense” (Monier-Williams 1984, 397), or perhaps conceptually 
more akin to ‘consciousness,’ Nala might be saying, in plain terms, that he has ‘lost 
himself.’ This is not the same phrasing as Draupadī’s question, but the contact between 
these two instances — the reversal of the disrobing and perceived separation between 
husbands and wives — seems to call the reader to make that dialogical connection. But 
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there is pull and push here. Nala will leave, he will not leave. The prince is inconsistent in 
words and actions to his wife, and we should remember that his possession by Kali 
persists. Of course the text itself reminds us here: ākr ̥ṣyamāṇaḥ kalinā 
sauhr ̥denāpakr ̥ṣyate (Mbh 3.59.22), which van Buitenen beautifully renders as “drawn 
forth by Kali, drawn back by his love” (van Buitenen 1975, 334). When they reach a 
sabhā in the forest, and Damayantī sleeps, Nala splits the remaining cloth in two and 
departs, though with repeated hesitation, and the text again describes him as 
gatacetana.68 
Nala’s Tale demonstrates incessant reduplications. Birds, once messengers to 
unite Nala and Damayantī, return to bring about their separation. The gambling scene is 
repeated between main story and subtale to mirroring effect, but with re-imagined detail. 
Perhaps most clearly illustrating how extreme the text is willing to concede to this trope, 
the dice themselves take flight so that they might return to the fore once their application 
has seemingly run its course. We should keep in mind Hiltebeitel’s explication of the 
epic, “No story is ever the whole story” (Hiltebeitel 2001, 38), but extend that 
understanding to the objects that resonate within the text. Just as the stories act as 
“sideshadows” (Hiltebeitel 2001, 38) unto themselves — altered versions to complicate 
understandings of the text and questions of its design — constituent parts are broken 
apart and refitted within and around those narrative elements. As David Shulman notes, 
the interplay between parts and wholes within the upākhyāna is reflective of the text’s 
drive, which is dictated both by genre on an abstract scale and objects in particular focus. 
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Almost nothing that the text mentions manages to remain intact, unsplit, or 
singular, although thematically there is also a countervailing drive toward unity 
— this is, after all, in the most general sense, a love story about two people 
uniting as one. Perhaps the most trenchant symbolic expression of this problem is 
the almost obsessive focus on the single garment (ekavastra) — the garment used 
to clothe both Nala and Damayantī after the geese make off with Nala’s own 
single cloth, and which Nala cuts in two as he abandons Damayantī in the forest. 
(Shulman 1994, 13) 
One cloth is never just one cloth, both in the case of Draupadī’s disrobing and Nala’s 
severance. The implication here, I would argue, is that for anything to be whole in the 
text — that is, fully realized — it must be understood as fractured, as hybrid. Nala 
himself is not just Nala at this point, but embodies both himself and Kali. That 
contradiction is evident in the push and pull of his departure from Damayantī in the 
sabhā. Jeffrey Jerome Cohen provides cause to consider the cohabitation of opposing 
forces intrinsic to the generic identification.  
Trapped in a dialectic of disidentification against the monster, the chivalric 
subject places himself in constant proximity to the abjected remainder: the 
monster’s (continued) existence, even if in the “zone of inhabitability,” is the 
condition without which the romance hero cannot come into being, and in whose 
absence cannot know himself. Boundaries that are reified through abjection are 
inevitably weak because they exist only as materialized through their constant 
reiteration. (Cohen 1999, 134) 
Kali as monster, the otherworldly force that enacts conflict for the hero of the genre, 
serves to build the other’s identity. The main story’s dice match could never be fully 
considered without the adjacent subtale scene. The birds that enjoin Nala with Damayantī 
are incomplete unless we examine their theft of the cloth. That dimension of the dice 
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which acts on its own is crucial to the dice themselves. Imbued with hybridity, containing 
difference, each element in the text enacts its process of formation. The vitality of the 
work, I argue, rests in its hybrid contents. 
Furthermore, these constituent parts and operative principles are brought through 
the Sanskrit epic in a long-form and non-linear process of reification. Meaning is carried 
between these points of contact in a mutually complicating and legitimizing fashion. If 
these are in fact mirroring practices, it is never explicit which side holds the glass. And I 
argue that we should never give precedent to the main story for its own sake. If 
translation is an undertaking to elucidate by altering signs and signifiers into a different 
context, then each reduplication is not only a transformation, but a continual translation 
of that element in order to develop understanding in both contexts. Finally, it is worth 
noting here that in his discussion of hybridity, Cohen refers specifically to the Medieval 
romance Sir Gowther — the story of a man who “never fights a traditional giant, because 
his monstrous body already contains that enemy” (Cohen 1999, 121). Such 
correspondences between far-flung tales allows us to view each story with new points of 
entry. By moving between the specific and abstract, expedited through the framework of 
genre, this study is enhanced by the inclusion of seemingly disparate worlds of literature. 
Just as the Mahābhārata works intra-textually to magnify crucial components, we must 
work in tandem intertextually, to carry meaning in between literary realms in order to 
augment our grasp of the work. The comparative ethic develops a mimetic 
comprehension between literatures through translatus — which I argue functions in line 
with the discursive force of the epic itself. Both sideshadow within the verse and 
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comparisons outside engage in a perpetual practice of meaning development that eschews 
monovalence and stasis. 
 
ON SEPARATION 
 
The text shifts focus to describe Damayantī’s distress upon waking to find herself 
without Nala. Though abandoned, the language is disparate from Nala’s “loss of self.” 
These verses describe the fervor of Damayantī’s pain, “tataḥ sā tīvraśokārtā pradīpteva 
ca manyunā” (Mbh 3.60.12) — “then she, agonized by sharp grief and in rage as if 
having burst into flame…” The invocation of fire speaks to the panic illustrated by 
Damayantī’s aimless darting about the wilderness. But she retains herself, and therefore 
control. Damayantī is attacked by a boa in the forest — fear for her safety while alone 
was voiced by Nala in his hesitation to leave — but is subsequently rescued by a nearby 
hunter. When the hunter subsequently attempts to attack Damayantī, she is able to stop 
him by virtue of her agency, once again employing the truth-act template described above 
by Burlingame. 
yathāhaṃ naiṣadhād anyaṃ manasāpi na cintaye | 
If I there is no other in my mind than Nala 
tathāyaṃ patatāṃ kṣudraḥ parāsur mr ̥gajīvanaḥ || 
then let this vile hunter fall dead. 
(Mbh 3.60.37) 
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Though it is rare for a woman to commit the act of killing in the Mahābhārata, the 
incident receives little reflection as Damayantī moves on through the wilderness. 
Likewise, Draupadī’s assailant is condemned to death, but it is at the hand of her husband 
and not the princess herself. Perhaps there is some internal change in Damayantī, who 
now traverses an increasingly perilous forest “nābhibhyat… kasya cit” (Mbh 3.61.10) — 
“without any fear.”   
Also surprising here is the text’s abstinence from anthropomorphizing the snake. 
Later on in their own wilderness, the Pāṇḍavas will also be attacked by a boa, but saved 
through dialogue between the serpent and Yudhiṣṭhira.69 The attempted consumption of 
Damayantī stands as the first interaction in the upākhyāna between the human and the 
natural world that does not involve reciprocated speech. As Damayantī continues to 
search for her husband, however, she comes across a tiger and attempts to engage the 
animal in conversation.70 But the tiger makes no reply when Damayantī asks for Nala’s 
whereabouts. She receives the same lack of response in querying a mountain and later, an 
aśoka tree. Though fully ensconced in it, the natural world appears lost to Damayantī. 
Only an illusory group of ascetics provide her momentary comfort with assurances that 
the couple will reunite in the future. 
These scenes of lamentation regarding love in separation distinguish upākhyāna 
from main narrative counterpart and further align the genre designation of Nala’s Tale 
with romance. Here we look at genre through a set of properties that might run through 
or, equally important, delineate pieces of writing. According to Tzvetan Todorov, the 
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identification of a “principle operative in a number of texts” (Todorov 1970, 3) provides 
argument for genre analysis through a structural lens. However, the perceived genre is 
not a crystalline formation that a particular work must mirror. Such a study will 
ultimately redefine genre designations as “every work modifies the sum of possible 
works, each new example alters the species” (Todorov 1970, 6). We are called, then, to 
compare literatures in order to perceive a dialectic of genre through peculiarities and 
abstractions. The Mahābhārata allows us space to work intra-textually, though 
comparisons outside will prove fruitful, as well. Marie de France’s lay “Chevrefoil,” for 
example, highlights the moment in which an exiled Tristan is pained over his detachment 
from Isolt.71 Likewise, The Letters of Abelard and Heloise, regarded as a central 
component of the romance genre from the medieval period, give us reason to consider 
lamentation as a cornerstone of this writing form. Heloise’s description of her suffering in 
the absence of love might easily be confused for that of Damayantī. 
You know, beloved, as the whole world knows, how much I have lost in you, how 
at one wretched stroke of fortune that supreme act of flagrant treachery robbed me 
of my very self in robbing me of you; and how my sorrow for my loss is nothing 
compared with what I feel for the manner in which I lost you. (trans. Radice 1974, 
113) 
By recognizing these structural similarities through the lens of genre, we can look further 
at the apposition of language between these texts; the resonance in entwining the self 
with the beloved and scorn toward the circumstances of the disunion. This operative 
principle, spanning literary traditions, enhances our perspective on salient features of the 
epic.  
                                                
71 see Hanning and Ferrante 1978, 190 
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Furthermore, an understanding of structural points of contact through genre 
allows us to query the shift in the characters’ relation to the natural world at this point in 
the subtale. Fredric Jameson provides a conceptual model within romance for such 
dissonant experiences of nature. 
Structural analysis now gives us the critical instruments for implementing our 
proposal to replace the older category of “character,” as it dominates such 
psychology-oriented forms as the Bildungsroman, with that, more appropriate to 
romance, of “states” or world configurations: characters would then be 
understood as so many “actants” and their deeds as so many properties in the 
complex mechanism which effectuate the transition from one state to the next; 
while romance as a whole would be seen as a sequence of what, following 
Wagnerian opera, we may call “transformational scenes,” in which, in some 
ultimate and unimaginably  rapid pass between higher and lower realms, all the 
valences are  suddenly changed, negative and positive poles reversed, and new  
complex or inverted or neutralized conditions make an unexpected  appearance. 
(Jameson 1975, 148-149) 
Nala and Damayantī’s shift from ordered landscape to wilderness alone aligns it with the 
main narrative. But by adding the subtale’s depiction of a suddenly inaccessible natural 
world, we are presented with an unexpected shift in realms as facets of the romance 
genre. The fantastical world, in which gods and animals intermingle in the affairs of men, 
suddenly gives way to both literal and figurative chaotic darting. Damayantī’s 
aimlessness illustrates an inability to follow the ordered existence of her previous life. 
Even when given momentary reprieve — the monks’ assurances that her former glory 
would be restored — Damayantī casts doubt on their forecasting in a way that she would 
not previously have questioned the appearance of the fantastic. 
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kiṃ nu svapno mayā dr ̥ṣṭaḥ ko ’yaṃ vidhir ihābhavat | 
Did I see a dream? What happened here? 
kva nu te tāpasāḥ sarve kva tad āśramamaṇḍalam || 
Where are those ascetics? Where is the group of ashrams? 
kva sā puṇyajalā ramyā nānādvijaniṣevitā | 
Where is the lovely river with its pure waters, frequented by all kinds of birds, 
nadī te ca nagā hr ̥dyāḥ phalapuṣpopaśobhitāḥ || 
and the charming trees adorned with fruits and flowers? 
(Mbh 3.61.93-94) 
In considering the episode an illusion, the text provides stark juxtaposition of these two 
modes of being. That earlier magical world, described in tandem with an idealized 
landscape, underscores the despair in Damayantī’s current state. According to Jameson, 
the structure of a romance is contingent upon the identification, inversion, and eventual 
resolution of these “higher and lower realms” (Jameson 1975, 158). While the genre 
guarantees a particular thrust for the story, much like those dreamed well-wishers do with 
Damayantī, the tension of the work remains in the possibility of variation in relation to 
genre. As we continue to interrogate the epic, we are not searching for exact fit, but genre 
as guidance in accessing elements of the text. Todorov gives cause for understanding 
genre as instructive rather than dogmatic as “[i]mperfection is, paradoxically, a guarantee 
of survival” (Todorov 1970, 23). 
When Damayantī finally comes across a means to exit the forest, we get a sense 
of how deeply entwined she has become with this untamed world. We should remember 
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the subtale’s emphasis on the beauty of the princess at the start of the story. At this point, 
however, the occupants of a passing caravan fear the sight of her.  
unmattarūpā śokārtā tathā vastrārdhasaṃvr ̥tā | 
She appeared mad and afflicted with grief, covered with half a cloth, 
kr ̥śā vivarṇā malinā pāṃsudhvastaśiroruhā || 
emaciated, pale, filthy, her hair soiled with dust. 
(Mbh 3.61.110) 
Nearing the end of her time in the wilderness, Damayantī has come to embody that state 
of being. I should admit here that I prefer Monier-Williams’ translation of pāda A in this 
verse, “Manic-like in form and feature” (1965, 79), to my own for both its economy and 
pliability. We get the sense that Damayantī has undergone transformation through and 
through in Monier-William’s rendering. She has become so separated from her previous 
form, in fact, that she is no longer recognizable. The people in the caravan wonder if she 
is devatā (goddess), yakṣī, rākṣaṣī (two types of supernatural monster in the epic), or 
varāṇganā (beautiful woman).72 Joining the pilgrims, then, it appears that Damayantī has 
discovered a clear path out of the forest. That night, however, a stampede of elephants 
decimates the retinue. Damayantī views the horrific event as the result of her inclusion 
into the group — the natural world remains unkind to her.  
The event is grave enough to warrant a stylistic change in the poetry, from the 
eight-syllable-per-pāda anuṣṭubh, to the eleven-syllable-per-pāda triṣṭubh. The 
upākhyāna scantly employed the alternative triṣṭubh prior to this point; first in the 
                                                
72 Mbh 3.61.114-115 
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subtale’s opening of chapter 50, verses twelve and thirteen, to describe the unparalleled 
beauty of Damayantī, and once again in chapter 54, verse eleven, to illustrate 
Damayantī’s anxiety in attempting to correctly choose Nala in spite of the mimicking 
gods at the svayaṃvara. When we get to chapter 61, however, which narrates 
Damayantī’s lone trek through the forest, the triṣṭubh form is employed more frequently, 
yet sporadically, in verses 6, 7, 25, 32, 38, 51, 66, 78, 117, 118, and 123. The first two 
instances in this chapter list the creatures Damayantī encounters in the forest. Verse 25 is 
a lament for Nala, while 32, 38, and 51 ask for his whereabouts from the silent tiger and 
mountain. Damayantī is questioned by the illusory ascetics in verse 66 and responds in 
78. Finally in verses 117 and 118 Damayantī introduces herself to the caravan and at 123 
its leader describes their traveling animals. Note then that a list of animals bookends the 
triṣṭubh telling of Damayantī’s journey. The subsequent chapter, relating the trampling of 
the caravan, presents a nearly uninterrupted use of the triṣṭubh from verses 6 through 18. 
Being the sole instance of more than two consecutive triṣṭubh verses heretofore, the start 
of the chapter warrants our attention. These verses describe, with some grisly detail, the 
slaughter by danta, kara, and pada— that is tusk, trunk, and foot.73 The culmination of 
these events appears when Damayantī reflects on, and attempts to reconcile, the events of 
the past two chapters. 
manye svayaṃvarakr ̥te lokapālāḥ samāgatāḥ | 
I think the world guardians gathered at the svayamvara, 
pratyākhyātā mayā tatra nalasyārthāya devatāḥ | 
                                                
73 Mbh 3.62.8. Strange that the text would have “padbhyāṃ” (broken by foot ~ trampled) in the dual here, 
suggesting bipedal elephants or focusing on just the front legs. Especially odd considering the apposition of 
the list, the other two modes of the caravan’s demise are written in the instrumental plural. 
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those gods I refused there in favor of Nala, 
nūnaṃ teṣāṃ prabhāvena viyogaṃ prāptavaty aham || 
surely it is by their power that I am separated from him. 
(Mbh 3.62.16) 
Damayantī, displaying difficulty in making sense of the events that have come to pass, 
finally considers her sin the act of choosing Nala as a husband over the gods. Outside the 
subtale, we know this is a half-truth: those gods present at the svayaṃvara have no hand 
in the matter. Instead, it is a vengeful Kali, having failed to arrive at the ceremony on 
time, missing the plot as it were, who constructs the partition between the two lovers. The 
end of this block of triṣṭubh verse marks the conclusion of Damayantī’s time in the 
wilderness as she immediately leaves the tragic caravan to arrive at the Cedi kingdom. 
We see that throughout the upākhyāna, this verse form is attached to the actions and 
experiences of Damayantī. This association is pronounced as the verse grows more 
frequent during her separation from Nala. Building connections among character, affect, 
and form, the text alerts the reader to the emotional resonances of these points in the 
narrative just as a minor-key adagio might signal a particular tone within a film — the 
elongated verse focusing in on those difficulties that Damayantī endures. By coinciding 
with the forest journey, this form underscores the emotion of Damayantī’s despair and 
resignation in ultimately finding herself the cause of such misadventure.  
Separation, then, is a driving force in the subtale, which I argue is reflected in 
three distinct but interwoven ways. First, the narrative plot depicts, on the most apparent 
level, the physical disjunction of its heroes. Second, the text reflects a concurrent 
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severance by means of structure, which we can view through the lens of genre. And third, 
a stylistic distinction is revealed in the building up of an alternative verse form. 
Paradoxically, the act of separation is a coordinated and carefully choreographed 
movement in the subtale, which gives it weight and a critical materiality. As Roland 
Barthes explains, the literary nature of this work finds essential quality in the ability to 
maintain both difference and sameness.  
There is supposed to be a mystique of the Text. —On the contrary, the whole 
effort consists in materializing the pleasure of the text, in making the text an 
object of pleasure like the others... The pleasure of the text is just that: claim 
lodged against the separation of the text; for what the text says, through the 
particularity of its name, is the ubiquity of pleasure, the atopia of bliss. (Barthes 
1975, 58-59) 
By repeatedly reflecting and enforcing the notion of separation, the story gives us 
something distinct to grasp. This monster has scales. Meaning is brought through 
narrative, structure, and style to reflect literature which Derrida calls “the institution 
which allows one to say everything in every way” (Derrida 1992, 36), to which he adds: 
To say everything is no doubt to gather, by translating, all figures into one 
another, to totalize by formalizing, but to say everything is also to break out of 
prohibitions. To affranchise onself—in every field where law can lay down the 
law. The law of literature tends, in principle, to defy or lift the law. It therefore 
allows one to think the essence of the law in the experience of this “everything to 
say.” It is an institution which tends to overflow the institution. (Derrida 1992, 36) 
Not only does this particular literature, as object in institution, express its functions 
through a range of utterances, it also translates and represents the preceding materiality. 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s lament occurs at the height of his own disjuncture and results in the telling 
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of Nala’s Tale, which translates the main story experiences into something unique on 
separation and suffering. This in turn renders the subtale separate from and intrinsic to 
the text as a whole. By distorting its echo of the main story, the subtale’s hybrid voicing 
provides essential ways for understanding the literature.  
Furthermore, by focusing on Damayantī as the hero distraught by separation, the 
subtale subverts its surrounding narrative. Recall that Yudhiṣṭhira asked for the story of a 
king unhappier than himself.74 Instead, Bṛhadaśva describes the sorrow of a king’s wife, 
asking Yudhiṣṭhira to look outside himself. While Nala will return to the fore, the text 
does not simply follow him out of the sabhā with newly ripped cloth. Instead, the subtale 
remains with Damayantī as she wakes to find herself abandoned and continues through 
her endurance of the forest. The narrative, then, is fixed on Damayantī as active 
protagonist, as hero. Of course we have seen this agency in her self-choice marriage, too. 
Draupadī’s question, posed at the moment of her disjunction from the Pāṇḍavas, 
continues to reverberate. 
 
ON DISGUISE 
 
Once in Cedi, Damayantī is spotted by the king’s mother who asks her identity — 
śaṃsa me kāsi kasya vā (Mbh 3.62.23) “Tell me who are you or whose?” The dialogue 
advanced by Draupadī on ownership again comes into play. Can Damayantī only be 
                                                
74 Mbh 3.49.34. Note that this verse, which is essentially Yudhiṣṭhira’s expression of ‘woe is me,’ is also in 
triṣṭubh. 
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understood in terms of property? The response is intentionally vague and misleading. 
Damayantī responds that she is noble, jātisaṃpanna, devoted to her husband, bhartṛ-
samanuvrata, and, to throw off the scent, a hairdresser, sairandhrī.75 Why Damayantī 
chooses to conceal herself is unclear. Unlike the Pāṇḍavas, who live in hiding in the 
subsequent book of the Mahābhārata, Nala and Damayantī’s expulsion had no condition 
of a veiled existence. Madeline Biardeau displays similar difficulty with this point in the 
narrative. 
Le but pour elle n'est pas de se faire reconnaître comme princess par des égaux 
mais de retrouver Nala dont elle est sans nouvelles. Et Nala est poursuivi par une 
ennemi invisible mais puissant. Quand on connait la suite des événements, on a 
malgré tout de la peine à justifier ainsi l'incognito de Damayantī: plutôt que 
d'être reconnue par un envoyé de son père, elle aurait pu immédiatement révéler 
qui elle était, quitte à en faire la preuve. Est-ce l'intérêt dramatique du récit qui à 
besoin de ce piment supplémentaire? Ou faut-il chercher ailleurs la raison 
profonde de ce détour? (Biardeau 1984, 261) 
Her goal is not to be recognized as a princess by others, but to find Nala without 
notice. And Nala is pursued by a powerful but invisible enemy.  Even when one 
knows the sequence of events, it is still difficult to justify Damayantī’s thus 
disguising herself: rather than being recognized by her father’s envoy, she would 
have been able to reveal who she was immediately, even to prove it. Is it dramatic 
interest of the story that needs this supplement? Or should we look elsewhere for 
the real reason for this detour? 
While it might be plausible to speculate that a revelation of Damayantī’s identity would 
foil her hope for reunion, the text provides no reason to make this assumption. Regardless 
of motivation, the act certainly forecasts events for the listening Pāṇḍavas. Draupadī will 
                                                
75 Mbh 3.62.25-26. And see Hiltebeitel 2001, 229. 
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pretend to be a hairdresser as well,76 returning the reflection of the mirror story. This is a 
crucial function of the subtale-main story dynamic: the upākhyāna not only re-imagines 
concurrent events but serves to instruct and guide the main story, as well. Yudhiṣṭhira’s 
request for the tale was to be both consoled for his past and advised on how to proceed. 
The text shifts focus to Nala at this point. The prince remains in the wilderness 
but, unlike Damayantī, retains his ability to speak with animals. Inverting the earlier 
scene in which Damayantī was attacked by a large boa, Nala responds to a snake’s call 
for help. In exchange for his life, threatened by a surrounding fire, the snake promises to 
assist Nala — upadekṣyāmi te śreyas trātum arhati māṃ bhavān (Mbh 3.63.6). Disparate 
translations of the line show us that the wording of the promise is as perilous as its 
outcome. Archaizing language notwithstanding, Monier-Williams’ translation renders a 
soteriological bent into the subtale: “I the way of bliss will show thee, if thou sav’st me 
from this fate” (Monier-Williams 1965, 95). Ganguli finds the declaration to have more 
personal application to Nala: “I will instruct thee in respect of thy welfare. It behoveth 
thee to deliver me” (Ganguli 2000, 141). J. A. B. van Buitenen presents the text as more 
plainspoken and direct: “If you save me, I shall teach you what will profit you” (van 
Buitenen 1975, 344). Considering these translations in concert, then, the snake’s words 
seem intentionally abstract to invite confusion for both the reader and Nala. While the 
offer might be understood as assistance particular to Nala’s predicament, the possibility 
of a broader interpretation either in mundane or spiritual terms persists, along with a 
sense of suspense through this concealment. Of course we should remember here the 
                                                
76 Mbh 4.3.16 
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boon given to Nala upon his marriage to Damayantī, he can pass through the fire 
unharmed. As the prince moves in to assist, a second proposal by the snake is equally 
puzzling. 
padāni gaṇayan gaccha svāni naiṣadha kāni cit | 
Go, counting your own steps, Nala. 
tatra te ’haṃ mahārāja śreyo dhāsyāmi yat param || 
Then, king, I will give you a great gift. 
(Mbh 3.63.10) 
So when the snake, who reduced his size so that he might be carried out of the fire, 
repays Nala by biting him on the tenth step,77 the reader hesitates to wonder whether 
Nala’s poor fortune persists. The bite instantly transforms Nala’s appearance and leaves 
him vismita, astonished.78 Once again this key phrase is associated with a type of 
paralysis as Nala is described as arrested, tasthau (Mbh 3.63.12), in order to take stock of 
his new self.  
That moment of astonished hesitation is a crucial component to what Todorov 
calls the fantastic. By discerning the fantastic and its role within a particular work, 
Todorov argues that we might gain insight into the genre function in literature.  
The fantastic requires the fulfillment of three conditions. First, the text must 
oblige the reader to consider the world of the characters as a world of living 
persons and to hesitate between a natural and a supernatural explanation of the 
events described. Second, this hesitation may also be experienced by a character; 
thus the reader’s role is so to speak entrusted to a character, and at the same time 
                                                
77 John D. Smith notes the similarity in the Sanskrit between the word bite, here in the imperfect form 
adaśat, and the number ten, in this verse a locative daśame. (2009, 173 n. 1) 
78 Mbh 3.63.12 
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the hesitation is represented, it becomes one of the themes of the work — in the 
case of naive reading, the actual reader identifies himself with the character. 
Third, the reader must adopt a certain attitude with regard to the text: he will 
reject allegorical as well as “poetic” interpretations. (Todorov 1975, 33) 
By employing the fantastic in this particular fashion, inviting and at once reflecting 
hesitation through reader response and character, the work resists reductive 
understandings. The shrinking, talking animal and Nala’s physical transformation do not 
require exegetical explanation, but are accepted in the literature through the moment of 
reflection. Astonishment occurs with the incorporation of the fantastic event through 
hesitation. In regard to the Mahābhārata, the moment is meant to occur on three planes: 
subtale, main story, and reader. This interaction reaches beyond shared experience to 
intertwined participation. As literature, rather than as a form of allegory, the poem 
incorporates and sustains difference. The fantastic allows shifting identity for Nala, 
Yudhiṣṭhira, and reader. 
Following this moment, the snake goes on to explain his obscured actions. The 
transformation will allow Nala to enter the city of Ayodhyā undetected: “mayā te 
‘ntarhitaṃ rūpaṃ na tvā vidyur janā iti” (Mbh 3.63.13) — “I concealed your form so 
that people may not know you.” In addition, the venom now coursing through Nala’s 
body will harm the possessing Kali. The exclamation by the snake serves as the first 
direct mention to Nala of Kali’s action. Up to this point, the humans in the subtale 
speculated upon some madness or possession as the only possible explanation for the 
virtuous Nala’s poor deeds, but remained unable to verify this hunch. The double action, 
freeing the hero from himself in both form and blame, propels Nala away from his 
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hopeless state of being. Furthermore, the snake reveals that Nala’s particular quality 
mentioned in the opening verse, his skill with horses, will soon gain him control over the 
dice, which will in turn lead to his reunion with Damayantī.79 In his final instruction, the 
snake supplements Nala’s cloth with “divyaṃ vāsoyugaṃ” (Mbh 3.63.23), which van 
Buitenen takes to mean “a pair of celestial clothes” (van Buitenen 1975, 345), but might 
also qualify the outfit as beautiful rather than divine. To return to his original form, Nala 
is told to put the clothes on and think of the snake. 
By the time he arrives at the kingdom of Ṛtuparṇa, Nala has developed a 
backstory for his new identity. Unlike Damayantī, who largely conceals herself by 
remaining vague, Nala fully commits to his disguise. 
sa rājānam upātiṣṭhad bāhuko ’ham iti bruvan | 
He approached the king, saying, “I am Bāhuka. 
aśvānāṃ vāhane yuktaḥ pr ̥thivyāṃ nāsti matsamaḥ || 
No one in the world is equal to me in guiding horses. 
arthakr ̥cchreṣu caivāhaṃ praṣṭavyo naipuṇeṣu ca | 
And I am consulted in difficult and specialized matters. 
annasaṃskāram api ca jānāmy anyair viśeṣataḥ || 
Also, I know how to prepare food better than others.” 
(Mbh 3.64.2-3) 
As with Damayantī, the disguise functions almost counterintuitively by further revealing 
the hero to the reader. Not only are those originally attested aspects reaffirmed, but we 
                                                
79 Mbh 3.63.20-21 
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are also reminded of Nala’s cooking ability. This information, though seemingly 
dispensable, will play a larger role later on in the story. The ruse convinces the king of 
Ṛtuparṇa to take on Nala, now Bāhuka, as his aśvādhyakṣa — supervisor of horses.80 The 
way in which the subtale sets the stage for subsequent events, initially describing a figure 
whose characteristics will be demonstrated when his or her identity is obscured, 
highlights disguise, the embodiment of difference, as a sustaining component of the self. 
Nala’s words and actions as Bāhuka refine and focus a depiction of the hero. 
The classical Tamil epic Maṇimekhalai obscures its titular hero in two distinct 
instances. Given the power to transform her appearance at will, Maṇimekhalai, who 
works throughout the text to fulfill Buddhist dharma, changes her identity while being 
stalked by a king so that she might freely roam the streets of her city. In this state, she 
transforms a prison into a temple and housing for monks, honoring the Buddha and 
saṅgha. Toward the end of the book, Maṇimekhalai disguises herself as a male student so 
that she might learn about the various religious traditions as the final stepping stone along 
her path to the Buddha. Disguise, therefore, both for the Tamil and Sanskrit epics, 
functions as a necessary component to relieve restriction rather than a means to hide. 
Perhaps, though inexplicit, Biardeau’s understanding of Damayantī’s concealment enacts 
an operative principle inherent in the genre without requiring pointed motivation. To 
transform in the epic, to become hybrid, is to fulfill the role of hero. Nala and Damayantī 
separately alter themselves so they might free themselves up to act as their character 
                                                
80 Mbh 3.64.6 
 77 
requires. The moment in which Nala’s possession is dismantled and he might again act 
under his own agency is simultaneously when he must proceed incognito, as other.  
Ensconced in this new setting, Nala breaks character once every night to sing a 
lament to Damayantī. Nala displays his guilt over the abandonment and concern for the 
welfare of his wife. 
kva nu sā kṣutpipāsārtā śrāntā śete tapasvinī | 
Where does that poor woman lie, afflicted by hunger and thirst, wearied,  
 and miserable? 
smarantī tasya mandasya kaṃ vā sādyopatiṣṭhati || 
Thinking of that fool, whom does she wait upon today? 
 (Mbh 3.64.10) 
In van Buitenen’s translation of the verse, the third-person subject is shifted to the second 
person, thereby rendering Nala’s call more direct and personal. While the alteration might 
more clearly present that crack in his mask, the use of the third person, however, aligns 
with Nala’s subsequent explanation of the verse to an overhearing party. Nala as Bāhuka 
recounts his own story in the third person, expounding upon a ‘nitwit’81 who separated 
from his venerable wife and now sings out to her in sorrow. Bāhuka states that the man 
does not deserve to live and doubts whether the wife survives.82 By stepping into that 
third-person role, Bāhuka’s reflection appears more damning and severe than Nala 
himself. The efficacy of the scene rests in what it hides from view. 
 
                                                
81 van Buitenen’s translation of mandaprajña from Mbh 3.64.12 and following (1975, 345). Nitwit might 
be a little lighthearted considering the gravity of the scene. 
82 “vasaty anarhas” (Mbh 3.64.15); “yadi jīvati” (Mbh 3.64.16 and 17) 
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TO BE DISCOVERED 
 
Damayantī’s disguise gives way almost immediately. Her father’s searching 
envoy is able to definitively identify Damayantī through both her unmatched beauty and 
deep sadness. Despite the feeble mask, Damayantī is changed. Her lengthy description by 
the envoy reminds us of the subtale’s opening verses. But here the praise is amended by 
descriptions of despair. 
rūpaudāryaguṇopetāṃ maṇḍanārhām amaṇḍitām | 
Beautiful, noble, and virtuous, she is worthy of ornament though unadorned, 
candralekhām iva navāṃ vyomni nīlābhrasaṃvr ̥tām || 
like a sliver of a new moon covered by dark clouds in the sky. 
 (Mbh 3.65.16) 
More than her identity, the disguise hid Damayantī’s trauma from view. When finally 
confronted with herself by the envoy, therefore, the princess is stripped of pretense “and 
wept powerfully”— “ruroda ca bhr ̥śaṃ” (Mbh 3.65.30). That display of emotions 
ultimately betrays Damayantī by causing her harborer, the Cedi king’s mother, to query 
the envoy for Damayantī’s identity. But the woman is glad to hear the truth, revealing 
herself to be the sister of Damayantī’s mother.83 In a fitting bit of symbolism, a lotus-
shaped mole, piplu, on the forehead of Damayantī, obscured at first by dust, confirms the 
story. The king’s mother permits the princess to return to her parents without hesitation. 
                                                
83 Mbh 3.66.11 
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Once safe in Vidarbha, Damayantī beseeches her parents to resume the search for 
Nala. Envoys are once again dispatched to outside kingdoms, but with specific 
instructions from the princess. Damayantī gives the envoys a scripted request to appeal to 
her husband. 
kva nu tvaṃ kitava chittvā vastrārdhaṃ prasthito mama | 
Where have you gone, gambler, having cut part of my cloth? 
utsr ̥jya vipine suptām anuraktāṃ priyāṃ priya || 
Having abandoned your beloved, dear one asleep in the forest, dear? 
sā vai yathā samādiṣṭā tatrāste tvatpratīkṣiṇī | 
Indeed, she waits for you there, as directed, 
dahyamānā bhr ̥śaṃ bālā vastrārdhenābhisaṃvr ̥tā || 
the girl covered with half a cloth is wholly consumed. 
tasyā rudantyāḥ satataṃ tena śokena pārthiva | 
To her, constantly weeping because of this sorrow, 
prasādaṃ kuru vai vīra prativākyaṃ dadasva ca || 
o king, show kindness and give her an answer. 
(Mbh 3.67.9-11) 
David Shulman identifies this passage as “a kind of riddle” (Shulman 1994, 8) that 
corresponds with the earlier verse sung by Nala each night in Ṛtuparṇa’s kingdom. This 
designation of ‘riddle’ is advanced by Shulman because an answer might be more 
complex than a surface reading of the question suggests. 
She is taunting him with a question that only has one answer, although enfolded 
within this answer is the other, perhaps unanswerable question: “why?” Only Nala 
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would act as he has acted — on the level the identification is utterly secure — but, 
she wonders, does the fatal moment of his abandonment have any meaning? 
(Shulman 1996, 9) 
Agreeing with Shulman’s recognition of the multivalent interpretations of the question 
along with its specificity directed at Nala, I would add that this ‘riddle,’ conjoined with 
Nala’s corresponding verses, connect back to the main story by sharing that accessible 
but ultimately unanswerable quality present in Draupadī’s query. Taking these three 
utterances in concert, then, the riddles present a moment of pause, a hesitation, to 
consider the significance of the preceding actions. Moreover, this style of questioning, as 
riddle, connects to the larger motifs of journey and disguise resounding in the main story 
and subtale. 
In this sense the riddling-speech of the period of searching and disguise is the 
proper paradigm for their communication. The riddle also embodies just such an 
open space, a “nowhere” that should somehow be bridged by the answer, even if 
the answer has the paradoxical effect of veiling or disguising again even as it 
brings the hidden solution to the fore. Couched in code, the riddle rings true: 
Damayantī’s question is the right one for Nala, not merely in the literal way in 
which it is conceived but in the much more pervasive sense that the story as a 
whole seems to suggest. It is the answer that is the locus of difficulty, for 
everyone — riddler, respondent, the eavesdropping audience outside. (Shulman 
1994, 11) 
Those three riddles remain unanswered by their intended recipients, Yudhiṣṭhira, 
Damayantī, and Nala, because their implied answer would be unsatisfactory to the 
demands of the narrative. The ‘riddles’ are more declaration than interrogative, as the 
second and third verses of Damayantī’s script more directly demonstrate. Her appeal to 
her husband is in describing her circumstance in order to reunite, just as Draupadī threw 
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the legitimacy of her situation in doubt so that Yudhiṣṭhira might disrupt their separation. 
The verse given to the envoys, then, is meant to appeal to both the prince inside the 
subtale and the one who occupies the main story. 
In fact, Damayantī is explicit on this intention in her instruction to the 
messengers. 
etad anyac ca vaktavyaṃ kr ̥pāṃ kuryād yathā mayi | 
And speak this and more so that he might take pity on me. 
vāyunā dhūyamāno hi vanaṃ dahati pāvakaḥ || 
When rattled by wind, the fire burns the forest. 
(Mbh 3.67.12) 
She hopes to “rattle” Nala in order to break down those elements that brought about their 
separation — here an oblique speculation on his possession, which is heretofore only 
confirmed to Nala himself by the snake. Rather than elicit the riddle’s implied answer, 
Damayantī advances the question for alternate effect. Her direct address to Nala, which 
clashes with the prince’s address to his wife in the third person, serves as a more 
undeviated emotional appeal. Furthermore, the need to read between the lines of the 
question might account for Damayantī’s contradictory detail, describing herself as 
remaining in the forest while she in fact stays in her parents’ kingdom. What Shulman 
does not address, however, is that the above verses are only the beginning of Damayantī’s 
plea. 
bhartavyā rakṣaṇīyā ca patnī hi patinā sadā | 
A husband always supports and protects a wife. 
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tan naṣṭam ubhayaṃ kasmād dharmajñasya satas tava || 
Although you are one who knows dharma, both these have perished — why? 
khyātaḥ prājñaḥ kulīnaś ca sānukrośaś ca tvaṃ sadā | 
You are ever acclaimed as wise and noble and compassionate, 
saṃvr ̥tto niranukrośaḥ śaṅke madbhāgyasaṃkṣayāt || 
grown cruel, I fear from my own bad luck. 
sa kuruṣva maheṣvāsa dayāṃ mayi nararṣabha | 
Great warrior! Have pity on me, bull among men! 
ānr ̥śaṃsyaṃ paro dharmas tvatta eva hi me śrutam || 
I often heard you say, compassion is the highest dharma. 
 (Mbh 3.67.13-15) 
The most striking aspect of this final portion of the appeal is the double invocation of 
dharma. The reasons for my own choice in leaving the word untranslated will be made 
clear below. But for now we should point out that van Buitenen chooses to render the 
word as “Law” (1975, 349) while Monier-Williams translates dharma as “duty” (1965, 
115). Ganguli employs two terms: in its primary instance here, dharma is deciphered as 
“duty” while at the end of the plea it becomes “virtue” (2000, 146-147). As a result, we 
should inspect those two distinct contexts in which the term is applied. Initially, dharma 
is framed particularly around marital responsibilities. The dharma of a husband requires 
acting as guardian for the wife. In the final verse, however, dharma is aligned with a 
more general substrate of the population as benevolent action. Elsewhere in the subtale, 
dharma appears in association with ceremonial practice, referring to the manner in which 
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Damayantī carried out her selection of Nala in the svayaṃvara.84 Dharma is also 
correlated with the duties of a king,85 a skill set that can be imparted by the gods as a 
marriage gift,86 a range of knowledge,87 and a method of hospitality.88 Through 
Damayantī’s explicit intention to “rattle” Nala with her plea, we should understand the 
employment of this pliable and loaded term as reflexively echoing its previous 
invocations. 
As Hiltebeitel argues in his 2011 text on the topic, dharma holds unique footing 
in the epic precisely because of its unusual pliability in providing structure to a particular 
narrative.89 More specifically, the text’s diffuse cast of characters, both, and often 
simultaneously, actors and listeners, along with disparate contexts, in divergent levels of 
narrative render the pivotal term impossible to associate with a singular stance.90 Dharma 
defies lexicographical interpretation in the Mahābhārata also in dialogical response to 
surrounding writings, such as Aśoka’s edicts and the Rāmāyaṇa, which offer narrower 
portrayal, often personified in a flawless singular figure. Despite the fact that Yudhiṣṭhira 
is frequently referred to as the dharmarāja, and is born directly from a deity named 
Dharma, we have seen that the text takes deliberate steps to disassociate the prince with 
idealized conduct and thereby a one-to-one correlation between the character and term. 
Instead, Hiltebeitel grounds the Mahābhārata’s dharma in legal precedent, as applied to 
                                                
84 Mbh 3.54.25 
85 Mbh 3.54.35 
86 Mbh 3.54.31 
87 Mbh 3.55.8 
88 Mbh 3.61.66 
89 See Hiltebeitel 2011, 27: Hiltebeitel uncovers dharma in the Mbh to include common sense, allowing the 
weight of this governing principle to apply to mundane and murky circumstances, thereby acquiring a 
range of meanings. 
90 See Hiltebeitel 2011, 424. 
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both formal and informal understandings of law, and proceeds to demonstrate its 
malleability. The upākhyānas are tied to concerns in understanding dharma as Hiltebeitel 
identifies the subtales as largely imparting non-homogenous lessons in the law.  
In effect, these lessons in legal precedent present just the opposite of what we 
have seen in the foregrounding that Rāma’s ever so law-abiding ancestors provide 
for him. It is not that lunar dynasty kings are less law-abiding. It is just that they 
bring the law into play because they like to mess around, which results in legal 
tangles that carry forward into the main story. (Hiltebeitel 2011, 427) 
As we will also find in my later discussion of the Yakṣa’s Questions, dharma itself 
becomes a type of riddle in Shulman’s terms. Its initial answer, the singular definition, 
only opens the gates to a host of unanswerable questions. To consider dharma in this epic 
is impossible without asking for whom or when or where it might be applied.  
I argue, therefore, that in its multivalence, dharma does not obscure, but rather, 
like Damayantī’s birthmark, reveals its subject. Its usage in Nala’s Tale  underscores both 
a range in application and its qualifiable importance in association. If we are to take 
dharma expressed in Damayantī’s plea as ultimately compassion for a moment, its earlier 
iterations demonstrate the challenge in applying a single understanding to multiple 
instances.  Agreeing with Hiltebeitel in its grounding in either formal or informal law, I 
add to that understanding dharma as a marker of distinction in the Mahābhārata. Dharma 
is itself what comes toward defining the entity at hand, the actions distinct for a husband, 
wife, king, et cetera. Whether rooted in convention, law, or some notion of essentiality, 
this term is utilized by the epic in its struggles to arrive at a distinctly complex 
worldview. Damayantī, in appealing to her husband as her husband, attempts to uncover 
the crucial aspect of Nala’s position. But as Shulman’s notion of riddle suggests, a simple 
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understanding only opens toward further unanswerable questions. Dharma at once 
reveals a crux quality and its challenges in being fulfilled. When Damayantī invokes 
dharma in the second instance — attempting to suss out some essential and general 
meaning of the word — we should read the text as indicating that this plea will have 
obscured results.  Not because she is incorrect, but because, like the structure of epic 
itself reveals, this is never the whole story. The Mahābhārata displays a syncopation in 
the processes of obfuscation and revelation that defies direct, measured, and directed 
correspondence. 
When the message reaches the disguised Nala, his response is at once revealing 
and presents further complications to Damayantī’s desired result. While he is indeed 
“rattled,” Nala’s reaction does not appear sufficient to bring about the couple’s reunion.  
vaiṣamyam api saṁprāptā gopāyanti kulastriyaḥ | 
Even having encountered difficulty, noble women guard themselves, 
ātmānam ātmanā satyo jitasvargā na saṁśayaḥ | 
by themselves, being those by whom heaven is won: there is no doubt. 
rahitā bhartr ̥bhiś caiva na krudhyanti kadā cana || 
And so when forsaken by their husbands, they never become angry. 
viṣamasthena mūḍhena paribhraṣṭasukhena ca | 
Him being in difficulty, confused, and fallen from happiness, 
yat sā tena parityaktā tatra na kroddhum arhati || 
when she has been abandoned by him she ought not be angry then. 
prāṇayātrāṁ pariprepsoḥ śakunair hr ̥tavāsasaḥ | 
 86 
Trying to obtain the necessities of life, his clothing was taken by birds, 
ādhibhir dahyamānasya śyāmā na kroddhum arhati || 
consumed by misfortunes, the beautiful one ought not be angry with him. 
satkr ̥tāsatkr ̥tā vāpi patiṁ dr ̥ṣṭvā tathāgatam | 
Whether treated well or not, having seen the husband in that condition, 
bhraṣṭarājyaṁ śriyā hīnaṁ śyāmā na kroddhum arhati || 
bereft of kingdom and fortune, she who is beautiful ought not be angry. 
 (Mbh 3.68.8-11) 
Perhaps indicative of Nala’s shaken state, there appears to be desperation in his speech. 
The incessant repetition, both within lines and through corresponding padas, carries a 
manic tone. Nala is clearly riddled with guilt and regret for his past actions, but also 
mounts something of a self-defense by citing those birds as locus of the couple’s 
separation. It is interesting to note that van Buitenen’s translation leaves out any mention 
of the birds, rendering the verse to explain that Nala himself took the cloth “to find a 
living” (1975, 350). But those golden-feathered fowl, as we have observed through close 
reading of the text, are not minor detail but rather crucial to the plot, both in their actions 
and their states of being. The most significant aspect of Nala’s speech, apparently, is the 
persistent “na kroddhum arhati,” evoked at each final pada of the latter three verses. The 
phrase contains a negative particle, the infinitive form of the verbal root krudh, to be 
angry, and the verbal root arh, deserve, conjugated in the third person present tense. 
Despite the simple construction, the phrase is rendered in three different forms in van 
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Buitenen’s translation alone.91 The repetition, however, seems crucial to reflecting Nala’s 
state of being. I argue, then, that Nala’s repetitive speech reflects Deleuze’s notion of a 
“stutter,” a deficiency in utterance that is intended to evoke meaning through silence — a 
pointed hesitation.  
When language is so strained that it starts to stutter, or to murmur or 
stammer…then language in its entirety reaches the limit that marks its outside and 
makes it confront silence. When language is strained in this way, language in its 
entirety is submitted to a pressure that makes it fall silent. (Deleuze 1998, 113) 
The simple construction, therefore, demands to be translated plainly and repeatedly in 
order to reflect the deficiency of language in reflecting Nala’s regret and desperate self-
justification. By finding other forms, the translator seeks out more coherent meaning 
within the speech, which I would argue is purposefully absent here.  
For when an author is content with an external marker that leaves the form of 
expression intact (“he stuttered…”), its efficacy will be poorly understood unless 
there is a corresponding form of content—an atmospheric quality, a milieu that 
acts as the conductor of words—that brings together within itself the quiver, the 
murmur, the stutter, the tremolo, or the vibrato, and makes the indicated affect 
reverberate through the words. (Deleuze 1998, 108) 
At first glance, the more literal translation might appear as though my early stance on 
lexicographical weight is turned on its ear. Instead, this instance reminds us that meaning 
built in the text through surrounding space, within and in between lines, deserves 
significant consideration. The prince fails to express any compassion or pity, at least in a 
manner that might indicate a desire to reunite with Damayantī — and this is certainly a 
                                                
91 “there should be no cause for a grudge,” “no beautiful woman would anger,” “what beautiful woman 
would anger?” (van Buitenen 1975, 350). Note that the final two translations also include the nominative 
śyāmā. 
 88 
significant omission. Instead, Nala is only able to stammer out his desire that the princess 
“does not deserve to be angry.” This intentional silence captures the hindrance of Nala’s 
agency at this juncture. Still possessed and in service to another, he cannot respond 
satisfactorily. As we have previously found that disguise can often facilitate new 
discovery, revelation might similarly point to constraint. When Damayantī subsequently 
hatches a plot to reunite with her husband, she remarks that her intentions must be hidden 
away from her father.92 
 
REDUPLICATIONS 
 
As we have just broached the topic of repetition above, we should turn to the 
subsequent resurgence of the subtale’s opening act. The text calls for a second 
svayaṃvara. Again the marriage ceremony is enacted by Damayantī following the word 
of a messenger, and again it is a ruse with the explicit intention of facilitating the union of 
Nala and the princess. Deleuze’s paradigm provides insight into the divergent “form of 
content” that allows reprised elements to subsume new meaning. The reader can 
recognize both the stutter and change as this second svayaṃvara is enacted with altered 
urgency. Damayantī dispatches an envoy to Ṛtuparṇa’s kingdom with news of her desire 
to select a husband again. Nala journeys to Damayantī once more in service to another — 
this time as Ṛtuparṇa’s disguised servant, Bāhuka, rather than a representative of the gods 
— and along the way faces another unexpected alteration. But first we should note that 
                                                
92 Mbh 3.68.15 
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her plan is disguised well enough that Nala is unsure whether Damayantī is exhibiting 
“strategy,” upāyaś cintito mahān (Mbh 3.69.4), “madness from grief,” duḥkhena mohitā 
(Mbh 3.69.4), or the desire to commit “a scornful act” against her husband, nr ̥śaṁsaṁ 
(Mbh 3.69.5). The uncertainty of this hero in an altered milieu draws a striking contrast to 
Nala at the start of the subtale. 
But the text does purposefully wish to call the reader’s attention to those opening 
movements in the story. Nala’s primary act as Bāhuka is in selecting horses to make the 
expedition to Damayantī. Here that initial aśvakovida descriptor comes into action, 
bolstered by Ṛtuparṇa’s skepticism of those animals based on superficial assessment.93 
Nala’s skill in horses is so tuned that it allows him to perceive elements that others might 
overlook. In transit, those horses validate Nala’s ability as their speed appears to render 
the chariot capable of flight.94 Furthermore, this image recalls the airborne chariot of the 
gods as they journeyed to the subtale's first marriage ceremony. And just like those gods 
in the chariot, Ṛtuparṇa’s second charioteer looks upon Nala and is “vismayaṃ 
paramaṃ” (Mbh 3.69.22) — completely astonished. Following the observed pattern 
here, the second charioteer experiences a moment of hesitation in his astonishment where 
he begins to question whether his co-charioteer is actually Nala in disguise. In fact, van 
Buitenen more explicitly translates the text’s description of Ṛtuparṇa’s other charioteer at 
this moment, “evam vicārya bahuśo… hṛdayena” (Mbh 3.69.32), as “with many 
hesitations in his heart” (van Buitenen 1975, 352). Monier-Williams renders the verse 
“sate debating in his mind” (Monier-Williams 1965, 129), while Ganguli illustrates that 
                                                
93 Mbh 3.69.14 
94 “samutpetur ivākāśaṃ” (Mbh 3.69.21) —they flew up together in the sky. 
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second driver as “Having thus reasoned in his mind” (Ganguli 2000, 150). While vicārya 
might be defined as ‘questioned,’ ‘debated,’ or ‘pondered,’ the term utilized by van 
Buitenen, ‘hesitation,’ more accurately supports my larger reading of the epic.  
Moreover, I argue that van Buitenen’s translation of the charioteer’s state of being 
demonstrates a careful consideration of the critical word at play. The verbal root car 
denotes movement, to walk or to stir or to wander,95 while the verbal prefix vi- adds 
words like away, apart, or out96 to our understanding of the term. Though present to 
observe Nala’s prowess, Ṛtuparṇa’s charioteer wanders away repeatedly in his heart. The 
dichotomy might remind us of Nala’s own more literal repeated departure and return, his 
hesitation at the abandonment of his wife. But more concretely, this moment reflects 
those gods, seeing Nala on the road to Damayantī’s first marriage ceremony, each 
experiencing “departed intention.” I argue that this moment further supports Biardeau’s 
argument as both instances in concert support a particular trope in which that viewer of 
Nala steps outside of himself and abandons selfish goals through astonishment and 
hesitation. Agreeing with Hiltebeitel, it is certainly unusual for the scene to depict a duo 
of charioteers on such a journey.97 But understanding the second actor as fulfilling the 
function of recognizing Bāhuka as Nala, while reflecting a larger story in the act of 
beholding Nala, the character becomes a necessary keystone in spanning these core 
moments of the text.  
                                                
95 Whitney 2006, 45. 
96 Whitney 2005, 1077. 
97 See Hiltebeitel 2001, 233. Hiltebeitel argues that the second charioteer, Vārṣṛṇeya, also serves as a 
double to Kṛṣṇa. 
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The text snaps back from reflection and hesitation to the chariot’s intense speed, 
which now blows the upper garment98 off the body of Ṛtuparṇa. The king orders his car 
reversed so that the clothing might be retrieved, but Nala refuses and the matter is 
immediately dropped. It is a brief and strange moment in the text, perhaps to remind Nala 
of his own lost cloth. Nala’s harsh rebuke of Ṛtuparṇa — on one level the 
insubordination of a servant to a king, which Thomas Parkhill cites as “displaying 
staggering chutzpah” (Parkhill 1984, 339)  — might reflect some internal anguish. 
Furthermore, the scene illustrates a transitional return to Nala’s own self-agency. In the 
next instant, Nala is halting the chariot on his own accord so that he can exchange his 
understanding of the heart of horses — aśvahṛdaya — with Ṛtuparṇa’s knowledge of the 
heart of the dice — akṣahṛdayajña.99 
As knowledge of the heart of the dice is imparted to Nala, Kali is finally pushed 
out of his body,100 coughing up the snake’s poison. The possession ends with a double 
regurgitation, both from possessed and possessor, and Kali goes on to explain that he was 
in fact victimized inside Nala’s body by additional curses. An enraged Nala restrains 
himself from imposing further punishment upon the deity, and the two fully break away 
from each other. The placement of this scene deserves additional consideration. As we 
have observed, the subtale takes care to juxtapose its two scenes on the road to 
Damayantī’s svayaṃvara. It is significant that Kali arrives at the corresponding moment 
that he missed in the first instance. Having never seen Nala on that road before, Kali 
                                                
98 “uttarīyam” (Mbh 3.70.2). 
99 Mbh 3.70.26 
100 “tasyākṣahr ̥dayajñasya śarīrān niḥsr ̥taḥ kaliḥ” (Mbh 3.70.27). 
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could not act in line with those other gods in sanctioning the wedding. Finally present on 
that road, Kali’s actions, though hardly of his own accord, clear the final hurdle in Nala 
and Damayantī’s union. Nala is finally dispossessed, fully himself once again. Though 
the Maha ̄bhārata would never allow anything that simple: Nala is still another, he is still 
Bāhuka. As the charioteer, Nala rejoins his fellow travelers and rushes in the direction of 
Damayantī. The horses are so well controlled here that they fly like birds.101 
The sound of those galloping horses first causes Damayantī to suspect that Nala 
has arrived at the kingdom. In expressing her longing for Nala, the subtale works once 
again to underscore the intensity of their romance. 
yadi vai tasya vīrasya bāhvor nādyāham antaram | 
If I am not in the space within the arms of that man today, 
praviśāmi sukhasparśaṃ vinaśiṣyāmy asaṃśayam || 
which is a joy to touch, then I will no doubt die. 
(Mbh 3.71.10) 
Certainly we can observe that Damayantī holds no grudge over her previous 
abandonment. Her forgiveness is more explicit in subsequent verses, stating that she has 
no recollection of past wrongs.102 Nala, however, is less merciful of himself. When 
Damayantī’s messenger questions Bāhuka on Nala’s whereabouts, repeating Damayantī’s 
riddle, he replies that the deserter’s actions are evil — “aśubhakarmaṇaḥ” (Mbh 3.72.15) 
— forsaking wife and children. In the first book of the Mahābhārata, the same phrase is 
utilized in the Śakuntalā upākhyāna to describe a king who similarly neglects his duty to 
                                                
101 “utpatato dvijān iva” (Mbh 3.70.37). 
102 The repeated phrase here is “na smarāmi” (Mbh 3.71.13). 
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his son103 and in categorizing the fire set to the lacquer house,104 underscoring the weight 
of such a pronouncement.  
The messenger facilitates a second test to determine the identity of Nala for 
Damayantī by bringing the princess some food prepared by Bāhuka. Where first Nala was 
recognized by sound, here he is also known through taste. Recall that Nala was gifted 
skill in cooking by the gods at his original marriage to Damayantī. Also mirroring that 
first ceremony, the sense of sight proves insufficient to suss out the true Nala — first 
because his form appeared in multitude and now because the prince resides within a 
disfigured disguise. The subtale repeatedly draws the reader back to the peculiarities of 
that initial marriage. Finally, echoing Nala’s unusual first meeting with Damayantī, in 
which he was granted exclusive audience with his future bride by acting as envoy to the 
gods, Damayantī calls Bāhuka into her chamber for a private meeting. In some respects, 
the scene being rehashed at this point in the subtale, that first encounter between the 
lovers, was the site of the actual svayaṃvara. This is the point in which Damayantī 
makes her intention clear to Nala: “varayiṣye naravyāghra” (Mbh 3.53.11) — I will 
choose you, tiger among men! As Shulman points out, Damayantī also introduces us to 
her “gift for recognition” (Shulman 1994, 24), which comes to full fruition at this latter 
point of the story. The correspondences between these two parts of the text allow the 
reader of the tale to view the process through which the narrative establishes and carries 
its own conditions. Given its climactic weight, the reader can expect this reflected scene 
                                                
103 Mbh 1.68.70 
104 Mbh 1.135.14 
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to be the moment when all pretense melts away. Nala fully confesses his identity to 
Damayantī. 
mama rājyaṁ pranaṣṭaṁ yan nāhaṁ tat kr ̥tavān svayam | 
My kingdom was lost not by my own doing. 
kalinā tat kr ̥taṁ bhīru yac ca tvām aham atyajam || 
That was done by Kali, timid one, and also that I abandoned you. 
(Mbh 3.74.16) 
J. A. B. van Buitenen renders Nala’s message in a more succinct fashion: “It was not my 
own fault.” (1975, 359). Considering the way in which Nala framed those events up to 
this point, resting the blame squarely on his own shoulders, the acceptance of Nala’s lack 
of agency is remarkable. Both Shulman and Hiltebeitel observe Nala as finally capable of 
recognizing the self, the completion of an internal struggle.105 But in observing the way in 
which Nala’s Tale veers back and forth onto itself, the final accomplishment is more 
circular than linear. Each action toward the conclusion can be anticipated, or at least 
given full dimension, through the template that is laid out before the reader in the 
corresponding scene. 
Agreeing, then, with Hiltebeitel’s work to align Nala’s disguise and revelation to 
those masks subsequently worn by the Pāṇḍavas further afield,106 both audiences of the 
subtale are effectively taught how to read the epic. As template, the subtale reveals issues 
to underline in conducting a close reading of the epic, i.e. a consideration of concealment 
as a point of disclosure as well as agency of the self. For the main story heroes and their 
                                                
105 See Hiltebeitel 2001, 236 and Shulman 1994, 27. 
106 See Hiltebeitel 2001, 239. 
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wife, their approach to the fourth book is informed by this subtale, which matches the 
process of understanding undertaken by the reader. By committing to these sideshadows 
and reduplications that occur within subtales, between subtales and main story, and, as 
we shall see, through dialogical interactions among disparate subtales, my study will 
continue to demonstrate that as literature, the Maha ̄bhārata commits the double action of 
relaying a narrative while simultaneously teaching the audience how it should be read. 
Unlike the rest of us, Nala does not appear to be clued in on the plot as he asks 
Damayantī how she could commence a search for a second husband.107  Damayantī’s 
response more explicitly presents the work of the preceding chapters, she invokes the first 
wedding scene. 
na mām arhasi kalyāṇa pāpena pariśaṅkitum | 
You should not suspect me of evil, blessed one. 
mayā hi devān utsr ̥jya vr ̥tas tvaṁ niṣadhādhipa || 
Having sent away the gods, I chose you, ruler of Niṣadha. 
(Mbh 3.75.1) 
By blurring the line between the two events, Damayantī’s speech reveals the larger 
design of the subtale. From the sky, the god Vāyu confirms the princess’ alibi while 
raining flowers down upon the reunited couple.108 While on one hand, it appears almost 
contradictory that Damayantī would require ratification, Shulman reminds us that the 
vitality of the story rests in that interplay between different storytellers. 
                                                
107 Mbh 3.74.21 
108 Mbh 3.75.11-15 
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You need an audience to recognize the story just as Nala needs Damayanti to 
recognize him. Without her, he has no identity of his own. Without the audience, 
the Nala narratives do not exist as such. The story, that is, constitutes something 
of a riddle. It needs to be answered or deciphered or identified as such. (Shulman 
2011, 7) 
Vāyu, existing outside of the main action, but also complicit in it, fulfills the function of a 
mediating audience for the story told between the two lovers, which is after all within a 
story that is within a story. As Shulman explains, “prior knowledge of the answer is 
required to resolve the riddle” (2011, 7). Since Nala’s stance prohibits his own larger 
awareness, the deity is in unique position to exhibit the supporting perspective. And as 
the gods sanctioned their initial union, it is only appropriate that a mirroring intercession 
occur. Shulman works to uncover that critical correspondence among actors, listeners, 
and readers of the subtale. 
Identification is a matter of knowing. Nala may know the answer to the riddle he 
constitutes, but he cannot use or become the answer without Damayanti. The 
interactive exchange is necessary and creative, laying down a field of force within 
which an identity can emerge… The Nala narrative cannot emerge unless 
someone tells it to someone else. (Shulman 2011, 8) 
The activity Shulman describes here, of telling and retelling in order to bring into 
existence, is akin to what Derrida pronounces as a process of carried meaning between 
events in a hermeneutic process of confirmation.109 A moment that is “haunted” (Derrida 
1992, 294) by another transposes the fundamental instance by carrying over meaning 
between different points while achieving mutual substantiation. Derrida’s discussion of 
the operation of translation, which we can align with the act of storytelling, reveals its 
                                                
109 Derrida 1992, 309. 
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critical function within and around the development of narrative. Shulman and Derrida 
both inform this reading of the Maha ̄bhārata by underscoring the notion that “interactive 
exchange is necessary and creative” (Shulman 2011, 8). 
 Their reunion now at a climactic point, Nala, following the snake’s instruction, 
puts on the dustless robe — “tatas tad vastram arajaḥ prāvr ̥ṇod vasudhādhipaḥ” (Mbh 
3.75.17) — to shed the disguise. Having lost himself through the removal of an 
ekavastra,110 Nala’s return must be accompanied by a corresponding act. With a stamp of 
finality, the ultimate verse in the scene breaks meter in presenting the resolution through 
Damayantī. 
saivaṁ sametya vyapanītatandrī śāntajvarā harṣavivr ̥ddhasattvā | 
Then joined together, she was free from weariness, alleviated of grief, and her 
being felt increased joy. 
rarāja bhaimī samavāptakāmā śītāṁśunā rātrir ivoditena || 
Her desire fulfilled, King Bhīma’s daughter shone like the night by the risen cool-
rayed moon. 
(Mbh 3.75.27) 
Physical transformation is not relegated to Nala alone. When Damayantī first called 
Bāhuka to her room, she is described as “malapaṇkinī” (Mbh 3.74.8) — covered in mud. 
This appearance might be at odds with her current housing within the kingdom, but the 
image is necessary to juxtapose the shift that occurs within and outside both figures upon 
the joint revelation. Nala and Damayantī are presented as altered through language of loss 
                                                
110 Mbh 3.58.19. 
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and recovery. They shed grief, weariness, and disguise, while gaining joy and their 
original forms. Ganguli’s translation of the verse above presents slightly different 
resonance, rendering   the term kāma as wish rather than desire, which must in turn be 
“obtained” rather than fulfilled, as I have advanced above.111 We can observe the 
subsequent effects of a seemingly interchangeable word choice in dictating subsequent 
acts of translation, noting that samavāpta derives from the verbal root āp, obtain.112 
However, and agreeing with van Buitenen,113 I argue that my translation as “fulfilled 
desire” is more contextually expressive of the depth displayed in Damayantī’s longing.  
With Damayantī’s resolution at an end, Nala must return to one final piece of the 
tale in order to complete the story: the dicing. After a month in his father-in-law’s 
kingdom, Nala travels back to Niṣadha for one final wager. We should note that 
Damayantī and their children do not accompany him at this point. The dicing, both here 
and in the outer main story, appears to be a segregated affair. Confronting his previous 
opponent, Nala resumes their dialogue by agreeing to Puṣkara’s request to wager 
Damayantī.114 Anticipating the events of the Maha ̄bhārata’s fifth book, Nala states that 
the kingdom will be staked either through the gamble with dice or in the gamble of battle 
— “na ced vāñchasi tad dyūtaṁ yuddhadyūtaṁ pravartatām” (Mbh 3.77.8). Puṣkara is 
happy to commence, revealing that his true intention was always to win Damayantī.115 
Incensed but restrained, Nala begins the game and ousts his opponent within a single 
                                                
111 Ganguli 2000, 159. 
112 Whitney 2006, 6. 
113 van Buitenen 1975, 361. 
114 Mbh 3.77.5. 
115 “sā hi me nityaśo hr ̥di” (Mbh 3.77.15) — She has always been in my heart. 
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verse.116 The returned king then explains to his opponent that Puṣkara did not best him in 
the first place, asserting that the defeat came at the hand of Kali. By identifying the true 
villain, then, the two reaffirm their friendship and Puṣkara returns to his own kingdom. 
Their resolution points to the narrative possibilities within the main story. As there is no 
external actor in that outer narrative’s dicing, severe conflict is inevitable. Within the 
upākhyāna, Nala’s kingdom is now safe to welcome home Damayantī and their children. 
The subtale closes by assuring its audiences that Nala and Damayantī live out their days 
contented. 
Subsequently returning to the narrator, then, Bṛhadaśva more explicitly tells 
Yudhis ̣ṭhira that he need not worry about his current predicament as the two narratives 
follow complementary trajectories.117 In a final act of correspondence,  Bṛhadaśva gives 
the Pāṇḍava prince the same knowledge of dice that Ṛtuparṇa bestowed upon Nala. 
Further satisfying Yudhis ̣ṭhira’s original request, the sage goes on to outline the ways in 
which Nala’s story contained greater calamity than the Pāṇḍava narrative. Having just 
witnessed the operation of reduplication within the text, however, we as readers should 
not be content to hold the story as simply appeasement or rationalization. Derrida and 
Shulman both compel us to consider interweaving strands of correspondence as 
fundamentally generative, simultaneously expanding and bringing into focus the artistic 
possibilities of the entire work. Our narrator, whom we share with the heroes of the main 
story, propels the epic, providing at once an infrastructure and countless means for its 
                                                
116 Mbh 3.77.19. 
117 “tathā tvam api rājendra sasuhr ̥d vakṣyase ’cirāt" Mbh 3.78.5. — So you also, great king, shall live this 
out with your kin for a short time. 
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subversion. The literary tension rests in reflectively viewing those latent sideshadows 
within each story. Rather than subsisting as derivative reflections, points of contact 
propagate the Maha ̄bhārata itself. By multiplying the narrative possibilities through 
subtale and main story, the epic declares, like the poet William Blake, “I will not Reason 
& Compare: my business is to Create” (Blake 1904, 8). 
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Chapter 3 - Rāma’s Tale 
 
THE TRANSLATED STORYTELLER 
 
Considering our discussion on the narrative possibilities that are born from 
interacting layers of storytelling, it should come as no surprise that Yudhis ̣ṭhira requests 
additional tales not long after his meeting with Bṛhadaśva. Though they have met before, 
the Pāṇḍavas engage the ṛṣi Mārkaṇḍeya in a pattern consistent with their introduction to 
Bṛhadaśva. Rather than ask after his own well being, however, Yudhis ̣ṭhira here requests 
a tale more explicitly directed at his recently kidnapped wife. 
asti sīmantinī kā cid dr ̥ṣṭapūrvātha vā śrutā | 
Is there a woman, or has one been seen or heard before, 
pativratā mahābhāgā yatheyaṁ drupadātmajā | 
as loyal to her husband and virtuous as that daughter of Drupada? 
(Mbh 3.277.3) 
This is not to say that Nala’s Tale satiates the prince’s request for tales more squarely 
directed at himself. Rāma’s Tale, immediately preceding Sāvitrī’s Tale, and also relayed 
by Mārkaṇḍeya, is in fact the result of a query that mirrors the one posed to Bṛhadaśva.118 
The shared pattern of questioning through which these subtales are initiated suggests their 
utility to the listeners and the story as a whole. The crucial point to be made here is not 
                                                
118 Mbh. 3.257.10 
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that Nala’s Tale is, as it appears, insufficient in alleviating the prince’s grief, but that one 
story for a listener is never enough.  
 Unlike Bṛhadaśva, Mārkaṇḍeya is a more consistent presence in the third book of 
the Maha ̄bhārata. First appearing upon the Pāṇḍavas’ arrival into the forest, the sage 
intervenes as the brothers debate whether to accept their thirteen-year sentence in the 
wilderness. Mārkaṇḍeya advises the brothers to “Live out this hardship term in the forest 
/ As you have promised” (trans. van Buitenen 1975, 272) — yathāpratijñaṁ ca 
mahānubhāva; kr ̥cchraṁ vane vāsam imaṁ niruṣya (Mbh 3.26.17) — under the terms of 
their loss in the dicing. The sage’s wording here deserves a moment of consideration as 
the act he recommends, niruṣya, containing the prefix nis and verbal root vas, more 
literally translates as ‘dwell.’ According to the ṛṣi, the time in the forest must be 
experienced rather than suffered before the desired result, the Pāṇḍavas’ return to exalted 
status, can come about — pointing to the education of the Dharma king. It should be of 
little surprise, then, that Mārkaṇḍeya returns to the Pāṇḍavas in the latter half of their 
exile in the forest to recount a series of tales surrounding the passage of time. 
Luis Gonzalez-Reimann refers to the extended session with Mārkaṇḍeya as “the 
most important section on the yugas in the whole poem” (Gonzalez-Reimann 2002, 92). 
The yugas, or eras of time, are delineated by the sage at the outset of his dialogue with 
Yudhis ̣ṭhira into two stages, utopian and polluted.119 Mārkaṇḍeya proceeds with a series 
of subtales depicting a process of exhausting, and consequently deteriorating, eras 
through these two distinct categories. The sage illustrates the utopian period through four 
                                                
119 Mbh 3.181.10-20 
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brief subtales, each depicting a conflict that is resolved to universal satisfaction. First, a 
brahmin is accidentally shot during a hunt, but revives himself and alleviates the anguish 
of the prince who shot the arrow.120 Second, a debate between a king and brahmin on 
their relative status ends harmoniously as the two groups are aligned both with gods and 
sages.121 Mārkaṇḍeya goes on to relay conditions for a perfect world as described in a 
dialogue between a sage and the goddess Sarasvatī.122 The final narrative in this 
succession depicts Manu as witness to a great flood, able to save himself and all creatures 
through the aid of the creator deity Brahmā in the form of a fish.123 Manu’s survival is 
depicted as the reciprocal result of his own good deed in initially rescuing the fish from 
harm. These vignettes are apparently linked by the time period they depict. This pure 
period, in which people act with elevated integrity, remains ultimately unscarred by trial. 
Following an interlude account in the first person by Mārkaṇḍeya, which will be 
discussed below, the brothers pose a more speculative question in regard to the 
forthcoming kaliyuga, which they designate as a period of agitated  or confused dharma 
— samākuleṣu dharmeṣu (Mbh 3.188.5). The imminent nature of this period is indicated 
in the shift to the future tense through which the sage describes the gradual discord in 
regard to dharma, signaled through relational and celestial disarray.124 A subsequent set 
of subtales narrated by Mārkaṇḍeya redeploys the sage’s established tropes with further 
                                                
120 Mbh 3.182. This trope occurs earlier in the epic’s main story (Mbh 1.109) with more disastrous results. 
121 Mbh 3.183 
122 Mbh 3.184. The purified world, as made explicit here, is based on acts, karman. 
123 Mbh 3.185. 
124 See Mbh 3.188.52-84. Mārkaṇḍeya describes a world full of mlecchas who devour everything 
(sarvabhakṣa) and are naturally cruel (svabhāvāt krūrakarmān). Nature is described as  correspondingly 
harsh with maligned stars (jyotīṁṣi pratikūlāni) and six destructively burning suns (ṣaḍbhir anyaiś ca 
sahito bhāskaraḥ pratapiṣyati). The final stroke of downfall appears to be the ruination of the family 
structure, hospitality, and friendship, the later of which Hiltebeitel argues makes up the basis for this epic’s 
discourse of civilizational order (Hiltebeitel 2011, 604). 
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complicated conflicts. Within these six subtales, a king’s brutal and selfish acts wrong a 
brahmin, resulting in the bludgeoning death of the king by rāks ̣asas; another king has 
difficulty finding regard; Viṣṇu is under threat; brahmins intentionally kill  animals; and 
dharma receives complicated dimension, illustrating its ‘subtleties’ — sūkṣmaṁ 
dharmaṁ (Mbh 3.196.2) —as applied to both women and base, wicked men — 
nr ̥śaṁsena durātmanā (Mbh 1.196.12). After focusing exclusively on brahmins, kings, 
and deities in the first block of subtales, concluding with the veneration of a hunter’s 
duties provides a stark marker of the distance traveled by the storyteller here. 
Transitioning between these sets of tales, the world described by the sage moves from 
ideal to entangled, Mārkaṇḍeya’s lesson from dogmatic to anecdotal. 
Here we should recall that the storytelling is interposed before the kaliyuga 
subtales as Yudhis ̣ṭhira requests Mārkaṇḍeya’s first-person account on the passage of the 
ages. The sage, illustrated here as inexhaustible, subsisting through countless epochs, 
provides his own testimony on the degeneration of a world increasingly filled with false 
speech125 and neglect,126 as well as its eventual dissolution. Mārkaṇḍeya describes his 
fearful experience walking across the ruins of Earth only to come across a lone child who 
presents the sage with a lush and populated universe, demonstrating the return from 
destruction that underpins the cosmological structure of the sage’s account. The child 
conveys the renewed world by bringing Mārkaṇḍeya into and out of his own body, an act 
described respectively as praveśitaḥ127 and niḥsāritaḥ.128 The first term is accurately 
                                                
125 Mbh 3.186.24 — anr ̥tavādinaḥ 
126 Mbh 3.186.27 — vivarjitāḥ 
127 Mbh 3.186.91 
128 Mbh 3.187.44 
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understood as ‘caused to enter,’ the causative form of the verbal root viś. Monier-
Williams describesthe latter term, niḥsārita, as a derivative of the verbal root sṛ particular 
to the Mahābhārata meaning ‘expelled.’129 In concert, the movement in and out serves as 
a type of education for Mārkaṇḍeya, a revelation that allows him to address the Pāṇḍavas 
with unique authority on both physical and temporal movement. 
Moreover, van Buitenen renders both praveśita and niḥsārita as ‘translated into’ 
and ‘translated from’ in his English edition of the text.130 Through this reading, 
Mārkaṇḍeya becomes the translated object, carried into and out of a different milieu 
while in turn carrying over his newfound perspective through both contexts. The choice 
by van Buitenen appears intentionally considered, linking the act to utterance, “On a 
sudden the child opens its mouth wide, and powerlessly I am translated into it by an act 
of fate” (van Buitenen 1975, 589), and cognition, “You entered inside my body, and, 
seeing all the world together there, you were amazing and did not understand; hence I 
translated you quickly from my mouth, brahmin seer, and declared myself to you” (592). 
It is worth noting that in the first book of the Maha ̄bhārata, praveśita is translated by van 
Buitenen as ‘admitted,’131 here vis à vis gaining entrance to a palace, and ‘stuck,’132 
describing the act of piercing an insect. Through the session with Mārkaṇḍeya, van 
Buitenen takes intentional steps to combine words meaning enter and exit into the single 
term ‘translated’ — rendering it into something of a contronym in suggesting its 
                                                
129 Monier-Williams 1984, 544. 
130 van Buitenen 1975, 589 and 592. 
131 van Buitenen 1973, 166.  
132 van Buitenen 1973, 238. 
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simultaneous and opposing trajectory. Of course, it is equally crucial here that the 
passage of time and translation are portrayed as interlinked. 
The process of diachronic translation inside one’s own native tongue is so 
constant, we perform it so unawares, that we rarely pause either to note its formal 
intricacy or the decisive part it plays in the very existence of civilization. By far 
the greatest mass of the past as we experience it is a verbal construct. History is a 
speech-act, a selective use of the past tense. (Steiner 1998, 29-30) 
As the title of Steiner’s chapter here makes clear, any attempt in developing an 
understanding between realms requires the act of translation. Steiner argues that language 
is contingent upon temporal arrangement, meaning alters rapidly from sign as soon as the 
latter receives placement. A work in perpetual redeployment must undergo a process of 
translation, whether within or between languages, in order to bring about its own 
apprehension. Particularly relevant then, a section  of the text that takes as its framework 
all of time, the cycle of the yugas, demonstrates the tension of renegotiation in meaning. 
Tasked with describing dharma, Mārkaṇḍeya portrays its variegation and ‘subtleties’ 
through an ever changing timeline. The sage himself becomes translator par excellence, 
existing throughout each of these periods and thereby undergoing his own process of 
translation which is made more literal when moved into and out of the body of the deity. 
Much like Umberto Eco’s assertion in Experiences in Translation, that the best 
translators have themselves been translated,133 the sage is able to reflectively reconfigure 
both himself and the evolutionary significance of dharma to his audience and portray 
unique authority to divulge his subtales due to his extended lifetime.  
                                                
133 see Eco 2001, 5. 
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By participating in the process of translation, Mārkaṇḍeya, the immortal 
storyteller, is acutely aware of the perpetual alteration of language just as the text is itself 
aware that its foundations will require pliability to subsist throughout generations. When 
presenting a dialogue on an ideologically foundational term such as dharma, therefore, 
the epic leaves space to permit a multitude of understandings. 
Polysemy, the capacity of the same word to mean different things, such difference 
ranging from nuance to antithesis, characterizes the language of ideology. 
Machiavelli noted that meaning could be dislocated in common speech so as to 
produce political confusion. Competing ideologies rarely create new terminology. 
(Steiner 1998, 35) 
Perhaps less nefarious in its intent, the sage, and thereby the Maha ̄bhārata, works to 
develop a perspective that can endure the inevitable march of time. Sheldon Pollock 
argues that efforts to centralize power in the epic focus more specifically on a question of 
geographic rather than temporal dominance. 
The spatial interests of the Maha ̄bhārata exert the same kind of structuring force 
on the narrative as do its political interests, and this is so because the two are 
mutually constitutive: the political exists in space, and what exists in space, and 
what exists in space is unavoidably related to the domain of power, whether as 
something inviting or something resisting incorporation. Thus the plotting of an 
epic geosphere, far from representing just another among the Maha ̄bhārata’s 
myriad concerns, forms one of its central subjects. Power here is figured, in 
essence, as the command of space, however we are to understand the idea of 
command (and the difficulties of a satisfactory understanding should not be 
minimized), and the space to be controlled is the fundamental concern of power. 
(Pollock 2006, 226) 
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Pollock’s description of mapping within the narrative is not tied to consolidation or the 
carving out of specific applicable locales. Rather, Pollock claims that the text is rendering 
coherent disparate regions. The dissemination of the Maha ̄bhārata conspires with the 
overall mapping of a larger ‘cosmopolis.’ 
The Maha ̄bhārata’s narrative construction of a supraregional domain was 
complemented, or perhaps better, enacted, by a range of material-cultural 
practices relating to the text, including the spread and distribution of manuscripts, 
the creation of editions, and the various modes of popular dissemination. These 
practices accomplished two things at once. First, they reproduced narrated space 
by their location in and circulation through actual space, thereby investigating the 
narrative with a new degree of actuality and cognizability. Second, they reasserted 
the symmetry of the political and cultural spheres, endowing the transregional 
cultural formation that found expression in Sanskrit with a political imagination 
of transregional scope. (Pollock 2006, 228) 
I would amend this argument to note that time and space are contingent in regards to 
understanding and power within the epic. Mārkaṇḍeya is similarly depicted as a far-
reaching traveler, endowed with an abundance of time134 to embark on world-spanning 
journeys. The text is aware that it should be made legible to disparate zones both 
temporally and geographically. The session with Mārkaṇḍeya and Steiner’s discussion of 
meaning demonstrate that language is deployed to reify notions of the past, to which 
Pollock adds conceptions of the foreign, in order to render a worldview more immediate. 
Depicting the sage as both translator and translated while providing a spectrum of 
perspectives on a crucial term in the text’s lexicon, I would argue that the Maha ̄bhārata 
anticipates and welcomes its own translation and, further, that van Buitnenen, here 
                                                
134 Mbh 3.186.80. 
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translator of the translator, is keenly aware that he is carrying over meaning that relies on 
the act of a translator in order to continue its efficacy, whether across languages, locales, 
periods, or all three simultaneously.  
 After recounting his experience throughout the cycle of the ages, Mārkaṇḍeya is 
again prompted to provide a more direct definition of dharma.135 While at first glance the 
sage’s answer might be read as evading the question, never directly addressing his 
inquiry, the sage more explicitly vocalizes the inevitable contingency of perpetual 
translation in developing understanding. 
na te ’sty aviditaṁ kiṁ cid atītānāgataṁ bhuvi | 
Nothing that has gone before or after on earth is unknown to you. 
tasmād imaṁ parikleśaṁ tvaṁ tāta hr ̥di mā kr ̥thāḥ || 
Therefore, do not have trouble in your heart, son. 
eṣa kālo mahābāho api sarvadivaukasām | 
This time belongs to all the dwellers in heaven, o great-armed one. 
muhyanti hi prajās tāta kālenābhipracoditāḥ || 
Surely beings born are bewildered, propelled by time, my son. 
(Mbh 3.189.24-25) 
Comparing the above translation with that of van Buitnenen will reveal the subtleties of 
the language. 
                                                
135 Mbh 3.186.20. Yudhiṣṭhira twice asks in which dharma he should be stationed — kasmin dharme mayā 
stheyaṁ — and what is the place of his own dharma — kathaṁ ca vartamāno vai na cyaveyaṁ 
svadharmataḥ — linking Steiner and Pollock’s focus on power in both time and place. Acting in 
accordance with dharma here is what bestows authority upon the prince. 
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You know all that is past and future on earth, so, my son, do not worry so much in 
your heart. This time is Time for all the celestials too — the creatures are 
confused, my son, they are being urged on by Time. (van Buitenen 1975, 598) 
An initial discrepancy can be observed in the translation of the compound atītānāgataṁ 
which van Buitenen correctly identifies as ‘past and future,’ now revealed to Yudhiṣṭhira 
by the immortal sage. This rendering supports the overarching identification of 
Mārkaṇḍeya as existing outside of the constraints of time. Given our discussion of Steiner 
and Pollock, however, and the depiction of the sage’s travel, my own translation of the 
term, attending to the verbal roots as ‘come and go,’ attempts to leave greater space for 
the interplay between temporal and geographic domains. Similarly, van Buitenen seems 
to render kāla twice as both time and Time, interchangeably. Capitalized, Time indicates 
a type of personification or principle, which is certainly present in a section that we have 
seen identified as one of the most important on the subject of yugas. However, I would 
argue that the notion of ‘time’ does not receive a spectrum of ideological definitions in 
the way that dharma does throughout the sage’s subtales. Instead, time is that actant upon 
which dharma rests, and while time experiences fluidity in the transfer between ages, as 
an overarching structure it is markedly more fixed — which arguably makes this session 
more dependent upon and interested in conveying a conception of time rather than 
dharma. In its instrumental form, kāla or time is abhipracud, which van Buitenen takes 
to mean ‘urged.’ In the causative and with the prefix pra, the verbal root cud is identified 
by Monier-Williams to also mean ‘driven,’136 which I argue corresponds more directly to 
the passive stance of those affected by kāla as well as the notion of time as carrier. Those 
                                                
136 Monier-Williams 1984, 607. 
 111 
actions attendant to time become the hinge of these verses, allowing transition and the 
sage’s translation to come to the fore. As a narrator experienced in translation, we will 
find Mārkaṇḍeya guiding and disseminating attentive readings through his later subtale 
on Sāvitrī.  
 
REVERBERATIONS 
 
Following the session with Mārkaṇḍeya, the sage remains in the retinue of the 
Pāṇḍavas as they undergo a series of trials that culminates in the attempted abduction of 
Draupadī by a king named Jayadratha. Now acquainted with the suffering that befell Nala 
upon separation with his wife, Yudhiṣṭhira asks if such an evil act is only made possible 
through the machinations of time137 before lamenting his station in the forest. The sage 
replies with an upākhyāna on the life of Rāma, whose wife, Sītā, is abducted by the 
rākṣasa Rāvaṇa. The loss of a loved one veers from subtale to main story to subtale 
again, recast from bewildered abandonment to attempted kidnapping to successful 
kidnapping. Increasing in intensity through each echo, the notion of separated lovers is 
enacted within the subtale to appease Yudhiṣṭhira, again requesting a story depicting 
someone in a similar position to his own. Similar to Nala’s Tale, Mārkaṇḍeya relays the 
story expressly to assure the prince that analogous hardships and trials find favorable 
resolve within the world of the Maha ̄bhārata despite dharma’s dependency on time.138 
                                                
137 Mbh 3.257.4. 
138 Mbh 3.276.12. 
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 It is worth noting that Yudhiṣṭhira’s prompt of the sage includes additional 
questions on the lineage of Rāma and his adversary, Rāvaṇa.  
kasmin rāmaḥ kule jātaḥ kiṁvīryaḥ kiṁparākramaḥ | 
Into which family was Rāma born? How heroic was he? How brave?  
rāvaṇaḥ kasya vā putraḥ kiṁ vairaṁ tasya tena ha || 
Whose son was Rāvaṇa? What was his fight with him? 
(Mbh 3.258.4) 
While Nala was introduced by name first, and subsequently described as the “mighty son 
of Vīrasena” along with a host of other admirable qualities, Rāma’s Tale begins by 
introducing and describing his grandfather, Aja, and father, Daśaratha.139 Rāma is listed 
among his brothers as Daśaratha’s sons, but not singled out or illustrated with adjectives 
promoting his virtues. Instead, the narrator moves on to similarly describe Rāma’s wife, 
Sītā, by means of her parentage.140 In contrast to Yudhiṣṭhira, Rāma’s introduction marks 
him as fully mundane. For van Buitenen, this status extends to Sītā as well, while their 
union is one which “the Maker himself had destined” (van Buitenen 1975, 728). For Peter 
Scharf, however, divine intervention arrives by means of Sītā’s birth, rendering her more 
akin to the subtale’s listeners. Scharf translates the line in question, “yāṁ cakāra svayaṁ 
tvaṣṭā rāmasya mahiṣīṁ priyām” (Mbh 3.258.9), as “Rāma’s dear queen, whom the 
Creator himself made” (Scharf 203, 98) — with the action of the creator, tvaṣṭṛ, referring 
to either Sītā herself or her marriage. The quick introduction of Sītā, however, also omits 
any detail of her union with Rāma, which is unusual given the rhythm of subtales 
                                                
139 Mbh 3.258.6. 
140 Mbh 3.258.9. 
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surrounding the Rāmopākhyāna. The marriage, as evidenced in both the tales of Nala 
and, as we will see below, Sāvitrī, serves as crucial exposition in understanding the force 
that compels both heroes to reunite with their partners. Given the importance of this 
element in Maha ̄bhārata stories that seek to portray the loss and recovery of a loved one, 
it seems more crucial for the text to comment upon the marriage’s divine provenance 
rather than that of Sītā. There is less discrepancy over the supernatural heritage of 
Rāvaṇa, however, who is initially designated as the grandson of the god Prajāpati141 and 
illustrated as daśagrīva — ten-necked/headed — and “balenāpratimau bhuvi” (Mbh 
3.259.7) — unmatched in strength on earth along with his brother. Rāvaṇa’s backstory 
receives much greater attention than that of Rāma, at the outset, chronicling Rāvaṇa’s 
asceticism, the resulting accrual of a boon to be free from danger by all beings except 
humans, and his violent accession to the throne of Laṅkā. The subtale presents the gods 
concerned over Rāvaṇa’s status, leading Brahmā to proclaim that Viṣṇu had taken human 
form to subdue the rākṣasa king, though Viṣṇu is not explicitly linked with Rāma at this 
point.142 
Both Hiltebeitel and Scharf cite this vague initial description of Rāma and Sītā as 
a point of departure between the Rāmopākhyāna and the Rāmāyaṇa.143 The Rāmāyaṇa 
links Viṣṇu to Rāma and his brothers at the outset, and recounts Sītā as plowed from the 
earth. Scharf finds the Maha ̄bhārata iteration capable of introducing the notion of 
incarnate deities slowly because “the expectation that Rāma is divine hasn’t been 
thoroughly imposed on the text.” (Scharf 2003, 1). Without such precedents, both 
                                                
141 Mbh 3.258.11. 
142 Mbh 3.260.5. 
143 See Hiltebeitel 2011a, 487 and Scharf 2003, 1.
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scholars surmise that the composition of the upākhyāna predates the stand-alone epic, 
leaving us to consider more explicitly the relation between subtale and main story rather 
than the subtale as a retelling of the Rāmāyaṇa.144 Any attempt to locate primacy between 
these two stories must rely on speculation. Therefore, the more useful framing for these 
texts can be summarized by the statement, “We are clearly not dealing with linear 
cumulative development” (Hiltebeitel 2009, 198). 
His questions satisfied, Yudhiṣṭhira responds by asking why Rāma, Lakṣmaṇa, 
and Sītā were exiled to the forest.145 Mārkaṇḍeya replies with the story of Rāma’s own 
consecration as king, chosen by his father and a counsel for his virtues, only to be undone 
by Daśaratha’s wife Kaikeyī, who forces the appointment of her own son, Bharata, as 
ruler. The moment that cements exile reverberates with both Nala and Yudhiṣṭhira’s loss 
of their kingdoms. 
sa tad rājā vacaḥ śrutvā vipriyaṁ dāruṇodayam | 
The king, having heard that unpleasant speech of dreadful consequence,  
duḥkhārto bharataśreṣṭha na kiṁ cid vyājahāra ha || 
fell into sorrow and said nothing at all, best of the Bharatas (Yudhiṣṭhira). 
(Mbh 3.261.26) 
This silence, reaching across the main story and subtale, evokes the moment in which 
Nala refuses to bet his wife and exits the kingdom along with Yudhiṣṭhira’s sullen state 
as Draupadī is dragged into the hall of the dice match. With the conditions established, 
Rāma immediately departs to the forest before another word can be uttered, along with 
                                                
144 For an extensive history on studies that compare the Rāmopākhyāna and Rāmāyaṇa, see van Buitenen 
1975, 207-214. 
145 Mbh 3.261.1. 
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his brother, Lakṣmaṇa, and wife, Sītā. Despite attempts by Bharata to reverse their 
father’s vow, Rāma remains steadfast. The moment recalls Yudhiṣṭhira’s dilemma in 
being followed by brahmins into the forest, as well as discussion at the outset of the third 
book on whether the Pāṇḍavas should accept the terms of their exile. We should recall 
that Mārkaṇḍeya, the narrator of the Rāmopākhyāna, arrived as the decisive voice early 
on to encourage the Pāṇḍavas to remain in the forest, alluding to Rāma.146 By enacting 
the subtale in the latter half of the Maha ̄bhārata’s third book, the sage adds further 
dimension to the notion of Rāma’s Tale as a type of guide for Yudhiṣṭhira throughout the 
period in the wilderness. 
Proceeding into the forest, Rāma battles with rākṣasas to keep his attendants safe, 
eventually maiming the sister of Rāvaṇa. Offended in this brutal fashion, Rāvaṇa’s 
reaction portrays equally violent imagery. 
svān amātyān visr ̥jyātha vivikte tām uvāca saḥ | 
Dismissing his councilors then, he said to her alone, 
kenāsy evaṁ kr ̥tā bhadre mām acintyāvamanya ca || 
Who, forgetting and despising me, has done this, woman?   
kaḥ śūlaṁ tīkṣṇam āsādya sarvagātrair niṣevate | 
Who, holding a sharp spear, uses it on all his body? 
kaḥ śirasy agnim ādāya viśvastaḥ svapate sukham || 
Who, having built a fire by his head, relaxes and sleeps happily?  
āśīviṣaṁ ghorataraṁ pādena spr ̥śatīha kaḥ | 
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Who is touching this terrible venomous snake with his foot? 
siṁhaṁ kesariṇaṁ kaś ca daṁṣṭrāsu spr ̥śya tiṣṭhati || 
And who stands touching a maned lion’s teeth? 
(Mbh 3.261.47-49) 
Contrasting with the quiet acceptance of ill occurrences as we have observed through 
both Nala and Yudhiṣṭhira, Rāvaṇa’s anger evokes the threatening pronouncements made 
by Yudhiṣṭhira’s brothers following the loss of their kingdom.147 Rāvaṇa brings his plan 
for revenge to a sage, who warns that a fight with Rāma will end in defeat, but the Laṅkā 
king remains obstinate.148 By juxtaposing these two types of reactions, reverberations 
between silence and noise, the epic approaches methods of communicating power. 
Foucault’s mapping of the interdependence between the two forms of expression 
illustrate their shared movements.  
Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and 
exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. In like manner, 
silence and secrecy are a shelter for power, anchoring its prohibitions; but they 
also loosen its holds and provide relatively obscure areas of tolerance. (Foucault 
1978, 101) 
In both instances, the utterance denotes a failure, and accordingly attempts to consolidate 
and respond in order to counter its damage. By presenting both forms of expression 
throughout the main story and subtales, the Maha ̄bhārata complicates the association 
between silence and sound, like Foucault, portraying power and its fragility as 
disseminated among multiple, seemingly opposing, actors. Neither Rāma nor Rāvaṇa 
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represent some ideal form of governance, depicting instead an enmeshed means of 
incorporating the text’s layered listeners. By moving apart from strict moral adherence or 
codified action, the interplay between the main story and subtale explores means of 
expressing power within a set of conditions and their effect in producing knowledge — 
which Foucault designates as “strategical integration” and “tactical productivity” 
(Foucault 1978, 102). 
To fulfill his desire for revenge, Rāvaṇa’s sage takes the form of a deer, described 
as possessing both jeweled antlers and hide — ratnaśṛṅga, ratnacitratanūruha149 — 
which Sītā sends her husband after to hunt. Rāma pierces the creature with his arrow, 
causing it to release a sound — svara150 — that mimics Rāma’s voice but transposes its 
tone to one indicating pain. The ruse  generates a compelling and harsh speech by the 
now distressed Sītā, threatening suicide if her husband is harmed.151 The grating sounds 
send Lakṣmaṇa, who is now described as ‘covering his ears,’152 after his brother, isolating 
Sītā and allowing Rāvaṇa to enact the abduction. Here sound is utilized to denote power 
through its ability to inform action, notably through deception and anger, and in 
recognizing the conditions of its response, a moment in which Sītā might be rendered 
vulnerable. Carrying over the recurring trope of the ill-fated deer hunt, the instance is 
dependent upon the translation of Rāma’s voice into another body and tone. Intersecting 
transpositions render themselves complicit in a structure that is at once discordant and 
measured. The scene of Sītā’s abduction can only be relayed to Rāma by means of 
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testimony from another party, here the vulture king Jaṭāyu, who in the same motion urges 
the brothers in the direction of Sītā’s rescue in his last breath.153 This cacophony of voices 
surrounding Sītā’s abduction decentralizes and weakens Rāma’s agency, fulfilling the 
loss of power initiated by his exile. 
 
LISTENING 
 
The helplessness experienced by Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa is soon alleviated as they 
work together to defeat an attacking rākṣasa and rescue a gandharva. Emboldened and 
provided with information on how to rescue Sītā by the gandharva, Rāma and his brother 
seek out the monkey king Sugrīva and his associate Hanumān. The two parties agree on a 
mutual accord. Rāma will assist in the killing of Sugrīva’s adversary and brother Vālin, 
while Sugrīva will help rescue Sītā.154 Scharf notes the dubious nature of the agreement, 
throwing Rāma’s ethical status into question.155 Like the jewel-encrusted deer, Sugrīva 
lets out a powerful sound — once again, svara — to call his brother to battle.156 In 
contrast to Sītā, however, Vālin’s wife urges her husband not to react to the noise.157 But 
with the sequence established, Vālin leaves to confront the terrible sound to his own peril. 
While the monkey brothers are occupied in their fight, Rāma strikes Vālin with an arrow 
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to the heart.158 In recasting the epic’s trope of ill-fated hunt, Rāma’s distinction from 
Rāvaṇa is obscured. I argue that in keeping the hero from divine or unblemished 
associations, the text anchors Rāma's actions within the realm of reproach in order to 
iteratively depict the character’s growth through the subtale. Following the episode, 
Rāma is depicted as remaining stationary on top of a mountain for four months, while 
tended to by the monkey king.159 
The epic shifts focus to Sītā, who is now imprisoned by Rāvaṇa on Laṅkā, though 
remaining obstinate and austere, and guarded by a troop of weapon-yielding rākṣasīs 
who desire to consume the woman. 
khādāma pāṭayāmaināṁ tilaśaḥ pravibhajya tām | 
Let’s eat her! Let’s tear her into sesame-sized pieces, 
yeyaṁ bhartāram asmākam avamanyeha jīvati || 
this one who lives here despising our lord. 
(Mbh 3.264.47) 
The excitement conveyed by those demons through the use of the imperative form 
underscores the intensity of their threat. Nevertheless, Sītā welcomes the gruesome fate 
over submission to her captor. When Rāvaṇa attempts to convince her to let down her 
guard, Sītā challenges his adherence to dharma in attempting to violate her marriage 
vow.160 Rāvaṇa resigns himself to Sītā’s constancy, but closes the conversation by 
reminding her that Rāma is also his ‘food.’161 
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 Meanwhile, Rāma grows impatient within Sugrīva’s kingdom. The monkey king 
assures Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa that any time spent there is necessary for a favorable 
outcome, as he has dispatched agents to pinpoint the location of Sītā — redeploying 
Mārkaṇḍeya’s appeal for patience. Returning from the south, Hanūmān brings his 
account of Sītā’s whereabouts. He explains that the dejected retinue reached the shoreline 
to no avail, and sought to remain there until their death. Instead, they encounter Jaṭāyu’s 
brother, who testifies to the whereabouts of Rāvaṇa’s kingdom. Emboldened, Hanumān 
jumps across the ocean and encounters Sītā, who gives Hanumān both a jewel and story 
to verify the account. With new resolve, an army rises up around Rāma and his mission.  
śirīṣakusumābhānāṁ siṁhānām iva nardatām | 
The tumultuous sound of those appearing like Śirīṣa flowers,  
śrūyate tumulaḥ śabdas tatra tatra pradhāvatām || 
roaring like lions, was heard by them running here and there. 
(Mbh 3.267.10) 
We find sound to be the recurring operative element in denoting materiality within the 
Rāmopākhyāna. The clamor within the subtale recalls the significance of the aural 
element to the epic. Within its own constraints, the Maha ̄bhārata is at once heard and 
written. For John Miles Foley, orality makes way for diversity, encouraging a text to be 
understood without monolithic reading.162 By invoking sound throughout the subtale, the 
epic marks pathways to a multiplicity of voices. Whether in concert or at odds, by means 
of speech acts or in metaphor, sonic expression serves a crucial function in depicting a 
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multifaceted narrative. By upholding variation, I argue that sound as multiplicity serves 
to expound upon the incorporation of difference that we have found present in the 
preceding chapter’s discussion of repetition.  
Attended by those monkeys, Rāma and Lakṣmaṇa make their way to the 
shoreline. Rāma convenes with the ocean in order to discover the means of its traversal. 
The god of the water instructs a monkey named Nala to construct a bridge.163 As the army 
enters Laṅkā, they are greeted by Rāvaṇa’s brother, Vibhīṣaṇa, who serves as an advisor 
to Lakṣmaṇa.164 As Rāma and his army  build their encampment outside the city walls, he 
sends an envoy to Rāvaṇa to deliver the terms of the battle. 
hantāsmi tvāṁ sahāmātyaṁ yudhyasva puruṣo bhava | 
I will kill you with your ministers. Fight! Be a man! 
paśya me dhanuṣo vīryaṁ mānuṣasya niśācara || 
See the strength of this human’s bow, demon! 
mucyatāṁ jānakī sītā na me mokṣyasi karhi cit | 
Free Sītā, the daughter of Janaka. If you will not free her for me, 
arākṣasam imaṁ lokaṁ kartāsmi niśitaiḥ śaraiḥ ||  
then I will rid the world of rākṣasas with my sharp arrows. 
(Mbh 3.268.15-16) 
Recalling the conditions of Rāvaṇa’s boon, Rāma highlights his strength as a function of 
his humanity. Additionally, Rāma’s threat verges on the genocidal, evoking 
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Jamamejaya’s snake sacrifice within the epic’s first book.165 The statement nearly proves 
disastrous for the messenger, who is immediately attacked by an enraged Rāvaṇa. In 
retaliation, Rāma commences his attack, breaking the wall of Laṅkā — “bhedayām āsa 
laṅkāyāḥ prākāram” (Mbh 3.268.23) and crushing the difficult-to-attack southern gate — 
“dakṣiṇaṁ nagaradvāram avāmr ̥dnād durāsadam” (Mbh 3.268.24). The verbal root bhid 
is notably employed by Kṛṣṇa at the start of the third book, denoting the type of violence 
that he wishes he could have imposed upon the Kauravas during the dicing.166 Similarly, 
in the fourth book, Bhīma is described as ready to crush — avāmr ̥d — Kīcaka for 
harming Draupadī. By establishing these links between subtale and main story, the degree 
of intensity cast upon the scene is girded by a dialectic of violence. The text acts to 
establish its lexicon in order to draw significance between realms. In each instance, the 
type of violence enacted is a response to a transgression toward a woman. Here the 
destruction of Laṅkā is depicted in language that invokes the obliteration of the body.  
 Over the subsequent fourteen verses, the battle is described as increasing in scale 
with countless participants and no clear victor. The text declares provisional victory when 
Rāma’s arrows are deployed upon the city. In a scene that anticipates the main story's 
Great War, Rāvaṇa’s troops attack a group of monkeys during a period of rest.167 The 
escalation caused by this form of fighting ultimately brings Rāma and Rāvaṇa face-to-
face. The severity of the battle is similarly illustrated by means of sound. 
tataḥ śabdo mahān āsīt tumulo lomaharṣaṇaḥ | 
Then there was a great, tumultuous, and hair-raising sound. 
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rāmarāvaṇasainyānām anyonyam abhidhāvatām || 
The sound of the armies of Rāma and Rāvaṇa as they attacked one another. 
(Mbh 3.270.9) 
The intensifiers denote a volume that continues to increase through the course of the 
battle. As Rāvaṇa realizes the extent of the threat, he plays his final cards by sending a 
rākṣasa named Kumbhakarṇa into battle, whom he awakens with various loud-sounding 
instruments — “vividhair vāditraiḥ sumahāsvanaiḥ” (Mbh 3.270.20). As the demon 
enters the battle, his roaring and laughter — vindaya, prahasan168 — both accompany and 
signal Kumbhakarṇa’s capture of Sugrīva. Lakṣmaṇa is able to respond quickly, killing 
the demon and rescuing the monkey king. The text repeatedly conveys the critical 
component of listening through these stories. 
In his final pronouncement, Rāvaṇa calls his son Indrajit to kill Rāma and his 
allies. Correspondingly marking the occasion, Indrajit “clearly shouted his name and 
challenged the luck-marked Lakṣmaṇa to a fight” (van Buitenen 1975, 752). Showing 
preference for van Buitenen’s translation of viśrāvya as ‘shouted,’ and its connection 
with the call to Lakṣmaṇa, the immediate resonance retains less efficacy in Johnson’s 
rendering, “Then, boldly announcing his name, the bullish demon challenged Lakṣmaṇa, 
marked by good fortune, to a fight” (Johnson 2005, 288), or Scharf’s, “Announcing his 
name loudly, the bull-like Rākṣasa challenged the lucky Lakṣmaṇ in battle” (Scharf 2003, 
703). In each of the latter iterations, the depiction of sound is pushed back from the 
action, though we have found evidence within the chapter to more explicitly align the two 
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strands. Nonetheless, Indrajit is not distinguished by his sound, but rather his sight. Upon 
rendering himself invisible, the demon severely wounds both Rāma and his brother. 
Though seemingly lost to Indrajit, Sugrīva and his retinue are able to revive Rāma 
and Lakṣmaṇa while Vibhīṣaṇa provides an ambhas169 — water, which contains Vedic 
resonances to power, from ambu, and is also aligned with the verbal root ambh, ‘to 
sound’170 — to assist in the fight. 
anena spr ̥ṣṭanayano bhūtāny antarhitāny uta | 
He whose eyes have been touched by this, then, those invisible beings, 
bhavān drakṣyati yasmai ca bhavān etat pradāsyati || 
he will see them, and whomever he will give this. 
(Mbh 3.273.11) 
The epic presents both sight and sound as ways of knowing. What is heard and what is 
seen serve as co-disciplinary methods of dissemination. As Damayantī could perceive the 
hidden Nala to bring about their union, Rāma and his attendants gain the faculty to 
overcome their obstacles. Through converging sense-objects, we find the incorporation of 
multiple perspectives. “The pleasure of the text is that moment when my body pursues its 
own ideas—for my body does not have the same ideas I do” (Barthes 1975, 17). By 
reorienting and reinvigorating the body, Lakṣmaṇa is able to overcome their interlocutor, 
removing Indrajit’s weapon-bearing arms and head from his body.171 The epic juxtaposes 
the grasping and removal of the senses with astonishing repercussions. 
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In response to the death of Indrajit, Rāvaṇa considers killing Sītā, but is advised to 
direct his ire toward Rāma — not, however, to spare the woman of injury, but rather 
reasoning that the murder of her husband might prove the more effective wound.172 First, 
Rāvaṇa summons a new wave of rākṣasa fighters, which van Buitenen describes as a 
type of undead army: “The hundreds of thousands of Rākṣasas who had departed from 
their bodies were seen to return…” (van Buitenen 1975, 755). Scharf and Johnson, 
however, retain the term body, deha, in its ablative singular form, portraying the army as 
likely emerging from Rāvaṇa’s own body: “Then Rākṣasas were seen after emerging 
from his body…” (Scharf 2003, 761).173 In van Buitenen's translation, the term is 
rendered plural indicating a return to corporeal form from death. Once the demons are 
defeated, Indra’s charioteer, Mātali, assists Rāma in dealing the final blow. This decisive 
point in the battle is again verified by its sound production. 
hāhākr ̥tāni bhūtāni rāvaṇe samabhidrute | 
When Rāvaṇa was attacked, the beings made the sound ‘hāhā.’ 
siṁhanādāḥ sapaṭahā divi divyāś ca nānadan || 
And the roar of a divine lion along with kettle drums filled the sky. 
(Mbh 3.274.18) 
While Rāvaṇa deploys the extent of his weaponry, Rāma fires a single sanctified arrow.174 
The shot, depicted deliberately over five verses, consumes Rāvaṇa by fire.175 The victory 
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is decisive to such an extent that no trace of Rāvaṇa’s body remains: na ca 
basmāpyadṛśyata — ‘not even his ashes were seen.’176  
 The crescendo of Rāma’s Tale coincides with our observed emphasis on the 
potency of sound in denoting efficacy in regard to the text’s action. The conditions are 
analogous to a moment in the Old Testament, in which Joshua is commanded to lay siege 
upon a seemingly impenetrable wall around Jericho through sonic force. 
The Lord said to Joshua, “See, I have handed Jericho over to you, along with its 
king and soldiers. You shall march around the city, all the warriors circling the 
city once. Thus you shall do for six days, with seven priests bearing seven 
trumpets of rams’ horns before the ark. On the seventh day you shall march 
around the city seven times, the priests blowing the trumpets. When they make a 
long blast with the ram’s horn, as soon as you hear the sound of the trumpet, then 
all the people shall shout with a great shout; and the wall of the city will fall down 
flat. (Joshua 6.2-5; ed. Attridge 2006, 317) 
In both instances, the attacking party’s power correlates with their denoted volume. We 
find that sound plays a role in manifestation — here, particularly, the act of destruction 
— in line with de Saussure’s equation between the sound-object and sign. 
The linguistic sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept and a sound-
image. The latter is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the 
psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses. 
The sound-image is sensory, and if I happen to call it "material," it is only in that 
sense, and by way of opposing it to the other term of the association, the concept, 
which is generally more abstract. (de Saussure 1986, 66) 
The impact, or efficacy, of these scenes are tied to representations of sound production. 
We are reminded here that when revealed in a text, sound does not denote itself, but 
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rather the surrounding web of significance that bears upon its determinations. Through de 
Saussure, we can query the relationship between materiality and sound as, “Whoever says 
that a certain letter must be pronounced a certain way is mistaking the written image of a 
sound for the sound itself” (de Saussure 1986, 30). While the type of sound discussed 
here specifically refers to speech in representing language, we can nevertheless associate 
that causal relationship between the emphasis of sound and clamor. 
Representation mingles with what it represents, to the point where one speaks as 
one writes, one thinks as if the represented were nothing more than the shadow or 
reflection of the representer. A dangerous promiscuity and a nefarious complicity 
between the reflection and the reflected which lets itself be seduced 
narcissistically. In this play of representation, the point of origin becomes 
ungraspable. There are things like reflecting pools, and images, an infinite 
reference from one to the other, but no longer a source, a spring. There is no 
longer a simple origin. For what is reflected is split in itself and not only as an 
addition to itself of its image. The reflection, the image, the double, splits what it 
doubles. The origin of the speculation becomes a difference. What can look at 
itself is not one; and the law of addition of the origin to its representation, of the 
thing to its image, is that one plus one makes at least three. (Derrida 1974, 36) 
I argue, then, that the tumult is generative and crucial for the text. Through the 
incorporation of diversity in an organized way that eschews uniformity, sound is 
strategically deployed to highlight an oral and aural component to the text that 
incorporates difference and rejects didacticism. That astonishing thunder-clap we 
identified in Nala’s Tale returns to simultaneously rattle our understanding of the world 
described within the text and incorporate an array of perspectives under a complex 
heading, rather than collapsing variation. Reverberation extends our understanding of 
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repetition as a rhizomatic incorporation of difference. Without origin or singular 
meaning, the epic signals toward a unifying framework. 
 Now reunited with Sītā, the text occupies Rāma’s gaze. Their reunion displays 
conditions that counter tropes established by Nala and Yudhiṣṭhira. 
tāṁ dr ̥ṣṭvā cārusarvāṅgīṁ yānasthāṁ śokakarśitām | 
Having seen that woman of whose every limb was beautiful, standing on the 
vehicle, emaciated by grief,  
malopacitasarvāṅgīṁ jaṭilāṁ kr ̥ṣṇavāsasam || 
every limb covered in dirt, her hair matted, wearing a black cloth, 
uvāca rāmo vaidehīṁ parāmarśaviśaṅkitaḥ | 
Rāma said to the princess, suspecting her violated, 
gaccha vaidehi muktā tvaṁ yat kāryaṁ tan mayā kr ̥tam || 
“Go, princess of Videha, you are freed. I have done what I had to do.” 
(Mbh 3.275.9-10) 
Here we find an example of vision as failure within the text. Through his sight, Rāma 
reads Sītā’s distressed state as a marker of infidelity, obfuscated in his understanding of 
his wife’s appearance. Unlike Damayantī, who recognizes and accepts Nala in his 
drastically altered forms, from bare to disguised and diminished, the focus on Sītā’s 
visual condition and subsequent rejection suggests a causal link. Rāma’s visual 
perception is quickly associated with his grasp of dharma,177 rendering the judgement 
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more severe. In a final blow, Rāma likens his wife to an ‘offering licked by a dog.’178 The 
stunning turn of events is underscored by the universal shock portrayed by figures in the 
text, ushering in a silence through which we might inspect the conditions of the subtale. 
For Peter Scharf, the episode recounts a cosmological construct. 
The scene of Rāma’s rejection of and reunification with Sītā serves as a metaphor 
of stages in the growth to enlightenment as well for the process of transcending. 
In the stage of enlightenment known as cosmic consciousness (kaivalya), the self, 
identified with pure consciousness, recognizing its own purity, views the body 
and other evolutes of nature as belonging to the field of change from which it 
disassociates itself. However, in the ultimate stage of development of 
consciousness (brahman), the self recognizes the transcendent original pure state 
of nature in all the active states of nature and embraces all levels of nature as one 
with itself. (Scharf 2003, 25) 
By associating the process of the couple’s reunion with a larger philosophical structure, 
Scharf enacts a particular interpretive layer on top of the epic. Through this construct, the 
rejection acts as a step in perfecting the self. But if Rāma’s initial rejection of Sītā can be 
read as enacting a universal process why does it remain so distinct from its surrounding 
narratives? 
 In contrast to Nala’s Tale, the Rāmopākhyāna omits any moments of lamentation 
or scenes depicting the emotion of love in separation during the disunion between 
husband and wife. We find Rāma driven to fight without justifying his actions through 
love. Reaching further back into the subtale, the lack of precursory marriage narrative 
stands in stark contrast to the depiction of the relationship between Yudhiṣṭhira and 
Draupadī, Nala and Damayantī, and, as we will find below, Sāvitrī and Satyavān. 
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Therefore, we have no evidence of a stark change of heart within Rāma at the conclusion 
of the battle, only the side-shadowed conception of his devotion through the surrounding 
tales. As both sight and their own accord fall short of enacting their reunion, Rāma and 
Sītā must instead listen to divine interlocutors. A host of gods descend upon the scene to 
endorse Sītā and verify her adherence to the marriage. Following a chorus of testimony, 
culminating in permission to return to his kingdom by Rāma’s departed father Daśaratha, 
Rāma accepts Sītā and returns to their kingdom. Closing out the narrative, Mārkaṇḍeya 
expressly frames the subtale as evidence of Yudhiṣṭhira’s inevitable victory over his 
enemies, particularly through the assistance of his brothers.179 The sage concludes by 
imploring Yudhiṣṭhira to see — paśya180 — Draupadī differently through the telling of 
the Rāmopākhyāna. By conveying the upakhyāna, however, Mārkaṇḍeya does not 
provide directives on the makeup of this new perspective. Instead, the inclusion of the 
text allows multiple viewpoints to coexist and challenge one another. 
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Chapter 4 - Sāvitrī’s Tale 
 
THE GOOD WIFE 
 
Having just heard the story of Rāma’s misfortune and the abduction of Sītā, 
Yudhiṣṭhira prompts the sage to recount a tale of a woman as virtuous as Draupadī.181 
Mārkaṇḍeya replies with the story of Sāvitrī, a woman born from a dharma king,182 who 
had acquired a boon by a deity of the same name to engender a child — of course, the 
relationship between the main story and the subtales would be compromised with a 
character born from mundane circumstances. Once matured, Sāvitrī’s beauty intimidates 
all potential suitors, leading her father to request that Sāvitrī find her own partner. 
Reflecting the current location of her main story counterpart, Sāvitrī departs for the 
forest, populated by sages,183 in order to commence the search.  
Upon returning to her father’s kingdom, Sāvitrī reports to the king and an 
attendant sage, Nārada, that she has made her choice — the son of exiled king 
Dyumatsena. 
tasya putraḥ pure jātaḥ saṁvr ̥ddhaś ca tapovane | 
His son, born in the palace and grown up in the austere forest, 
satyavān anurūpo me bharteti manasā vr ̥taḥ || 
                                                
181 Mbh 3.277.3. 
182 dharmātmā (Mbh 3.277.5) — For van Buitenen, the phrase renders the king “Law-spirited” (van 
Buitenen 1975, 762) while for Johnson he is “the epitome of law” (Johnson 2005, 155) and Smith depicts 
him as a “righteous man” (Smith 2009, 215). 
183 Mbh 3.277.39. 
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Satyavān, is the right husband for me. I have chosen with my mind.  
(Mbh 3.278.10) 
While the third book bears the title Āraṇyakaparvan, translated as Book of the Forest, the 
text seems to use two terms for forest somewhat interchangeably: araṇya and vana. 
Dictionary references remain mostly consistent, but Monier-Williams reserves the word 
‘wilderness’ to entries on araṇya, thereby allowing for further untamed resonances.184 
But considering the appearance of both terms in the verse prior, we might read the text to 
consider the words on equal footing.185 With the qualifier tapas, however, tapovana 
appears distinct from the dangerous regions of the forest. In Nala’s Tale, the tapovana is 
the region of the forest inhabited by ascetics, in which Damayantī asks after her separated 
husband.186 Elsewhere, it is described as a type of refuge187 and sacred place188 — thereby 
distinct from araṇya as a sanctified region. More immediate for our purposes, the 
tapovana is described as a region of the forest in which the Pāṇḍavas are currently 
stationed with Draupadī and Mārkaṇḍeya in the outer narrative.189 Bypassing the more 
treacherous aspects of the forest, the subtale reflects the progress of the main story. 
Sāvitrī’s swift movement into and out of the forest similarly signals the impending close 
of the Pāṇḍavas’ time in the forest.  
Furthermore, we should note the motion through which the bride selects her 
husband. The expected svayaṃvara model, enacted by both Draupadī and Damayantī, 
                                                
184 Monier-Williams 1984, 80 and 883. 
185 Mbh 2.278.9. 
186 Mbh 3.61.82. 
187 Mbh 3.82.98 and 83.83. 
188 Mbh 3.88.26. 
189 Mbh 3.241.4 
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veers slightly in both terminology and demonstrative steps. That is to say, no contest was 
held to determine a suitor and the correlated phrase employed here is manasā vṛtaḥ.190 
Despite the fact that svayaṃvara can be translated to mean ‘self-choice,’ Sāvitrī’s 
selection method illustrates a greater degree of agency and autonomy, and also unique 
monologue, as implied by the inclusion of manasā. Despite Brodbeck’s alignment of 
Sāvitrī and Draupadī’s marriages,191 the phrase used to describe both the unions of 
Draupadī and Damayantī appears only within this altered form within the upākhyāna. 
While we are aware at the outset that the subtale works to align with the main story, this 
discrepancy seems necessary to maintain. I believe that the difference here speaks to the 
weight of Sāvitrī’s subsequent choices. Utilizing the term manasā as the means for 
selection, a number of translation possibilities arise. ‘Heart’ appears to be the most 
apparent choice, utilized by van Buitenen, Johnson, and Smith192 and invoking our earlier 
discussion of genre through romance and Nala’s Tale. While less resonant with love in 
our own milieu, the word manas is also connected with reflection, cognition, and 
understanding. Those externalized actions of the contest veer sharply into internal 
considerations. This alteration is necessary because the external action, namely 
Satyavān’s foretold and impending death, could not stand up to the rigors of the 
svayaṃvara structure — with logic dictating that a condemned man makes a poor choice 
for partner. Moreover, we should note that the overarching difference between these three 
narratives lies in the focus on the female protagonist. Damayantī remains a crucial but 
supporting figure in Nala’s Tale, Draupadī’s narrative primarily serves her husbands, 
                                                
190 Mbh 3.278.10. 
191 Brodbeck 2013, 451 n. 23. 
192 van Buitenen 1975, 764. Johnson 2005, 294. Smith 2009, 218. 
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while Sītā is all but objectified into plot propelling device. Fixed on Sāvitrī, then, the text 
must augment the power of her choice and thereby align it with those other characters as 
a kind of apologia depicting all three unions within a more egalitarian institution. Lauren 
Berlant allows us to consider the imagined upheaval of established structures around 
marriage as a necessary component of its efficacy. 
This desire for love to reach beyond the known world of law and language 
enables us to consider the idea that romantic love might sometimes serve as a 
placeholder for a less eloquent or institutionally proper longing. A love plot 
would, then, represent a desire for a life of unconflictedness, where the aggression 
inherent in intimacy is not lived as violence and submission to the discipline of 
institutional propriety or the disavowals of true love, but as something less 
congealed into an identity or a promise, perhaps a mix of curiosity, attachment, 
and passion. But as long as the normative narrative and institutionalized forms of 
sexual life organize identity for people, these longings mainly get lived as a desire 
for love to obliterate the wildness of the unconscious, confirm the futurity of a 
known self, and dissolve the enigmas that marks one’s lovers. (Berlant 2012, 95) 
The four narratives in dialogue here, the main story and subtales of Nala, Sītā, and 
Sāvitrī, offer a series of alternative perspectives on love and simultaneously their means 
of subversion — choices that query their own definitions. The term manas  as the 
instrument of choice here allows previously established language to fall away while 
conveying effect. It is worth noting that the construction, manasā vr ̥taḥ, does not appear 
elsewhere in the context of marriage or any other choice. The sage Nārada responds in 
protest, calling Sāvitrī’s choice ajānantyā… vr ̥taḥ193 — made in ignorance — clearly in 
                                                
193 Mbh 3.278.11. 
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apposition with Sāvitrī’s self-description and furthering the need to associate manas with 
the mind in this section of the text. 
 Finally, as outlined by Berlant, the sage reveals the ultimate mystery of Satyavān: 
the time of his death. Once revealed, the king gives Sāvitrī an imperative to select another 
suitor,194 stating that the information supersedes Satyavān’s virtues — tasya doṣo mahān 
eko guṇān ākramya tiṣṭhati (Mbh 3.278.24). Note the imagery associated with shadow 
here. The term doṣa contains the double meaning ‘flaw’ and ‘darkness’ while ākram can 
refer both to the flaw’s immanence or an eclipse.195 Both Johnson and Smith translate the 
term as “outweighs” (Johnson 2005, 218 and Smith 2009, 294) while van Buitenen 
preserves the resonance: “he has one great flaw that overshadows his virtues” (van 
Buitnenen 1975, 764). I argue that the preservation of this imagery is significant to the 
poetics of the verse and permits dialogue within the literary tradition of the target 
language, which contains similar associations, here exhibited by Alfred Lord Tennyson’s 
1830 poem, Love And Death: “Life eminent creates the shade of death; / The shadow 
passeth when the tree shall fall” (Tennyson 1911,17). Tennyson’s writing on the triumph 
of love over death can enter fruitfully into conversation here when granted the full scope 
of their intercessions as works of literature. We continue to find that the Sanskrit epic 
must move toward the study of literature as deliberately as the study of literature must 
approach the Maha ̄bhārata. 
 Returning to Sāvitrī’s proclamation, the woman rebukes her father and Nārada by 
expounding upon the nature of her choice. 
                                                
194 ehi sāvitri gaccha tvam anyaṁ varaya śobhane (Mbh 3.278.24) 
195 Monier-Williams 1984, 128.  
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manasā niścayaṁ kr ̥tvā tato vācābhidhīyate | 
Having made the decision with the mind, the thought is then speech. 
kriyate karmaṇā paścāt pramāṇaṁ me manas tataḥ || 
Then, it is made with action. So, my mind is the authority. 
(Mbh 3.278.27) 
Through this construction in which thought leads to speech and then action, it becomes 
difficult to continue to translate manas as ‘heart.’ None of our three above translators 
maintain the earlier rendering, here utilizing the word ‘mind’ for manas in both instances 
of its occurrence within the verse. Furthermore, by bookending the translated section 
above with manas, the kāvya is arranged to promote a full understanding of the term. The 
question then becomes, why maintain the translation of ‘heart’ less that twenty verses 
prior? In concert, the two verses underscore both the agency of the female protagonist in 
this subtale and her means of power. Sāvitrī distinguishes herself from other women 
through the means of her marriage choice, which we will find to resonate through the 
proceeding subtale. By emphasizing the cognitive turn, rather than emotion, the text 
presents the decision with severity and resoluteness. The mind here is not only ‘authority’ 
but also something of the primogenitor, the source of both speech and action. I argue that 
the distinction emerges here in the structure of the narrative, here squarely and uniquely 
focused upon the female protagonist. While the epic narrates from the third person 
throughout, the subtales are expressly told to allow the audience, often first a main story 
character, the opportunity to inhabit the perspective, or even the mind, of the subject. 
Transitively, the marriages of Damayantī and Draupadī are given additional dimension in 
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respect to this tale as self-selected affairs because this story allows the opportunity for 
insight into the mind of a woman committed to an exiled king. Here the subtale renders 
legible the actions of a woman within the epic’s restraints. 
To what extent do regulatory practices of gender formation and division constitute 
identity, the internal coherence of the subject, indeed, the self-identical status of 
the person? To what extent is “identity” a normative ideal rather than a 
descriptive feature of experience? And how do the regulatory practices that 
govern gender also govern culturally intelligible notions of identity? In other 
words, the “coherence” and “continuity” of “the person” are not logical or 
analytic features of personhood, but, rather, socially instituted and maintained 
norms of intelligibility. (Butler 1990, 23) 
Judith Butler allows us to reframe the portrayals of demonstrative gender and cultural 
roles196 toward open-ended dialogue on the cogent identity. As literature, the epic 
demands an inclusive and, as mentioned earlier, a type of apologia in regards to the role 
of a wife in convening a marriage within the subtale in order to incorporate difference 
rather than prescribe frameworks. Returning to the story, then, Sāvitrī’s words satisfy 
both the king and sage, the latter of which promptly departs, having fulfilled his narrative 
duty as messenger of Satyavān’s death.197 
 
 
 
                                                
196 See McGrath 2009 and Brodbeck 2009 and 2013. 
197 I have argued elsewhere (2008) that Mārkaṇḍeya and Nārada are corresponding characters, often 
standing in for each other. This appears the case within the subtale as well, as Nārada presents himself as 
something of an expert on time. 
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FOLLOWING DEATH 
 
Nārada’s departure does not alleviate all concerns over Satyavān. Now married 
and within three days of his foretold death, Sāvitrī vows to remain standing for the 
duration in a display of constancy.198 The term repeated to describe Sāvitrī’s state is 
vyavasāya199 — purposeful, determined, or intent. Her conviction is so firm, in fact, that 
Sāvitrī is likened to wood, kāṣṭhabhūteva.200 The means of decision-making here differ in 
language from the selection of a husband. Here, Sāvitrī’s choice resides more 
unambiguously in her heart, employing the locative form of the noun rather than the 
instrumental — eṣa me hr ̥di saṁkalpaḥ (Mbh 3.280.17). When Satyavān sets off for the 
forest,201 his wife’s insistence on joining repeats the term utsāha,202 which van Buitenen 
similarly translates to ‘set one’s heart’ while for Johnson the term reflects the ‘mind’ and 
‘determination.’203 Smith, conversely, renders the phrase ‘longing,’204 adhering both to the 
dual usage and feeling as object. Inspecting the text’s usage of these three terms, then, 
manas,  hr̥d, and utsāha, we can observe that the work is more intentionally utilizing 
repetition and distinguishing types of desire. Their correlation within the target language, 
therefore, might relay further nuance in the three individual instances by reflecting the 
distinctive word usage. Having convinced her husband to acquiesce, Sāvitrī requests 
                                                
198 vrataṁ trirātram uddiśya divārātraṁ sthitābhavat (Mbh 3.280.3) 
199 Mbh 3.280.6. 
200 Mbh 3.280.8. 
201 satyavān prasthito vanam (Mbh 3.280.18). An interesting distinction given their current location within 
the tapovana, again, suggesting degrees of wilderness within the forest. Furthermore, Satyavān states that 
Sāvitrī had never before entered the vana — vanaṁ na gatapūrvaṁ (Mbh 3.280.20) — strongly suggesting 
division between these spaces. 
202 Mbh 3.280.21 and 22. 
203 van Buitenen 1975, 767; Johnson 2005, 296. 
204 Smith 2009, 222. 
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leave from her in-laws, stating that her desire is to see the forest in bloom205 and thereby 
revealing to the audience that the knowledge of her husband’s death remained 
proprietary. Following her husband, then, the text proceeds by describing Sāvitrī with 
both burning and bifurcated heart.206 Paired now with the section’s earlier reference to the 
organ, the prominence of emotion is highlighted above cognition. Sāvitrī displays greater 
feeling in connection to knowing, heightening the importance of remaining alongside her 
husband though she does not have a clear vision on how to save him from the foretold 
fate. Furthermore, increased attention upon cognitive and corporeal faculties seems to 
underscore the impending loss of life. 
 Once out in the forest, Satyavān experiences a pain in his head as well as, like 
Sāvitrī, a burning heart.207 Placing her collapsing husband’s head in her lap,208 Sāvitrī 
confronts the noose-wielding209 deity Yama, who approaches to retrieve the man. In her 
resistance, Yama forcefully removes Satyavān’s soul, described here as ‘thumb-sized,’ 
via the noose. A corresponding description of a being reduced down to the size of a 
thumb occurs in the Nalopākhyānam — the snake-king Karkoṭaka, whom Nala rescues 
from fire. In both instances, the carried party is described as aṅguṣṭhamātra.210 The term 
reflecting Yama’s exertion here, vaśa, might also indicate the deity’s authority or 
dominion, pointing toward his destination with Satyavān. 
yamas tu taṁ tathā baddhvā prayāto dakṣiṇāmukhaḥ | 
                                                
205 vanaṁ kusumitaṁ (Mbh 3.280.26) 
206 hr ̥dayena vidūyatā (Mbh 3.280.29) and dvidheva hr ̥dayaṁ (Mbh 3.280.33) 
207 śirasi vedanā (Mbh 3.281.2 and 3) and hr ̥dayaṁ dūyatīva (Mbh 3.281.4) 
208 utsaṅge ’sya śiraḥ kr ̥tvā (Mbh 3.281.6) 
209 pāśahastaṁ (Mbh 3.281.9)  
210 Mbh 3.63.8. and 3.281.16. 
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Yama, having then tied him, set out facing south. 
sāvitrī cāpi duḥkhārtā yamam evānvagacchata | 
And so Sāvitrī followed Yama with distress, 
niyamavratasaṁsiddhā mahābhāgā pativratā || 
most virtuous, devoted to her husband, perfected in her vow of constancy. 
(Mbh 3.281.18) 
As we have observed within Nala’s Tale, the atypical verse structure signals increased 
emotional weight. Here the narrator underscores his original prompt by illustrating the 
depths of Sāvitrī’s devotion. We should also recall that dakṣiṇa is where Nala directs 
Damayantī, toward a city called Dakṣiṇāpatha, when he compels his wife to save herself 
following the debacle with the birds.211 Johnson points out that the south retains particular 
meaning when associated with Yama, who is also referred to as dakṣiṇapati, lord of the 
south.212 In our own milieu, therefore, the domain of death might be more accurately 
referred to as the underworld. Despite their divergent connotations, in both instances the 
direction is traveled by the wife following tragedy within the forest.  
Though Yama repeatedly compels Sāvitrī to turn back, the wife refuses, calling 
her pursuit sanātana dharma,213 the ‘eternal’ or ‘ancient’ dharma. This phrase occurs 
sparingly but consistently throughout the Mahābhārata. The primary invocation occurs in 
conversation between the Pāṇḍavas’ parents regarding a woman’s actions. Here sanātana 
dharma is depicted as freedom for women, even from marriage bonds.214 Later in the first 
                                                
211 Mbh 3.58.22. 
212 Johnson 2005, 339. 
213 Mbh 3.281.20. 
214 Mbh 1.113.1-21. The phrase sanātana dharma occurs twice at verses 7 and 13. 
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book, that liberty translates to the unrestricted Ganges, which is personified as an ideal 
woman.215 In the second book, Draupadī cites the phrase to protest her forceful 
appropriation into the hall during the dice match.216 In the third book, the construction 
occurs on eight different occasions. First, the term describes the requirements of  punitive 
punishment, then, seemingly conversely, the need for restraint. The dispute involves 
Yudhiṣṭhira and Draupadī’s conversation on whether or not to wait out their time in the 
forest before exacting revenge upon the Kauravas, to which Bhīma also finds 
exception.217 Later, the phrase is used to describe Kṛṣṇa, the first yuga, and the conduct of 
a king, states of perfected being.218 The construction will turn up again through Sāvitrī 
only a few verses later in an attempt that might squarely explain the term. Finally, 
occurring once in the fourth book and twice in the fifth, sanātana dharma is used to 
denote means of honoring a teacher, here Droṇa, and a deity, Kṛṣṇa.219 While there is 
indication to link sanātana dharma with women’s independence, which surely positions 
Sāvitrī as its exemplar, additional variation renders the phrase difficult to contain. 
Perhaps rather than attempting to pin down the type of dharma, we can instead observe 
its turn in incorporating female independence into a discussion of dharma as a whole. By 
employing language and structure that allows conceptions of independence to co-mingle 
with larger theoretical underpinnings, the epic works toward establishing greater standing 
for women in relation to men. As Hiltebeitel points out, the Mahābhārata is 
                                                
215 Mbh 1.158.20. 
216 Mbh 2.62.9. 
217 Mbh 3.13.6; Mbh 3.30.50 and 34.53. 
218 Mbh 3.86.21, 148.10, and 152.9. 
219 Mbh 4.50.7; Mbh 5.83.7 and 86.17. 
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unprecedented in its depiction of female agency, which is in turn crucial to the 
development of the text as a whole.  
Each of these women plays her part in this textualization of dharma, bringing 
home its nuances — whether in questioning it, interpreting it, raising questions by 
her silences, or even by a slip of the tongue. (Hiltbeitel 2011, 410) 
In establishing a multivalent and incorporating literature, voices of complication and 
dissent prove crucial to the efficacy of the text. Sāvitrī’s consistent framing or reframing 
of dharma, developing both intertwined with and parallel to egalitarian depictions of 
gender that arise from her narrative, but also a host of corollary societal functions, is 
complicit in the project of literature as denoting possibility.220 Returning, then, to 
Sāvitrī’s second pronunciation of sanātana dharma, it is interpreted by the devoted wife 
in association with non-injury by thought, deed, or word, kindness, and giving.221 The 
phrase is intentionally broadened to dilute particular meaning. Throughout this subtale 
and the subsequent Yakṣa’s Questions, we will see a text preoccupied with understanding 
dharma. As literature, however, I argue that the narrative works more toward expanding 
rather than homing in on a definition. 
 Though wanting to rid himself of the pursuing woman, Yama admits to 
experiencing pleasure in her extemporaneous speech.222 Akin to Draupadī’s acquisition of 
her husband when he had lost himself during the dicing,223 Sāvitrī is granted boons by 
Yama for her deft pronouncements. The only restriction, Yama repeatedly reminds, is a 
                                                
220 See Peder Jothen’s discussion of Kierkegaard on artistic possibility opposed to the didacticism of 
religiously organized society (Jothen 2014, 209). 
221 Mbh 3.281.34. 
222 Mbh 3.281.25. Pleasure as tuṣṭa. 
223 Mbh 2.63.27-35. 
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request for her husband’s life.224 Instead, Sāvitrī selflessly requests the reinstatement of 
her father-in-law’s sight and kingdom.225 In addition to expounding upon dharma, Sāvitrī 
seems concerned with explicating sat, repeating the word seven times in the genitive 
plural satām226 and eleven times in the nominative plural santaḥ227 throughout the 
dialogue with Yama. Recurring 18 times within a span of 27 verses, sat calls for close 
inspection here. The word is translated consistently as ‘the strict’ by van Buitenen, ‘the 
self-controlled’ and ‘the good’ by Johnson, and ‘the virtuous’ by Smith. Of greater 
interest, perhaps, is Sāvitrī’s own translation of the term, persons who hold dharma as 
paramount and enact the sanātana dharma as described above, as well as selfless and 
undeterred adherents to dharma. In her final explication, sat appears crucial to the 
landscape of time recently described by Mārkaṇḍeya. 
santo hi satyena nayanti sūryaṁ  
santo bhūmiṁ tapasā dhārayanti | 
So with truth the good lead to the sun.  
With austerity the good uphold the earth.  
santo gatir bhūtabhavyasya rājan 
 satāṁ madhye nāvasīdanti santaḥ || 
The good are the course of what has been and what will be, king.228 
In the midst of the good, the good do not fall apart. 
(Mbh 3.281.47) 
                                                
224 vinā punaḥ satyavato ’sya jīvitaṁ, or a slight variation therein. (Mbh 3.281.25, 30, 36 43) 
225 Mbh 3.281.26 and 281.31. 
226 Mbh 3.281.24, 29 (twice), 34, 46 (twice), and 47. 
227 Mbh 3.281.23, 24, 35, 46 (twice), 47 (four times), 48, and 49  
228 Here, a vocative address to Yama. 
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For Sāvitrī’s Tale, those persons described as sat — which I have elected to render  above 
as “the good” because it seems to more inclusively capture the spirit of the verse, that is, 
denote beings in a pure and simple state — are crucial cosmological actors. Like her 
narrator, then, Sāvitrī portrays knowledge of the inner workings of the universe. As 
observed through the earlier depiction of Mārkaṇḍeya, time and space, here a type of 
interplanetary balance along with  the traversal of past and future, portray conditional 
linkage through shared maintenance. In consideration with Sāvitrī’s definition of 
sanātana dharma, those pronounced virtues that maintain the movement of time and 
space seem to adhere into a type of lexicon: kindness, giving, truth, austerity, and so on. 
The fundamental quality of these terms calls into the question the particularity of 
Sāvitrī’s knowledge. Though clearly distinct in her actions, that is marrying a doomed 
man of her choosing and following Yama to the underworld to retrieve his soul, we 
should wonder why her worlds appear so universally applicable. 
Echoes of an objective relativism support the narrator’s earlier pronouncements 
leading up to the subtale. If we are to wonder why Sāvitrī’s words please Yama to such 
an extreme degree, I would argue that they serve to support the epic’s current 
preoccupation with encompassing worldviews. While we have at other times observed 
explicitly nuanced and contradictory modes of being, the story reaches a precipice 
through the culmination of Yudhiṣṭhira’s education in the forest and must thereby stake a 
more definitive claim. The epic undertakes the increased responsibility by leaving 
additional work for its audience, namely the development of a more granular perspective 
from a foundational basis. For a text that we have uncovered as cluttered with 
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sideshadows and foil figures that subvert and expand one another, we find the lack of 
singular hero intrinsic to the generation of meaning within the epic. Sāvitrī is, perhaps, as 
idealized of a figure as the Mahābhārata permits, and runs the risk of strict 
pronouncement in her proclamations. By keeping her words in the realm of abstraction, 
the epic might proceed unabated. For Rancière, the issue revolves around questions of 
genre, transitioning between religious work and literature. 
The sacred writer has turned into a poet, the symbol into a symbolic play of 
language. But this disappearance is itself possible only because the “promise of 
body” of the figure has been incorporated into the matter of imagination to 
identify it with a promise of meaning: a promise included in the natural and 
material language that announces in its imagistic profusion a language of the 
mind. (Rancière 2004, 83) 
The epic’s disinterest in static figures, instead favoring imaginative possibility, finds 
shape in the life of its actions rather than didacticism. The specific content of her speech 
exhibits a type of metalanguage while Sāvitrī enacts her efficacy by embarking 
repeatedly upon the dialogue with the deity. The repetition of particular concepts such as 
sanātana dharma and sat in such a way that their definitions are constantly redeployed in 
varying shades of light permits space for their wider interpretation. “Thus the exegesis of 
stories belongs to the same activity as their invention, to the same activity too as the art 
that brings them to life” (Rancière 2004, 83). It is the persistence of this primary act that 
in fact allows her to win back her betrothed. Those abstract concepts linger particularly 
within the singularity of Sāvitrī. Each speech reasserts the language of her uniquely bold 
pursuit of Death.  
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 Repeatedly winning over Yama, Sāvitrī asks for two final boons. First, she 
appeals for one hundred sons from Satyavān,229 a seemingly impossible request given her 
husband’s current mortality. However, we should recall the story of Bhadrā Kākṣīvatī, 
endowed with the ability to bear sons with her husband’s corpse.230 Nonetheless, the boon 
appears to set up a final argument. Following her pronouncement translated in part above, 
Sāvitrī makes her ultimate goal known.  
varātisargaḥ śataputratā mama 
 tvayaiva datto hriyate ca me patiḥ | 
You have granted me the boon of one hundred sons. 
And though given you take my husband. 
varaṁ vr ̥ṇe jīvatu satyavān ayaṁ  
tavaiva satyaṁ vacanaṁ bhaviṣyati || 
I choose the boon that Satyavān live. 
Your word will then be true. 
(Mbh 3.281.53) 
We should note that Yama’s gift of a boon for the first time does not contain the 
qualifying exception of her husband’s life noted above. The omission here suggests that 
Yama anticipates the request and is prepared earlier on to grant the boon. Brodbeck 
names the inciting incident and ultimate resolution the requirement for sons in two 
patrilines.231 He claims that each boon is successively granted to alleviate the restricting 
elements toward a strong male lineage, Sāvitrī’s father-in-law’s blindness, loss of 
                                                
229 Mbh 3.281.45. 
230 Mbh 1.112.19-34. 
231 Brodbeck 2013, 531. 
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kingdom, her father’s lack of sons, and her own sons by her living husband. While a 
resulting surplus of sons is explicitly celebrated at the conclusion of Yama’s granting of 
boons,232 such analysis might threaten to reduce Sāvitrī to an agent of childbearing. 
Instead, evidence within this subtale and its resonances with figures from both the main 
story and Nala’s Tale suggest the female figure more accurately works to incorporate 
difference and possibility into the imagined milieu through multifaceted and powerful 
female depictions.  
 
THE RETURN OF THE KING 
 
Yama, having loosened the ropes,233 returns home.234 Sāvitrī departs to the spot in 
the forest where Satyavān’s body was left and with an embrace, upagūh,235 brings him 
back to life. Lingering for a moment over this construction, which bookends the death as 
the action similarly taken by Sāvitrī when Satyavān collapses,236 the verbal root guh more 
accurately denotes a type of hiding or concealment.237 Embrace as concealment follows 
Sāvitrī’s initial act in shielding her husband from Yama. However, repeated at the end of 
their time in the forest, upagūh appears associated with the unique affection between the 
characters — a contact so enveloping that it obscures the individual. In his return, 
Satyavān appears disoriented, asking his wife why he had slept, supta, for an extended 
                                                
232 Mbh 3.281.58. 
233 pāśān muktvā (Mbh 3.281.54). 
234 eva bhavanaṁ yayau (Mbh 3.281.59). 
235 Mbh 3.281.61. 
236 samāsādyātha sāvitrī bhartāram upagūhya ca (Mbh 3.281.6). 
237 Whitney 2006, 38. 
 148 
period and the identity of the dark colored person, puruṣa śyāma.238 Likely at a loss for 
words at present, Sāvitrī declines to provide full details of the ordeal. Furthermore, the 
story must be recounted with the entire cast present. She instead expresses fear for the 
oncoming night and its jackals — kampayantyo mano mama (Mbh 3.281.74) ‘causing my 
mind to tremble.’ This is a peculiar position for one who has just faced down death 
himself. Moreover, Satyavān’s reanimation allows the resumed reassertion of corporeal 
language. The repeated focus on faculties and sensations within the body appear to 
underscore the dire threat of loss. Sāvitrī’s physicality reflects her potency within the 
subtale. 
Satyavān, however, is otherwise motivated to return home. Supporting 
Brodbeck’s focus on lineage, the prince fears worrying his parents over his prolonged 
absence. In his longest speech within the subtale, Satyavān expounds upon his 
importance to his father and mother, here quoting them: 
tvayā hīnau na jīvāva muhūrtam api putraka | 
Abandoned by you, we would not continue living, little son. 
yāvad dhariṣyase putra tāvan nau jīvitaṁ dhruvam || 
As you are maintained, son, so our life is firm. 
vr ̥ddhayor andhayor yaṣṭis tvayi vaṁśaḥ pratiṣṭhitaḥ | 
You are the support of two blind old people. The lineage relies on you. 
tvayi piṇḍaś ca kīrtiś ca saṁtānaṁ cāvayor iti || 
And so goes our livelihood, fame, and succession. 
                                                
238 Mbh 3.281.63. 
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(Mbh 3.281.86-87) 
This is an interesting monologue from the embattled husband insofar as it corresponds 
and diverges from the selflessness and devotion of his wife. Sāvitrī’s ordeal is 
unreciprocated here, and furthermore any concern for her wellbeing is offset toward her 
in-laws. It is difficult not to read sympathy for the wife here, who has already gone to 
great lengths to alleviate every concern expressed by her husband, but is not credited or 
given respite. Her husband is clearly unaware of the distance Sāvitrī has already traveled 
on this day. Instead, Satyavān insists on trudging through the dark forest to return home, 
displaying pronounced emotion239 while urging on his wife to partake in another 
treacherous journey.240 Once again, however, Sāvitrī bears the brunt of the task. 
kr ̥tvā kaṭhinabhāraṁ sā vr ̥kṣaśākhāvalambinam | 
Having hung the heavy vessel from the tree branch, 
gr ̥hītvā paraśuṁ bhartuḥ sakāśaṁ punar āgamat || 
having grabbed the ax, she again approached her husband. 
vāme skandhe tu vāmorūr bhartur bāhuṁ niveśya sā | 
Then that strong-thighed one put her husband’s arm over her left shoulder. 
dakṣiṇena pariṣvajya jagāma mr ̥dugāminī || 
Clutching him with her right arm, she set off gently. 
(Mbh 3.281.103-104) 
The image of a burdened Sāvitrī, in one arm her husband and in the other an ax, serves to 
underscore the extended plight that culminates in the forest. Again, the text draws the 
                                                
239 ucchritya bāhū duḥkhārtaḥ sasvaraṁ praruroda ha (Mbh 3.281.94). — “having raised his arms in 
sorrow, he began to weep aloud.” 
240 sāvitri māciram (Mbh 3.281.98) — “Quickly, Sāvitri!” 
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reader’s gaze toward the body, providing close detail of Sāvitrī’s physical support of 
Satyavān while illustrating further her own corporeality. As opposed to abstract dialogue, 
the wife’s support for the husband is now made flesh and thereby given additional 
dimension in the schema of the subtale. I argue that Sāvitrī’s act is an extension of her 
time with Yama, carrying her husband over from death and back out of the forest. As a 
type of translator, then, responsible for transporting her subject through different realms, 
it is perhaps appropriate that her own desires are sublimated against the concerns of that 
subject, namely, the family’s lineage. Moreover, this gulf between perspectives is 
pronounced in the image of the woman departing the forest, holding both ax and husband. 
In contrast, Satyavān was unable to conceive of his wife’s self-sufficiency at the outset of 
their journey when he asks her, “yāvad gamyaṁ gataṁ tvayā” (Mbh 3.281.19) — “how 
will you manage on foot?” (tr. van Buitenen 1975, 767). 
Satyavān’s parents are as concerned as predicted, requiring a retinue of attendants 
and sages to provide reassurance of their son’s safe return. Justification ranges from 
knowledge in sacred texts, Sāvitrī’s prowess, signs from animals, and Satyavān’s 
virtues.241 The anxiety of their absence supersedes interest in the king’s newly returned 
eyesight. Instead, the parents reminisce over stories of their son as a child, only 
increasing their worry.242 When they finally return, Satyavān is interrogated by his 
parents and the sages on their time in the forest but can only account for the moments in 
which his consciousness and body lay intact. The sages, however, appear more aware of 
Sāvitrī’s role in the ordeal and its connection to the king’s reinstated vision — “you know 
                                                
241 Mbh 3.282.10-19. 
242 Mbh 3.282.8. 
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the cause of this, so the truth should be told” (tvam atra hetuṁ jānīṣe tasmāt satyaṁ 
nirucyatām) (Mbh 3.282.35). At their prompting, Sāvitrī relays the series of events, from 
Nārada’s intervention to Yama’s boons. Those sages, then, become the first to recognize 
and offer gratitude toward Sāvitrī. But the appreciation remains framed around the family 
line. 
nimajjamānaṁ vyasanair abhidrutaṁ  
kulaṁ narendrasya tamomaye hrade | 
Beset with calamity, sinking 
the king’s family was in a lake made of darkness. 
tvayā suśīle dhr ̥tadharmapuṇyayā 
 samuddhr ̥taṁ sādhvi punaḥ kulīnayā || 
By you, good woman, auspicious supporter of dharma, 
the family was rescued again, virtuous one. 
(Mbh 3.282.43) 
The commendation, along with Satyavān’s earlier speech, supports Brodbeck’s reading of 
patrilineal concerns as propulsion for the narrative. But I would argue that its frequent 
redeployment by secondary voices serves more to underscore its absence from Sāvitrī’s 
thought and speech. While indeed she executes the reinstatement of the conditions to 
permit the continuation of the family line, by design within the structure of those granted 
boons, it is not her own ultimate goal.    Reconfirming this order, then, we might find 
additional understanding in her paradoxical request to have one hundred sons as her 
second to last request. Instead, considering her lack of concordance with the ultimate 
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concerns of her husband, father, and those sages and culminating request from Yama, we 
might find Sāvitrī genuinely preoccupied with maintaining her proximity to her beloved. 
Lending more credence to amorous motivations in the plot, we might observe productive 
affinity with Marie de France’s “Les Deus Amanz.” In the French work, a king is unable 
to part with his daughter, devising an arduous test for her hand in marriage, here carrying 
the woman across a difficult landscape. In the young man’s mirrored collapse by means 
of the trial, the young woman attempts in vain to revive him and thereby perishes 
herself.243 Both narratives portray love as the grounds for their divergent outcomes. In the 
Mahābhārata, Sāvitrī’s love informs her preparedness in the face of division by death. 
For the Lais, ardor brings about brash action that leaves its lovers dead together.    
Finally, though the text has established the prowess of her speech, the story of 
Sāvitrī’s interaction with Yama is not told directly to her parents or husband. Instead, the 
tale is repeatedly filtered through those sages the following day.244 We are aware that the 
sages’ interpretation of events lead them to extol the family line, making their narration 
perhaps more appropriate for those parents who share those lineage concerns. In fact, 
Sāvitrī’s voice is absent from the remainder of the subtale, instead concerning itself with 
the king’s return from exile and re-coronation. Sāvitrī is mentioned again twice, as an 
attendant to the king and to quickly convey that she gave birth to one hundred sons.245 I 
read her eclipse as somewhat tragic — having unique agency to fulfill her desires that 
initially clash with the will of a male sage and deity, only to be sublimated by the object 
of her strength. Unlike Damayantī, Sāvitrī does not undergo a transformation through her 
                                                
243 See Robert Hanning and Joan Ferrante’s translation (1978, 126-133). 
244 Mbh 3.283.2. 
245 Mbh 3.283.10 and 12. 
 153 
narrative or express particular elation at the resolution of her concerns. This distinction is 
further pronounced in an upākhyāna that squarely names the devoted wife as its subject. 
Though in returning to the main story, the narrator Mārkaṇḍeya continues to orient the 
resolution toward concerns of the production of healthy sons, stating that “by Sāvitrī, her 
husband’s family was rescued from calamity” — bhartuḥ kulaṁ ca sāvitryā sarvaṁ 
kr ̥cchrāt samuddhr ̥tam (Mbh 3.283.14). And furthermore, the sage adds, Draupadī will 
act in kind.246 The term employed to connect the subtale and main story here is 
tārayiṣyati, a causative future from the verbal root tṛ. For Smith, the phrase amounts to 
“she will save (you all)” (Smith 2009, 233), while Johnson and van Buitenen’s 
translations vary slightly in the meaning as “she shall rescue (you all)” (Johnson 2005, 
215 and van Buitenen 1975, 778). Brodbeck and Black have both questioned the tense 
here and attempted to connect that future aid to an incident within the impending Great 
War.247 Instead, we might find Mārkaṇḍeya’s allusion more immediate through a closer 
inspection of the etymological clues. I argue that Mārkaṇḍeya is not, in fact, discussing a 
type of rescue in its broader connotations. ‘Rescue,’ as divulged by the sages we have 
already observed, is aligned with the verbal root sam + ud + √hṛ,248 evoking an image of 
saving another from drowning in a lake. The verbal root tṛ is instead employed earlier in 
the epic’s main story as the Pāṇḍavas move through the forest. Bhīma offers to assist 
Draupadī and his brothers through the particularly treacherous landscape — “durge 
saṁtārayiṣyāmi yady aśaktau bhaviṣyataḥ” (Mbh 3.141.17). The type of help described 
here is precise, resonating with the actions of Sāvitrī. “I will carry them over difficult 
                                                
246 Mbh 3.283.15. 
247 See Brodbeck 2009, 538-540 and Black 2007, 69. 
248 Mbh 3.282.43 
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places, if they will be unable to do so themselves.”249 The phrase in question, 
saṁtārayiṣyāmi, renders the verbal root and act of ‘transporting’ or ‘carrying’ from one 
location to another, particularly over hardship. Therefore, I argue that Mārkaṇḍeya does 
not share a preoccupation with lineage but instead concerns himself more with the 
opening prompt in describing the actions of a noble woman and their application to the 
main story's preeminent female protagonist. Sāvitrī’s act in ‘carrying’ Satyavān is 
reduplicated in the subtale, first in ferrying his soul back from Yama to his body, and, 
more explicitly, in strapping herself to her husband and towing him out of the forest. 
Mārkaṇḍeya’s construction in the future tense points to the impending close of their time 
in the forest. He advises that the brothers will be figuratively carried over their hardships 
in that landscape by their faithful wife. That crucial measure of Sāvitrī in ushering her 
husband away from death and the forest is thereby her defining characteristic rather than 
an ability to uphold a family. Furthermore, her ability to carry over does place Sāvitrī in 
league with the translated narrator — an appropriate final tale by the sage. A translator 
provides the interwoven skein of possibility in deconstructing and rebuilding language. 
“Therefore translating is not only connected with linguistic competence, but with 
intertextual, psychological, and narrative competence” (Eco 2001, 13). Confronting the 
language that surrounds Sāvitrī’s Tale reveals an epic intent on providing the tools for its 
own continuous redeployment. 
 
 
                                                
249 We should note that, unexpectedly, Bhīma does not fulfill his promise. In the subsequent chapters, when 
Draupadī collapses, Bhīma summons his son Ghaṭotkaca to carry her. Other Rākṣasas carry then carry the 
Pāṇḍava brothers and their attendant brahmins as they cross over difficult terrain.  
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Chapter 5 - The Yakṣa’s Questions 
 
APPROACH 
 
The Yakṣa’s Questions serve to close out the Book of the Forest as simultaneous 
denouement and recapitulation, rendering the section in part through the parlance of 
upākhyāna. As is immediately apparent, the episode does not contain the same basic 
generic features as other subtales — that is, a story told to characters in the main 
narrative with distinct actors disconnected from the immediate action of the epic, though 
thematically relatable. Instead, Hiltebeitel provides a foundation for considering the 
section exceptional in its relation to the main story and subtale structure of the epic. 
To call it a subtale looks incongruous, for not only is it part of the epic’s main 
story, it is in fact unique because its listener hears questions rather than a sub-
story. In effect, Yudhiṣṭhira lives a substory, and draws, I will argue, on 
information learned from hearing other substories in his answers. I will thus 
interpret the episode as a “substory clearing house”: one in which Yudhiṣṭhira is 
tested on what he has learned so far in life, for which the subtales he has heard in 
the forest provide a fair index. (Hiltebeitel 2011, 425-426) 
Proceeding then by considering The Yakṣa’s Questions a type of final exam in 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s education in the forest, one in which he must cross into the milieu of those 
subtale lessons, my exploration will consider the language deployed through the chapter 
and its resonances within other subtales and the main story. How might a series of 
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eighteen prompts convey the transition from the forest, between frames, and effectively 
close the book?   
Initiating the episode, the Pāṇḍavas are called to recover “araṇīsahitaṁ” (Mbh 
3.295.8) — more accurately perhaps a bundle of kindling, though I prefer the expediency 
of van Buitenen’s translation as “drilling woods” (van Buitenen 1975, 796) or Smith’s 
“firesticks” (Smith 2009, 241). The thief, an ostensibly unassuming deer whose antlers 
tangled with the heap, escapes the brothers’ grasp. The astute audience, however, has the 
contextual evidence to associate the pursuit of the deer with impending tribulation.250 
Marooned in the forest, Nakula wonders why the brothers continue to encounter a 
succession of crises. The dire tone of the question is reflected in the atypical eleven-
syllable meter. 
nāsmin kule jātu mamajja dharmo  
na cālasyād arthalopo babhūva | 
Dharma never declines in our family. 
Nor do we fail for lack of effort. 
anuttarāḥ sarvabhūteṣu bhūyaḥ  
saṁprāptāḥ smaḥ saṁśayaṁ kena rājan || 
Being best among all beings, 
why have we arrived at danger, king? 
(Mbh 3.295.17) 
                                                
250 See van Buitenen 1973, 447 n. 35: “the motif of ‘the mishap of the deer hunt’” 
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Confounded by their persistently poor luck, Nakula expresses a query on character, 
action, and reward. Immediately, Yudhiṣṭhira moves to negate the basis of the question, 
stating that such a system does not exist. 
nāpadām asti maryādā na nimittaṁ na kāraṇam | 
Misfortune does not have limit, reason, or cause. 
dharmas tu vibhajaty atra ubhayoḥ puṇyapāpayoḥ || 
Dharma distributes it to both the good and evil. 
(Mbh 3.296.1) 
Demonstrating perhaps his understanding of Mārkaṇḍeya’s lesson here, and thereby 
retroactively answering his own prompts toward various sages for companion tales to his 
own misfortune, Yudhiṣṭhira appears to more firmly grasp their predicament as 
unassociated with their innate and active virtues and, more importantly, their ever 
expanding grasp of dharma. His brothers, however, resurrect a conversation that opened 
the third book urging immediate revenge on their condemners.251 Bhīma, Arjuna, and 
Sahadeva each name a figure they should have struck down in the dice match, repeatedly 
deploying the term hata,252 which van Buitenen and Johnson both render as “kill” (van 
Buitenen 1975, 797 and Johnson 2005, 283). While the dialogue does not reflect a major 
shift in positions, Yudhiṣṭhira always advocated for constancy as his brothers’ argument 
for more forthright action appears to have tempered little in their twelve years of exile. 
                                                
251 Mbh 3.25-36. 
252 Mbh 3.296.2 and 4.  
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Strengthening the link between those bookending scenes, both occur at a location 
designated Dvaitavana.253  
Finally, I want to suggest lexical discordance between Yudhiṣṭhira and his 
brothers. In the question posed by Nakula, the prince laments their predicament as 
“saṁprāptāḥ smaḥ saṁśayaṁ,” which I translate above as “arrived at danger,” 
employing Monier-Williams' definition of saṁśaya as it appears in the Mahābhārata254 
and agreeing with van Buitenen.255 Nakula’s phrase, “prāptāḥ sam saṃśayam” is 
subsequently redeployed by the three remaining younger brothers in providing their more 
revenge-prone response.256 Yudhiṣṭhira’s answer, conversely, offers a break in the 
repetition, replacing saṁśaya with āpadā, which Monier-Williams defines as misfortune 
or calamity.257 Danger as the threat of injury might cleave more closely to their state of 
hunger and thirst.258 Misfortune, I argue, aligns more with diverting trials and the 
overarching predicament of The Book of the Forest. Such calamity is embodied in the 
boa that arrests Bhīma just prior to the session with Mārkaṇḍeya — a natural or 
supernatural force that renders action outside of the Pāṇḍava’s control. Yudhiṣṭhira 
describes the snake as āpad,259 which he ultimately appeases through the type of lesson 
we see reverberate throughout these frames.260 We should also recall Yudhiṣṭhira’s 
request of Bṛhadaśva to better understand his situation through the subtale of a king as 
                                                
253 Mbh 3.295.5 and 3.25.10. 
254 Monier-Williams 1984, 1117. 
255 van Buitenen 1975, 797. 
256 Mbh 3.296.2-4. 
257 Monier-Williams 1984, 142. 
258 kṣutpipāsāparītāṅgāḥ (Mbh 3.295.15)  
259 Mbh 3.177.2. 
260 “What must be fetched for you or taught to you that will satisfy you, snake?” (tr. van Buitenen 1975, 
563). 
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unlucky as himself.261 The term utilized at that earlier juncture, alpabhāgyatara, is absent 
from the discussion between the brothers, though Yudhiṣṭhira’s veer from their 
established terminology, coupled with the resonant translations does give cause to suspect 
affinity between the misfortune Yudhiṣṭhira expresses here before Nala’s Tale. That 
alignment, then, serves to further demonstrate the type of knowledge acquired by 
Yudhiṣṭhira through his time in the forest. Furthermore, the order of declarations is 
highly suggestive. After Nakula poses the question, Yudhiṣṭhira is the first to provide his 
response, which does not dissuade the rest of the brothers or curb their use of the repeated 
phrase. As Hiltebeitel frequently points out, the act of listening is a crucial motif through 
the narrative layers of the epic.262 
Rather than offer a rejoinder, Yudhiṣṭhira implores his brother to find sustenance 
to remedy their despondent state. Nakula finds evidence for a body of water in spotting a 
large growth of trees and hearing the sound of cranes — “sārasānāṁ ca nirhrādam” 
(Mbh 3.296.8). Approaching the lake surrounded by cranes, Nakula receives a command. 
mā tāta sāhasaṁ kārṣīr mama pūrvaparigrahaḥ | 
Do not be hasty, friend. This is claimed first by me. 
praśnān uktvā tu mādreya tataḥ piba harasva ca || 
Having replied to my questions, son of Mādrī, then take and drink. 
(Mbh 3.296.12) 
My translation favors Johnson’s rendering of sāhasa as “hastily” (Johnson 2005, 285), 
rather than van Buitenen’s rendering as “violence” (van Buitenen 1975, 797). Surely it 
                                                
261 Mbh 3.49.34. 
262 See Hiltebeitel 2001, 215 and following. 
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seems a stretch to categorize drinking water as a type of violence, though perhaps 
forcible action is an appropriate connotation. Elsewhere in the Mahābhārata, the term 
sāhasa is associated with sudden and even unconscious movement.263 We should also 
recognize the unique structure put in place through that initial warning. Unlike Sāvitrī, 
who spoke in reflection of her knowledge unprompted, the scene here is more explicitly 
an inquest. The other major occurrence of a question, praśna, acting as a major driving 
force in the narrative occurs in the second book through Draupadī’s protestations in the 
hall,264 which, I have argued earlier, reverberate through the third book particularly in 
Nala’s Tale. Nakula does not take notice of the warning, drinks from the lake, and falls 
— again, the act of listening looms large.  
The consequence, pītvā ca nipapāta ha (Mbh 3.296.13), thereby deserves a closer 
inspection. The reduplicated root pat with prefix ni- might suggest a fall downward. 
Johnson interprets the construction to its logical conclusion, stating that Nakula “dropped 
down dead” (Johnson 2005, 285). Through van Buitenen, the term is rendered more 
pliable: “he collapsed” (van Buitenen 1975, 979). I have pointed out elsewhere that the 
presence of cranes suggests paralysis as the punishment endured by Yudhiṣṭhira’s 
brothers.265 Once again, we see a recycling of language as the scene repeats through 
Sahadeva, Arjuna, and Bhīma’s approach on the lake. Each receive the same warning and 
result, with some small alteration for Arjuna as he goes on the offensive with a flurry of 
arrows and thereby draws an additional question after the act. I argue that persistent 
repetition at the outset of the subtale serves to set the stakes for subsequent events in the 
                                                
263 See Mbh 3.73.26 and 27, Nala is emotional in his sudden reunion with his children. 
264 See especially Mbh 2.61 in which the efficacy and repercussions of Draupadī’s questions are discussed. 
265 See Hiltebeitel 2011, 446. 
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text while providing dialogical access to further afield points in the text. In displaying a 
pattern within and through the particular episode and epic, additional points of entry and 
connections elucidate the work. 
Hence the hypothesis: what if patterns showing affinity, instead of being 
considered in succession, were to be treated as one complex pattern and ready 
globally? By getting at what we call harmony, they would then find out that an 
orchestra score, in order to become meaningful, has to be read diachronically 
along one axis — that is, page after page, from left to right — and also 
synchronically along the other axis, all the notes which are written vertically 
making up one gross constituent unit, i.e. one bundle of relations. (Lévi-Strauss 
1955, 432)  
Concurring with the larger thrust of this study, the identification of patterns, mirrored 
elements, or repetition within the text forms an interwoven network of significance that 
can reshape pathways into the epic. More specifically in regard to the type of linguistic 
repetition evident in this section, not only do methods of construction and proliferation 
become apparent, but the epic works to connect the immediacy of the moment with 
foregrounding substrates. 
First, the question has often been raised why myths, and more generally oral 
literature, are so much addicted to duplication, triplication or quadruplication of 
the same sequence. If our hypotheses are accepted, the answer is obvious: 
repetition has as its function to make the structure of the myth apparent. For we 
have seen that the synchro-diachronical structure of the myth permits us to 
organize it into diachronical sequences (the rows in our tables) which should be 
read synchronically (the columns). Thus, a myth exhibits a “slated” structure 
which seeps to the surface, if one may say so, through the repetition process. 
(Lévi-Strauss 1955, 443) 
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In mapping premodern narrative, Lévi-Strauss allows us to conceive of repetition as a 
crucial function of structural integrity. By redeploying those Pāṇḍavas, with the 
exception of Yudhiṣṭhira, in their thirst for vengeance both within the scene and at the 
outset of their time in the forest, which then informs their repeated hasty actions at the 
lake and subsequent ruin, the reader or listener of the epic can witness the machinations 
in which the conditions and actions of these characters are intentionally guided over the 
course of the text. 
 By allowing its audience to approach from multiple angles and scrutinize those 
interconnected threads, I argue that the text is also setting its own conditions for 
redeployment and translation. The epic is constantly aware that it will not be told or heard 
once. Thereby, it establishes a lexicon that might proliferate the means of its 
transmission. According to Lévi-Strauss’ notions of myth translation as quoted below, the 
metalanguage remains so pungent that the work rejects mistranslation. 
[T]he mythical value of myth remains preserved, even through the worst 
translation. Whatever our ignorance of the language and the culture of the people 
where it originated, a myth is still felt as a myth by any reader throughout the 
world. Its substance does not lie in its style, its original music, or its syntax, but in 
the story which it tells. It is language, functioning on an especially high level 
where meaning succeeds practically at “taking off” from the linguistic ground on 
which it keeps on rolling. (Lévi-Strauss 1955, 430) 
Amending that, however, I argue that the language of the text is so well grounded, 
through exactly the type of repetition and patterning that Lèvi-Strauss identifies above, 
that translation can more effectively and expediently derive from the language of the 
work. Through redeploying its own conditions, the text itself carries over meaning into 
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multiple contexts. Returning to agreement with Lèvi-Strauss, then, the more prudent 
inspection in the study of the epic is not its original form, but rather the way in which its 
rudiments set the stage for constant representation and re-presentation. 
Thus, our method eliminates a problem which has been so far one of the main 
obstacles to the progress of mythological studies, namely, the quest for the true 
version, or the earlier one. On the contrary, we define the myth as consisting of 
all its versions; to put it otherwise: a myth remains the same as long as it is felt as 
such. (Lévi-Strauss 1955, 435) 
Certainly, we can identify degrees of successful translation and consider the possibilities 
that open and close with each iteration. What our discussion of Lévi-Strauss allows us to 
conceptualize, then, is the collaboration that occurs in developing meaning in a mirrored 
way both within different strata of a text and between speaker and audience, again and 
again.  
 
THE DHARMA KING 
 
As the sole remaining Pāṇḍava, Yudhiṣṭhira approaches the lake in search of his 
brothers only to find their inanimate bodies.266 The established model of approach allows 
us to read the variations as pronounced through Yudhiṣṭhira. First, an emotional 
outpouring267 and protracted reflection accompanies the king’s introduction to the scene. 
                                                
266 nirviceṣṭān (Mbh 3.297.2), which might be rendered ‘motionless,’ perhaps supporting my theory of 
paralysis. 
267 sa dīrgham uṣṇaṁ niḥśvasya śokabāṣpapariplutaḥ — He signed long and passionately, overwhelmed by 
tears of grief. (Mbh 3.297.3)  
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He inspects his brothers for the cause of their demise, and, finding no wound,268 suspects 
a ghost spirit or his enemy Duryodhana.269 Hiltebeitel does well to uncover the reiterative 
focus on the king’s mental faculties here, arguing a point of distinction between 
Yudhiṣṭhira and his hasty brothers. Hiltebeitel points out that the section contains 
repeated use of the verbal root cint, which he translates to mean ‘ponder,’ and buddhi, 
therein ‘wits’ or ‘intellect.’270 This usage is immediately distinct from the recurrent focus 
on manas, utsāha, and hṛdaya that accompanied Sāvitrī, though in both cases, those 
recurrent phrases will set up and guide the subsequent course of the narrative. Amplifying 
that link, Yudhiṣṭhira proceeds to wonder if his adversary at this juncture is in fact also 
Yama.271 Instead, that interlocutor is first identified as a voice from the sky — “vācam 
antarikṣāt” (Mbh 3.296.25) — and is subsequently referred to as a Yakṣa through the 
narration of the tale.272 
Having inspected the scene, Yudhiṣṭhira does not venture a drink like his brothers 
before him, but instead immerses himself in the water, repeated within the verse through 
the terms avagāḍhavant and gāhamāna273 — the former veers closely toward 
envelopment while the latter suggests the depth of Yudhiṣṭhira’s plunge.274 The act 
appears to be a protective measure in response to Yudhiṣṭhira’s conclusion that his 
brothers were felled by the power of a flood.275 Though I could find no instance of the 
terms for immersion denoting protection otherwise in the epic, they do nonetheless signal 
                                                
268 śastraprahāra (Mbh 3.297.4) 
269 bhūtaṁ mahad idaṁ manye (Mbh 3.297.4) and verse 5. 
270 See Hiltebeitel 2011, 444-445. 
271 Mbh 3.297.9. 
272 Mbh 3.296.30. 
273 Mbh 3.297.10. 
274 See Monier-Williams 1985, 97. 
275 aughabalā 3.297.9. 
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a sort of reversal from the course of the brothers before Yudhiṣṭhira. The reversal also 
denotes a self-control in contrast to his brothers, here able to to immerse himself in water 
without taking a drink. This alternate path prompts the disembodied voice to reveal a 
form, identifying as a baka,276 or crane, before providing the rote disclaimer. 
 A quick point of distinction here: while Sāvitrī’s Tale certainly appears to 
anticipate the conditions of this episode replete with collapsed men in the wilderness, a 
powerful interlocutor, and a unique protagonist bent on their return, Hiltebeitel states that 
“Yudhiṣṭhira has just heard how Yama released Satyavān because of Sāvitrī’s 
extraordinary fidelity, and also because she answered Yama’s question” (Hiltebeitel 
2011, 446). Our study has shown, conversely, that Sāvitrī does not speak at the beckoning 
of praśna, but rather on her own accord. In fact, Yama pleads with her to stop and turn 
back, uninterested in testing the dedicated woman. The interrogation that awaits 
Yudhiṣṭhira, then, is a reframing of the model established by the previous subtale. This 
variation, I argue, prevents the mirrors from reflecting too closely to one another while 
allowing resonance with Draupadī’s question, as discussed above, and thereby the 
propelling action of The Book of The Forest.   
Before acquiescing, Yudhiṣṭhira sets forth his own line of questioning per the 
identity of the voice. By means of deduction, he opines that the defeat of his brothers 
could not have come about by means of a bird or divine being. Moreover, through the 
course of his questions, the object of his speech is visually revealed and thus names itself 
a Yakṣa.277 Now seen, the Yakṣa again credits himself with striking down the brothers 
                                                
276 Mbh 3.297.11. 
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and repeats his warning. Yudhiṣṭhira replies that the good do not act impulsively, echoing 
Sāvitrī’s meditation on sat,278 and invites the Yakṣa’s questions. 
yadātmanā svam ātmānaṁ praśaṁset puruṣaḥ prabho | 
Although, o master, a person should not praise the self by means of self, 
yathāprajñaṁ tu te praśnān prativakṣyāmi pr ̥ccha mām || 
but according to my understanding, I will answer your questions. Ask me! 
(Mbh 3.297.25) 
In his circular speech, Yudhiṣṭhira again enacts the relativist outlook with which he took 
up Nakula’s earlier query on punishment and reward. Yudhiṣṭhira has heard that time 
alters any absolute knowledge, even so far as it applies to seminal concepts like dharma. 
Stating that he can only provide his own limited perspective, Yudhiṣṭhira steadies himself 
for the examination, deploying the imperative pr ̥ccha to his examiner.  
Moving into the eighteen sets of questions posed by the Yakṣa and their ensuing 
replies by Yudhiṣṭhira, this study does not attempt an exegetical understanding, but rather 
finds strands of resonance through other points of the Mahābhārata. Shulman states that 
“only the first question manages to elicit straightforward reference” (Shulman 1996, 
153). 
kiṁ svid ādityam unnayati ke ca tasyābhitaś carāḥ | 
What raises the sun? And what then ushers it near? 
kaś cainam astaṁ nayati kasmiṁś ca pratitiṣṭhati ||  
And so what leads it down? And where is its foundation? 
                                                
278 santo hi puruṣāḥ sadā (Mbh 3.297.24). 
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brahmādityam unnayati devās tasyābhitaś carāḥ | 
Brahman raises the sun. The gods usher it near. 
dharmaś cāstaṁ nayati ca satye ca pratitiṣṭhati || 
Dharma leads it down. And truth is its foundation. 
(Mbh 3.297.26) 
Immediately, we can view the intricate construction of the verse as the interrogatives and 
conjunctions in the initiating query give way to crucial terminology within the subtale. In 
so doing, the answer links the four terms in question, brahma, deva, dharma, and satya, 
as co-dependent concepts. Equally, the schema of the verse itself, illustrating the process 
of solar movement, renders the terminology contingent. For Shulman, the initiating verse 
is ‘straightforward’ by beginning with ‘Brahman’ as in effect the ultimate answer to all 
questions that will follow as the overarching concept at play. Our recent discussion of 
dharma as it interacts with time through Mārkaṇḍeya along with its deployment through 
the speech of Sāvitrī should already give us opportunity to understand the term as seminal 
here. Furthermore, we should recall the frequent associations among Nala, Damayantī, 
and truth, both as central quality but also guiding force within their subtale. Herein lies 
the crux of my reading of the section as a subtale “clearing house.” Yudhiṣṭhira 
exemplifies his education in the forest as the accrual of a vocabulary permitting 
participation in the narrative. The king’s failure to rescue Draupadī at the close of the 
second book stems from his inability to answer her question. Recall here that Yudhiṣṭhira 
pointedly sat silent in the midst of the question, which I speculated above might reflect 
his shame within the situation. Instead, we have cause now to suggest that the language 
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was not available to him at that juncture. Now Yudhiṣṭhira is provided a second 
opportunity to rescue by means of language. We are not provided with the same query, or 
type of query, however, as a reflection of the conditions of the interview. Exploring these 
questions further, we can consider how the Dharma King’s period in the forest informs 
the dialogue. 
Proceeding, then, through the questions: 
kena svic chrotriyo bhavati kena svid vindate mahat | 
With what does one become knowledgable in the Veda? With what does one find 
the great? 
kena dvitīyavān bhavati rājan kena ca buddhimān || 
With what is one who has a companion, King? And with what is one learned? 
śrutena śrotriyo bhavati tapasā vindate mahat | 
With listening, one becomes knowledgable in the Veda. With austerity, one finds 
the great. 
dhr ̥tyā dvitīyavān bhavati buddhimān vr ̥ddhasevayā || 
With constancy, one becomes companions. With attention to what is older, one is 
learned.  
(Mbh 3.297.28) 
A few points of contention in my translation. First, both van Buitenen and Johnson render 
the verbal root śru as knowledge, learning, or instruction,279 for which there is certainly 
precedent. While śrotriya is a technical term referring to Vedic knowledge, the verse’s 
                                                
279 See van Buitenen 1975, 800 and Johnson 2005, 299. 
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utilization of “śrutena” as its rejoinder does call upon the reader to unpack the term 
toward its verbal root. Considering the  possibility of the verse’s gesture toward notions 
of listening is certainly consistent with our own understanding of śru as a crucial act 
throughout the third book. To be clear, this is not to provide one layer of reading over 
another, but simply to argue that these multiple layers might be simultaneously present 
and productive in conversation with the rest of the text. We should recall the moment of 
Nala’s return to the kingdom of Damayantī’s father in which he is known because his 
wife hears the sound of Nala’s chariot.280   Likewise, Nala hears the speech of his wife 
beckoning him home and is altered as a result.281 Somewhat like dharma, the frequent 
appearance of tapas in the epic renders the term difficult to discern, deriving its own 
lexicon of meaning given the context, though I side with van Buitenen’s employment of 
‘austerities’ over Johnson’s understanding as ‘asceticism,’ the latter containing more 
pointed connotation. Finally, both the translations of van Buitenen and Johnson illustrate 
slight variation on the final answer: 
one gains insight by attending on one’s elders. (van Buitenen 1975, 800) 
By serving the elders, one acquired judgement. (Johnson 2005, 299) 
By veering away from van Buitenen and Johnson’s understanding of śru as learning, I 
have the opportunity to utilize the term here as a translation for buddhimat, which I argue 
contains necessary resonance here through the lens of Yudhiṣṭhira’s ongoing education in 
the forest, pivoting further from ‘acquiring judgement’ than to ‘gaining insight.’ 
Distancing further from van Buitenen and Johnson’s understanding of vr ̥ddhasevā as 
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strictly filial piety, the translation might leave space for the resonances of the Pāṇḍavas’ 
recent cosmological history lesson by Mārkaṇḍeya. The compound is also found in the 
description of Rama’s virtues within his recently heard subtale.282 Not discounting the 
attention on care for elders within the text, the pivot instead attempts to more literally 
break down the compound in order to incorporate that sentiment with the other forms of 
knowledge gained from the past. 
  The next two questions relegate themselves to the particular groups of people, 
namely brahmins and kṣatriyas, in order to bring about a contrastingly informed 
illustration of those factions. The verses are posed exactly the same, save for the name of 
the object, asking Yudhiṣṭhira to identify the devatva, dharma, mānuṣa, and asa of both 
parties,283 that is, their divinity, dharma, humanity, and vice. Through the structure of the 
verse, we can see that the first and third questions are designed to correspond, as are the 
second and fourth, here both concerned once again with sat, which we have identified as 
a classification of persons deemed the good or, elsewhere, the strict. The correspondences 
between the lines and verses serve to underscore the difference. Divinity is identified for 
brahmins as the recitation of Vedas, svādhyāya, while for kṣatriyas is it the bow, iṣvastra. 
Skipping to the third pāda, their humanity, by contrast, is identified as death, maraṇa, for 
the brahmins and fear, bhaya, for the kṣatriyas. The dharmas of brahmins and kṣatriyas 
are cited as austerity, tapas, and sacrifice, yajña, respectively, and their vice slander, 
parivāda, perhaps more suitably false speech, and desertion, parityāga. In concert, we 
can view these answers veering between affinity and dissonance between the persons 
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described. The text goes as far as rendering the final answer of each set of questions near 
in sound to one another (parivāda / parityāga). The final answer is especially resonant as 
Yudhiṣṭhira, a kṣatriya who has over the past twelve years heard the stories of abandoned 
wives and kingdoms, displays awareness of his own participation in that schema. 
 In these initial questions from the Yakṣa, we can observe the reliance on form in 
the creation of meaning. The verses gain layers of significance through their complex 
interaction. This interplay, I believe, is what leads Shulman and Hiltebeitel to designate 
those questions as riddles. Furthermore, Bakhtin provides causes to conceive of meaning 
as contingent upon form. 
In poetic genres, artistic consciousness — understood as a unity of all the author’s 
semantic and expressive intentions — fully realizes itself within its own language; 
in them alone is such consciousness fully immanent, expressing itself in it directly 
and without mediation, without conditions and without distance. (Bakhtin 2010, 
285) 
Bakhtin is crucial here in distinguishing the study of the epic as one of literature: the form 
enacts its content. By inspecting the ways in which those constituent parts build and carry 
signification through language and its form, we can begin to view that self-reflective 
layer of the subtale, at once incorporating and setting the ground for its own reading. 
Through this framework, I argue that we can begin to view and translate the dialogue that 
persists between verses both in this episode and in its correspondences with the larger 
text. While such a reading might render the epic more intentionally crafted than some are 
prepared to argue, instead this model might provide further evidence to support the notion 
that the Mahābhārata anticipates and welcomes its own dissemination and proliferation. 
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 Following a series of questions that consider sacrificial practice, cultivation, and 
what Shulman cites as querying the boundaries between the human and inanimate,284 the 
Yakṣa moves more explicitly to an interrogation of language. 
kiṁ svid ekapadaṁ dharmyaṁ kiṁ svid ekapadaṁ yaśaḥ | 
What one word is dharmic? What one word is fame? 
kiṁ svid ekapadaṁ svargyaṁ kiṁ svid ekapadaṁ sukham || 
What one word occupies heaven? What one word is happiness?   
dākṣyam ekapadaṁ dharmyaṁ dānam ekapadaṁ yaśaḥ | 
Skill is one word that is dharmic. Giving is one word that is fame. 
satyam ekapadaṁ svargyaṁ śīlam ekapadaṁ sukham || 
Truth is one word that occupies heaven. Character is one word that is happiness. 
(Mbh 3.297.48-49) 
Both van Buitenen and Johnson render the reiterative phrase ekapada into the more 
conventional parlance “in a word” (van Buitnenen 1975, 802; Johnson 2005, 313). Such a 
construction seems redundant as most of Yudhiṣṭhira’s responses thus far have satisfied 
such a condition, as we have witnessed the structural conditions in redeploying the 
question with only the alteration of a single word in place of those interrogatives. 
Considering also the shared form as neuter nominatives with the object of each query, my 
translation argues that the two terms are in apposition. Therein, the verse veers toward 
linguistic presuppositions, asking for further definitional access to the concepts. 
Considering van Buitenen and Johnson’s somewhat divergent take on the final one word 
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in the reply, śīla, as “character” and “good conduct” respectively, we can observe the 
vitality of context in carrying meaning. Monier-Williams cites śīla as signifying “habit, 
custom, usage, natural or acquired way of living or acting, practice, conduct, disposition, 
tendency, character, nature” (Monier-Williams 1985, 1079) and on first inspection of the 
verse there appears little cause to favor or strike out any of these possibilities. We do 
immediately know that the term is meant to be associated with sukha, happiness, though 
the definition of this term appears so elusive in our own language that divining its 
connection here might not seem feasible. Listening more closely to the structure of the 
subtale, then, we have already uncovered an ethic through which the terminology in the 
answers can interact. Considering, then, śīla in relation to skill, giving, and truth, we can 
observe a pattern of active elements in contrast to their more innate counterparts in the 
question, namely dharma, fame, heaven, and happiness. By means of this method giving 
credence to Bakhtin above, we can surmise that the translation might tend more toward 
the active ‘conduct’ rather than the more passive connotations of ‘character’ or ‘nature.’ 
Furthermore, we can recast śīla back through the third book. Toward the close of Nala’s 
Tale, Damayantī, the abandoned wife, confirms her constancy and dedication toward 
their reunion. Verified by the deity Vāyu, Damayantī is described as employing both 
satya and śīla to bring the two back together.285 Through this lens, the emotion of the 
scene in the Nalopākhyānam is brought to the fore. 
  Agreeing with Shulman’s consideration of larger structural workings within the 
Yakṣa’s Questions, we might observe a progression in which each successive query sets 
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the stage for the approximate verse. Closing above with a meditation on happiness, the 
interrogator follows by invoking larger motifs expressed throughout the subtales leading 
to their meeting. 
kiṁ svid ātmā manuṣyasya kiṁ svid daivakr ̥taḥ sakhā | 
What is the self of a man? What is a friend made by fate? 
upajīvanaṁ kiṁ svid asya kiṁ svid asya parāyaṇam || 
What supports his life? What is his highest goal? 
putra ātmā manuṣyasya bhāryā daivakr ̥taḥ sakhā | 
A son is the self of a man. A wife is a friend made by fate. 
upajīvanaṁ ca parjanyo dānam asya parāyaṇam || 
Rain supports life. Giving is his highest goal. 
(Mbh 3.297.50-51) 
As observed within Sāvitrī’s Tale, the male descendant occupies a particular anxiety for 
actors in the text. Redeploying those speeches by Satyavān’s parents, which occur both as 
speculation and action in the text, the son bears the charge of maintaining the self that has 
existed across generations. But, and I argue as particularly telling here, the stories that we 
have inspected through the Mahābhārata are not focused on the relationship between 
fathers and sons, but instead, husbands and wives. Furthermore, a figure’s happiness is at 
stake in both subtales and the main story at moments when that particular union is in 
duress. As a friend made by fate, we can understand the wife by means of the inevitable 
return of lovers, as often extolled by subtale narrators as evidence of the main story’s 
eventual happy conclusion. Furthermore, both Damayantī and Sāvitrī’s subtales allow us 
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to perceive the wife as a friend who makes fate, that is, bend supernatural powers to their 
desired conclusions. Repeatedly, we observe Damayantī subverting the will of gods in 
order to be with Nala, just as Sāvitrī exhibits the ability to contend with Death to be near 
her own husband. As Mārkaṇḍeya illustrates, the wife’s ability to carry her beloved in the 
face of fate is critical to the narrative. Within the questions here, we should note that this 
is the second time the wife is an answer given by Yudhiṣṭhira. The wife is also described 
as “the companion of the one at home”286 in a preceding response verse. Here we can 
obverse the two states of marriage as portrayed in the subtale, together at home and in 
trial outside, brought about by fate.  
Furthermore, the third answer in this verse appears at first incongruous with the 
other four. In one regard, there is no stretch in understanding the construction that rain 
supports life, but such an image stands out in the midst of a discussion of wives and sons. 
However, we should recall a masterful address by Yudhiṣṭhira’s wife, Draupadī, at the 
outset of the third book during their tête-à-tête on how to proceed in the face of their 
recent exile. The thesis of her argument to her husband is the need for industrious action. 
paśyāmi svaṁ samutthānam upajīvanti jantavaḥ | 
As I see it, creatures live off their own effort, 
api dhātā vidhātā ca yathāyam udake bakaḥ || 
as does the Placer and the Disposer, as well as that crane in the water. 
(Mbh 3.33.7) 
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To demonstrate her point, Draupadī deploys a metaphor in field cultivation, stating that 
the farmer can only take so many steps before the fate of the land is in the hands of 
another. 
pr ̥thivīṁ lāṅgalenaiva bhittvā bījaṁ vapaty uta | 
āste ’tha karṣakas tūṣṇīṁ parjanyas tatra kāraṇam || 
The peasant cleaves the earth with his plow, then sows the seed, then he sits by 
silently and the rain does the work. (Mbh 3.33.44; tr. van Buitenen 1975, 285) 
By invoking the operative term parjanya within a mesh of significance that involves both 
fate and the wife, I argue that Yudhiṣṭhira is demonstrating his attention to that earlier 
moment in the book. Rain here is presented as companion to fate, which in turn is 
brought by the wife through her effort. This active principle is further underscored and 
linked with the immediately preceding question verse as ‘giving,’ dāna recurs within 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s answer.  
Nearing the close of those eighteen questions, the Yakṣa returns to the concept of 
dharma. 
kaś ca dharmaḥ paro loke kaś ca dharmaḥ sadāphalaḥ | 
Which is the highest dharma in the world?  
Which dharma is always fruitful? 
kiṁ niyamya na śocanti kaiś ca saṁdhir na jīryate || 
Controlling what do they not grieve? 
With whom does the bond not waste away? 
ānr ̥śaṁsyaṁ paro dharmas trayīdharmaḥ sadāphalaḥ | 
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Noncruelty is the highest dharma.  
Vedic dharma is always fruitful. 
mano yamya na śocanti sadbhiḥ saṁdhir na jīryate || 
Controlling the mind, they do not grieve. 
With the good the bond does not waste away. 
(Mbh 3.297.54-55) 
Hiltebeitel cites this as a “climactic question” (Hiltebeitel 2011, 450) in accordance with 
Shulman’s assertion that here “Yudhiṣṭhira is summing up his life’s wisdom” (Shulman 
1996, 156). Hiltebeitel finds resonances of this section in Nala’s Tale. Keeping with our 
clearing house inspection, Hiltebeitel finds resonances in Nala’s Tale where ‘noncruelty,’ 
his translation of ānr ̥śaṁsya, is similarly designated the highest dharma.287 Within the 
earlier subtale, the context for the phrase involves Damayantī’s message disseminated in 
order to locate her lost husband. Pleading for his return, she invokes ānr ̥śaṁsya as paro 
dharma in regard to the treatment of the husband to his wife. We continue, then, to 
observe the importance of listening to the wife through the main story and subtales. 
Likewise, trayīdharma is divulged earlier in the form of the third book to Bhīma by 
Hanumān. Once again blurring the line between subtale and main story, Hanumān 
introduces himself with the explanation that he was granted a boon to subsist as long as 
the story of Rāma,288 though that upākhyāna is yet to be told at this point in the book. 
Hanumān proceeds with a lesson on dharma identifying trayīdharma, or Vedic dharma, 
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as one of three conditions necessary for the upkeep of the world.289 Hanumān, like 
Mārkaṇḍeya, appears to derive authority from his long life, portraying his understanding 
through a grasp of time.290 It is important to note, however, that Yudhiṣṭhira does not hear 
the lesson from Hanumān. Bhīma separates from his brothers following birds to a lake.291  
In his final question of the eighteen, the Yakṣa eschews the established structure 
to deliver a flurry of definitional examinations. 
kā dik kim udakaṁ proktaṁ kim annaṁ pārtha kiṁ viṣam | 
What is direction? What is called water?  
What is food, prince? What is poison? 
śrāddhasya kālam ākhyāhi tataḥ piba harasva ca || 
Tell me the time of śrāddha. And then take and drink. 
santo dig jalam ākāśaṁ gaur annaṁ prārthanā viṣam | 
The good are direction. The sky is water. Cow is food. Request is poison. 
śrāddhasya brāhmaṇaḥ kālaḥ kathaṁ vā yakṣa manyase || 
A brahmin is the time of śrāddha. Or what do you think, Yakṣa? 
(Mbh 3.297.60-61) 
The inquiry closes with a return. Yudhiṣṭhira is given the opportunity again to expound 
upon sat, an act that initiated the episode in response to Nakula, and within Yudhiṣṭhira 
reasoning for complying with the Yakṣa’s ban on drinking from the lake. Furthermore, its 
repetition recalls the recurrent invocations of sat within the boon-gaining speeches by 
Sāvitrī. The second section requests a consideration of water, aligned with ākāśa here, 
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translated by both van Buitenen and Johnson as “space” (van Buitenen 1975, 803; 
Johnson 2005, 311). My own rendering of the term as ‘sky’ is informed by a description 
Nala’s charioteer work, depicted as achieving speeds that allowed his car to travel 
through the sky.292 This is the second mention of cows within Yudhiṣṭhira’s answers, 
earlier described as “pratiṣṭhamānānāṁ” (Mbh 3.297.37) — which van Buitenen 
interprets as “the best of the standing” and Johnson “the best for those dwelling” (van 
Buitenen 1975, 801; Johnson 2005, 301). The term prārthanā occurs at one other point in 
the Book of the Forest, during that above-mentioned dialogue between Bhīma and 
Hanumān as the latter describes his understanding of time. Here, Hanumān describes 
what I have translated here as ‘requests’ or elsewhere considered “prayers” (Monier-
Williams 1985, 708), as a degenerated iteration of dharma.293 These questions allow us to 
consider the way in which the entire third book develops meaning through an 
interconnected mesh of speakers and listeners through concomitant language. 
To take responsibility for the language of the work as a whole at all of its points 
as its language, to assume a full solidarity with each of the work’s aspects, tones, 
nuances — such is the fundamental prerequisite for poetic style; style so 
conceived is fully adequate to a single language and a single linguistic 
consciousness. (Bakhtin 2010, 286) 
By arguing that Yudhiṣṭhira’s education is in fact the development of a vocabulary, we 
are also privy to the way in which the text guides its reader through the establishment of a 
lexicon through each successive layer. The significance of its own language builds 
through the development of the Mahābhārata to such an extent that the text must provide 
                                                
292 samutpetur ivākāśaṁ rathinaṁ mohayann iva (Mbh 3.69.21) 
293 yugakṣayakr ̥tā dharmāḥ prārthanāni vikurvate (Mbh 3.148.36) 
 180 
more or less explicit pathways between moments and frames in order to excavate 
complex reverberations. Considering its literary resilience, which Bakhtin allows us to 
arrive at through an understanding of the dialogical correspondences of language, we can 
view the epic as engaged in the practice of teaching its audience, along with its subjects, 
how the work might be read. 
Upon arriving at this final answer, Yudhiṣṭhira once again reflects the questions 
back to his interlocutor. The opportunity for additional commentary on his responses is 
left open as the Yakṣa only replies with satisfaction and a final, bonus question on the 
subject of a man. Yudhiṣṭhira’s response is interesting, equating a man to sound, śabda, 
and stating that he exists as long as the sound is heard,294 not unlike Hanumān who lives 
as long as his story. The act of listening continues to hold crucial importance within the 
Mahābhārata. Finally, Yudhiṣṭhira expands his explanation in stating that a man will be 
prosperous through losing distinction between happiness and sadness, past and future.295 
The answer spurs the Yakṣa to offer to revive one of the brothers — an interesting 
reversal from Sāvitrī’s Tale, in which Yama attempted to avoid rejuvenation at all costs. 
Here the prince has the opportunity to enact his equanimity by selecting Nakula, who is 
explicitly and rather harshly described as the least beneficial choice for Yudhiṣṭhira.296 
The king replies by exemplifying his understanding of the word ānr ̥śaṁsya as the highest 
dharma297 — his choice allows each of his father’s wives to retain a living son. His 
demonstration, then, further impresses the Yakṣa into reanimating all four fallen 
                                                
294 yāvat sa śabdo bhavati tāvat puruṣa ucyate (Mbh 3.297.63) 
295 Mbh 3.297.64. 
296 See Mbh 3.297.67-70 in which the Yakṣa is perplexed, describing Arjuna as parāyaṇa and comparing 
Bhīma’s strength to an elephant.  
297 3.297.71. 
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Pāṇḍavas before revealing himself to be Yudhiṣṭhira’s divine father, Dharma. Before his 
departure, the god grants three more boons. First, Dharma admits to donning the guise of 
a deer and returns those firesticks that the Pāṇḍavas set out after.298 Second, an ability to 
hide in plain sight,299 refracting the theme of Nala’s Tale300 and effectively transitioning 
the brothers out of their time in the forest. Finally, the Dharma king asks Dharma for a 
slew of virtues, a list of abstract vocabulary which we have found redeployed through the 
course of the book, their meaning given dimension and context over the interacting layers 
of narrative presented within the epic. Dharma replies that such things are already within 
Yudhiṣṭhira’s possession.301  
The subtale concludes with a benediction of sorts, stating that whoever hears the 
story shall live one hundred years, never act in adharmic fashion, nor be poor in deed. 
Most intriguing for our purposes, that the episode self-identifies here in three instances. 
The Yakṣa’s Questions are thereby a report, kīrti, more accurately in compound, one that 
contains power, vardhana. Additionally, the text is readings or recitations, “paṭhan,” as 
well as clever men’s true story, “nr ̥ṇāṁ sadākhyānam idaṁ vijānatām” (Mbh 3.298.27-
28). This unique ending, I argue, sets the section apart from the main story in content, 
allowing its containment as a particular section under distinctive genre designations. 
Stylistically, the section mimetically adapts a hallmark of the subtale, namely the 
summation address provided directly by the narrator to the listening party. Recall that 
                                                
298 Mbh 3.298.13. 
299 yady api svena rūpeṇa cariṣyatha mahīm imām | na vo vijñāsyate kaś cit triṣu lokeṣu bhārata || — Even 
though you will move with your own outward appearance, no one in the three worlds will distinguish you, 
Bharata. (Mbh 3.289.17) 
300 The brothers will choose disguises that reveal something innate of themselves, as we have seen occur in 
Nala’s Tale. 
301 Mbh 3.298.25. 
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both Bṛhadaśva and Mārkaṇḍeya conclude their subtales by explaining the ways in which 
their story applies to and benefits the predicament concurrently confronted by 
Yudhiṣṭhira. That narrator’s voice shifts outward and, through the tale’s focus on abstract 
concepts, casts a wider net in order to underscore the story’s application. As a subtype of 
ākhyāna, and through its cumulative relationship with those preceding subtales, the 
Yakṣa’s Questions might more firmly occupy Hiltebeitel’s designation as a “substory 
clearing house.”  
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Conclusion 
 
HOW FAR IS FAR 
 
As understood through the above reading of the Mahābhārata, the epic is engaged 
in a self-conscious and reiterative process of reinterpreting its own constructs. Sets of 
conditions, themes, and even idioms are recast in order to develop and proliferate their 
significance throughout the poem. I argue that this process is particularly effective, or 
perceivable, through the Mahābhārata’s playful utilization of genre. Explicitly cagey 
with its designations, interrogating the boundaries of each episode, the epic upends 
convention through the use of interacting genres, turning Todorov’s definition on its 
head. 
Genres are therefore units that one can describe from two different points of view, 
that of empirical observation and that of abstract analysis. In a society, the 
recurrence of certain discursive properties is institutionalized, and individual texts 
are produced and perceived in relation to the norm constituted by codification. A 
genre, literary or otherwise, is nothing by this codification of discursive 
properties. (Todorov 1976, 162)  
That double scrutiny remains crucial, allowing resonances to co-mingle within the unit 
while at the same time complicating and rendering suspect codification. Agreeing with 
Todorov, conversely, “we must understand that a text is not only the product of a pre-
existing combinatorial system (constituted by all that is literature in posse); it is also a 
transformation of that system” (Todorov 1970, 7). My inspection of the Mahābhārata, 
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reading along with the subtales and their collaborative relation to the epic at large, reveals 
that the process of transformation can intercede in a work of literature. 
Recently, Emily T. Hudson took up the question of literature in relation to the 
Mahābhārata, determining that literary-ness is defined by a process of meaning 
development rather than overt pronouncements. Specific to this epic, what is shown 
rather than told, to paraphrase, is what Hudson describes as an “aesthetic of suffering.” 
The aesthetics of suffering, which is my articulation of the specific way the 
Mahābhārata works as a literary text, is made up of five components that work 
together to produce meaning in the text. These five components are (1) the 
concept of suffering, both as a central theme and an aesthetic principle, (2) 
narrative strategies, (3) the sensitive reader/receiver (sahṛdaya), (4) characters, 
and (5) conceptual categories. (Hudson 2013, 27) 
Furthermore, Hudson states that these five components conspire together to advance a 
singular worldview, “which centers on confronting the pervasive presence of suffering in 
the world” (Hudson 2013, 27). Agreeing that literature guides readers through a process 
of meaning development rather than straightforward instruction, my own reading of the 
epic might not be compatible with an “aesthetic of suffering.” This is not to say that 
suffering is not pervasive within the epic, but our analysis serves as directly opposed to 
the notion that such force of conflict extends through the epic for pointed ends. To be 
sure, Nala, Rāma, Sāvitrī, and the Pāṇḍavas all suffer a great deal, whether by means of 
exile, concealment, or longing for separated love, but conflict as a way to propel the plot 
serves as a means to multiple ends, underscoring the artistic possibility rather than a 
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single viewpoint. Literature, as it should be clear at this point, is first and foremost a form 
of art, not pedagogy. Hudson’s discussion of the “sensitive reader” — one who can be 
guided by the text to the conclusions of a specific worldview — recalls Jean Paris’ 
conception of translation, advocating a core instruction to carry from original to target.302 
By identifying conceptual categories that work to “manipulate the sensitive 
reader/spectator’s hopes, desires, and expectations regarding central concepts in the epic” 
(Hudson 2013, 31), I would argue that Hudson’s perspective positions the Mahābhārata 
as a pointed religious work, rather than literature. Hudson’s discussion of dharma, to that 
end, finds its complicated depiction as points of transgression from a singular mode of 
being, and not, as I have argued above, a multivalent concept.  
 Concurring with Hudson again, points of rupture serve as crucial ground for 
meaning production in the epic,303 though we have found cause to give equal weight to 
moments of correspondence, as well as moments that veer between the two endpoints. 
This close reading of the Mahābhārata, guided by an interrogation through the process of 
translation in order to consider the epic’s rhetorical, literary, and contextual components, 
uncovers the multivalent relationship between subtale and the frame story. As Alastair 
Fowler explains in his discussion of genre, to the association between these two types of 
stories within the epic allow for critical reflection on the literary aspects of the text as 
“genre operates in at least three ways, corresponding to the logical phases of criticism—
                                                
302 See, for example, Hudson 2013, 72: “The fourth feature [of the text’s implicit literary theory] is the 
inextricable link that the epic’s aesthetics of suffering makes between the aesthetic goals of literature and 
the themes of suffering, loss, separation, death, and impermanence, which as mentioned earlier, constitutes, 
to a large degree, the dominant worldview of the three major religious traditions of premodern India. 
Implicit in the Mahābhārata’s aesthetics is an argument for why narrative is a distinctively successful 
genre for exposing this truth.” 
303 See Hudson 2013, 220. 
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construction, interpretation, and evaluation” (Fowler 1982, 256). That is to say that in 
apposition, this study has sought out attributes that distinguish and underscore main and 
subtale narratives through a process that carries meaning between genres, or contexts. 
The character developments of Nala, Rāma, Sāvitrī, and Yudhiṣṭhira, while progressing 
along a similar trope of loss and renewal, are given unique bent and understanding 
through their distinct conditions, which serves as much to sustain and propagate as it does 
to distinguish their individual meaning. By applying theory to these readings, not only 
has my analysis revealed possibilities in interpretation, but also provided further insight 
into the operative principles that demand a text to be considered a work of literature.304 
We have additionally sought out pathways to other milieus of literature, disparate in 
language and periodization, in order to illustrate the fruitful act of comparative analysis in 
literature, advocating in a sense for an analytical process in conversation with other 
literary traditions. 
 Translation is both critical and omnipresent within the Mahābhārata, whether 
monolingual or distanced by time and space. The epic is aware of the immediacy of its 
utterance and the means to reverberate the narrative and idiom in order to maintain its 
vitality. Concurring with Steiner: 
This metaphysic of an instant, this slamming of the door on the long galleries of 
historical consciousness, is understandable. It has a fierce innocence. It embodies 
yet another surge towards Eden, towards that pastoral before time… But it is an 
innocence as destructive of literate speech. Without the true fiction of history, 
without the unbroken animation of a chosen past, we become flat shadows. 
                                                
304 “the literary together with the critical genre can be seen as a group composition, through which 
understanding collectively deepens” (Fowler 1982, 271).  
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Literature, whose genius stems from what Éluard called le dur désir de durer, has 
no chance of life outside constant translation within its own language. Art dies 
when we lose or ignore the conventions by which it can be read, by which its 
semantic statement can be carried over into our own idiom. (Steiner 1998, 31) 
That strong desire to exist renders its verses welcoming to translation, whether the act of 
carrying original to target language or through the process of reading. As van Buitenen 
comments on his own translation of the text, his desire as translator is to “open up the 
vast literature of The Mahābhārata” and “make the text as accessible as I can make it” 
(van Buitnenen 1973, xxxvii, xxxviii). That simply stated ethic corroborates with the way 
in which the epic itself renders meaning legible across its varied units of narrative.  
My own translation above hovers around the realm of metalanguage, attempting 
to elucidate linguistic possibilities and points of interrogation, while providing a reading 
that recognizes the limitations of its own contingent utterance. As such, the translation is 
focused on retaining the pathways through which Sanskrit was transposed into English, 
i.e. attempting to remain strict to line and pāda breaks so that those steps might be traced 
backwards. Underpinning this pursuit is Derrida’s description of the recurring act in 
Ulysses Gramophone, the translation of laughter, which can only be retransmitted insofar 
as it can point to the singular act. Furthermore, Foucault’s relational approach to 
language alleviates the burden of inherent meaning for morphology and contextual 
germination. 
Language is not what it is because it has a meaning; its representative content, 
which was to have such importance for grammarians of the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries that it provided them with the guiding thread of their 
analyses, has no role to play here. Words group syllables together, and syllables 
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letters, because there are virtues placed in individual letters that draw them 
towards each other or keep them apart, exactly as the marks found in nature also 
repel or attract one another. (Foucault 2002, 39). 
I believe that an approximate step might concur more accurately with Steiner’s 
methodology for translation and provide a more realized English iteration, here rendering 
the verses into a form that might mimetically reflect the pacing and emotion of the 
Sanskrit. Furthermore, an alteration of form, pronouncing difference, allows meaning 
carried between the two milieux to eschew reduction. 
The concept of the sign, in each of its aspects, has been determined by this 
opposition throughout the totality of its history. It has lived only on this 
opposition and its system. But we cannot do without the concept of the sign, for 
we cannot give up this metaphysical complicity without also giving up the 
critique we are directing against this complicity, or without the risk of erasing 
difference in the self-identity of a signified reducing its signifier into itself or, 
amounting to the same thing, simply expelling its signifier outside itself. For there 
are two heterogenous ways of erasing the difference between the signifier and the 
signified: one, the classic way, consists in reducing or deriving the signifier, that 
is to say, ultimately in submitting, the sign to thought; the other, the one we are 
using here against the first one, consists in putting into question the system in 
which the preceding reduction functioned: first and foremost, the opposition 
between the sensible and the intelligible. (Derrida 1978, 281) 
Foucault and Derrida find cause to interrogate the structural underpinnings in order to 
encourage the development of meaning — an act that I have argued is anticipated by the 
unique style of the Sanskrit epic. By enhancing the narrative possibility through form, a 
translation might provide more explicit means of gesturing toward the original through 
the overt signaling of discord between iterations. When Sāvitrī, to utilize Hudson’s 
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phrase, disorients her audience through the distinctive nature of her marital relationship 
as it reflected back to Draupadī, the reciprocal act of comparison and inquiry by the 
audience renders the character intelligible, rather than compliant. Translation, therefore, 
must find pathways between languages while also veering sharply to each other. My 
close reading of four subtales within the third book of the Mahābhārata underscores the 
vitality of the literature through its corresponding and divergent recasting, causing the 
perpetual reaffirmation of dialogical narrative elements. 
This study of the Mahābhārata aspires to support the epic’s own ambitious 
pronouncement, “yad ihāsti tad anyatra yan nehāsti na tat kva cit” (Mbh 1.56.33) — 
what is found here is elsewhere, what is not here is nowhere else. By interrogating the 
relationship between main story and subtale, we have uncovered a system through which 
the epic generates meaning. The text deconstructs and rebuilds its own narratives in order 
to present the possibilities inherent within its own difference on a wholly comprehensive 
scale. 
The signified concept is never present in and of itself, in a sufficient presence that 
would refer to only itself. Essentially and lawfully, every concept is inscribed in a 
chain or in a system within which it refers to the other, to concepts, by means of 
the systematic play of differences. (Derrida 1982, 11) 
Not just large, but also exacting, the Mahābhārata extends this process of 
deconstruction to its language, inviting translation as a co-conspirator in its totalizing 
project. Reveling in its incompleteness, in its imperfection, the narrative renders clamor 
legible — the epic bears the lightning of possible storms. 
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ON THE PROBLEM OF SAMENESS 
 
How might we develop a conceptual framework for understanding the 
relationship between main story and subtale within the Mahābhārata? Perhaps the text 
provides an approach in its opening stages. Within the Ādiparvan, following the recent 
marriage of the Pāṇḍavas with Draupadī and the establishment of their kingdom at 
Indraprastha, the sage Nārada relays the subtale of Sunda and Upasunda.  
 The identical asura siblings set out to overtake the universe together. They enact a 
series of arduous austerities in order to accrue powers, threatening the gods. Attempting 
to placate the monstrous brothers, the gods offer a boon. The asuras ask for immortality, 
are rejected, and in compromise request that they can only be harmed by each other. The 
gods acquiesce and in turn the asuras relinquish their austere practices and engage in 
more worldly pleasures. In short order, the brothers amass an army and begin conquering 
different realms, including heaven and the abode of brahmins and sages. The decimated 
world is described equal to the destruction that marks the close of the kaliyuga, as 
divulged by Mārkaṇḍeya later on in the third book. To carry out their decimation, Sunda 
and Upasunda alter their forms, becoming elephants, lions, and tigers. The sages conspire 
with the gods to intervene by creating a beautiful divine woman, named Tilottamā,305 
whom they send to entrap the brothers. Sunda and Upasunda, having conquered the 
                                                
305 Detail, as translated by van Buitenen, on the process of the woman’s creation is worth noting: “First he 
gathered from everywhere with great care whatever is beautiful in all three worlds, whether standing or 
moving, and placed these gems, which numbered in the millions, into her body. He created her out of the 
gatherings of gems with celestial loveliness” (van Buitenen 1973, 396). 
 191 
world, encounter Tilottamā in a forest, wearing a single piece of red cloth.306 Being of 
same mind, Sunda grabbed the woman’s right hand while Upasunda grabbed her left, and 
both immediately claimed Tilottamā as his own. The brothers’ impasse turned 
immediately to violence, and the two beat each other to death over the woman. 
 The most frequent descriptor of Sunda and Upasunda within the subtale is 
ekaniścaya, which introduces the brothers and serves to illustrate them in the 
recapitulation.307 The construction is translated by van Buitenen as ‘identical resolution,’ 
‘identical decision,’ and ‘of the same mind’ (van Buitenen 1973, 393 and 398). 
Attempting to encapsulate the slight variations of van Buitenen while invoking Adam 
Bowles, my own understanding of the compound suggests the rendering ‘one design,’ eka 
as single and niścaya meaning intention, purpose, or construction. The sameness in 
Sunda and Upasunda, then, reflects both their development and internal machinations. 
Likewise, Adam Bowles’ consideration of design as a lens through which we might 
understand the relation between parts of the epic and methods of significance building, 
brings to the fore issues of sameness and difference within the Mahābhārata. Listening to 
the text, then, a single design brings destruction and self-negation. Mono-focused effort 
would narrow scope to a degree that the narrative would lose its efficacy.  
The stereotype is the word repeated without any magic, any enthusiasm, as though 
it were natural, as though by some miracle this recurring word were adequate on 
each occasion for different reasons, as though to imitate could no longer be sensed 
as an imitation: an unconstrained word that claims consistency and is unaware of 
its own insistence. (Barthes 1975, 42) 
                                                
306 “raktenaikena vāsasā” (Mbh 1.204.9). A single clothed woman in the forest under much different 
circumstances in the forest than Draupadī, though equally dire. 
307 Mbh 1.201.5 (twice) and 204.25. 
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Roland Barthes allows us to consider sameness an unworthy interlocutor, flattening 
language. Difference, by contrast, is the propelling fuel of the epic, imbuing each 
utterance with continuously reconsidered significance. The ākhyāna and upākhyāna do 
not attempt to deploy matters equally, but instead recast tropes with different trajectories, 
creating those sideshadows, as described by Hiltebeitel, that, like Nala himself, serve as a 
mark of vitality. Through my consideration of the interplay between subtale and main 
story, I argue that the text exhibits veering, to employ a phrase defined here by Nicholas 
Royle. 
‘Veering’ is a present participle and also a noun. As a present participle it means 
‘Changing course or direction; turning round, revolving’, or (in a figurative sense) 
‘Vacillating, variable, changeful’; as a noun ‘veering’ refers to the ‘The action or 
fact of changing course or direction’… the figure and concept of veering are 
linked to the emergence of what I call the literary turn. (Royle 2011, 2) 
As a potential marker for the methodology utilized in the above study of the epic, an 
inspection of its veering design, possible chiefly through close reading, proliferates points 
of entry into the work. 
‘Veering’, in fact, impels us to think afresh and otherwise about the borders or 
oppositions between interior/exterior or inner/outer. Its appearance in literature 
and other kinds of discourse… consistently seems to prompt larger questions of 
interior and exterior worlds, meaning and intention, rhythm and movement, 
chance and desire, purpose and end. (Royle 2011, 7) 
My efforts above are threaded by the interrogation of boundaries, working to illuminate 
points of correspondence, indefinite lexical borders, and discern the process of carried 
meaning between milieux. In so doing, we have found cause to allow further 
correspondence in highlighting briefly other works of literature, disparate in space and 
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time, that can mutually benefit from collaborative theorization. Invoking Pollock again, 
the application of theory renders prismatic view on particulars rather than structure 
literature or literatures ab initio.308 My pursuit should not be confused with an attempt to 
compare in order to find sameness, but rather propagate the dialogical possibilities 
inherent within the study of literature. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                
308 Pollock 2006, 32. 
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Adarkar, Aditya. 2008. “The Mahābhārata and Its Universe: New Approaches to the All- 
Encompassing Epic.” History of Religions 47 (4). The University of Chicago 
Press: 304-319. 
Attridge, Harold W. 2006. The Harper Collins Study Bible. San Francisco: HarperOne. 
Bakhtin, M. M. 2010. The Dialogic Imagination. Austin: University of Texas Press. 
Barthes, Roland. 1975. The Pleasure of the Text. New York: Hill and Wang. 
Barthes, Roland. 1986. The Rustle of Language. 1st ed. New York: Hill and Wang 
Becker, A. L. 2003. Beyond Translation. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Berlant, Lauren. 2012. Desire/Love. Brooklyn: Punctum Books.  
Biardeau, Madeleine. 1984. “Nala et Damayantī. Héros épiques. Part 1.” In IIJ 27:247-
74. 
Biardeau, Madeleine. 2002. Le Maha ̄bhārata: Un Récit Fondateur Du Brahmanisme Et 
Son Interprétation. Paris: Seuil. 
Black, Brian. 2007. “Eavesdropping On The Epic: Female Listeners In The 
Mahābhārata.” In Gender and Narrative in the Mahābhārata. eds. Simon 
Brodbeck and Brian Black. London: Routledge. 
Blake, William. 1904. The Prophetic Books of William Blake: Jerusalem. ed. by E. R. D. 
Maclagan and A. G. B. Russell. London: A. H. Bullen. 
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113-136. Zagreb: Croation Academic of Sciences and Arts. 
von Simson, George. 2009. “The Lunar Character of Balara ̄ma/Saṃkars ̣ana.” In Parallels 
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the Sanskrit Epics and Pura ̄ṇas, September 2002, ed. Petteri Koskikallio, 21-80. 
Zagreb: Croation Academic of Sciences and Arts. 
